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Abstract
This dissertation investigates three topics related to migration and human capital forma-
tion in developing countries. The ﬁrst essay attempts to determine the conditions under
which exposure to international migration can have a positive eﬀect on economic growth.
Numerical simulations show that the lower the contribution of private investment in ed-
ucation to human capital accumulation in the source countries, the higher the likelihood
that exposure to international migration negatively impacts economic growth if migration
is suﬃciently high. The level of eﬃcient government expenditure on education is higher
for an economy with migration than for an economy without migration only if migration
has a positive eﬀect on growth. The second essay analyzes the determinants of remittances
using household data from Ecuador. It provides empirical evidence as follows: remittances
and household migration size are non-monotonically related, remittances are altruistically
motivated, the size of remittances decreases with time after migration and the Ecuadorian
migrants who moved to the U.S. are more likely to remit and to remit more than those
who moved to other countries. The third essay of this dissertation combines data from the
2002 National Population Census and the distribution of the number of victims and human
rights violations across 22 departments to examine how the worst period of the civil war in
Guatemala, between 1979 and 1984, aﬀected human capital accumulation. The identiﬁca-
tion strategy exploits variation in the war’s intensity across departments and which cohorts
were of school age during the war. It ﬁnds a strong negative impact of the civil war on
female education. The 2002 data reveal that the worst period of the war appears to have
intensiﬁed both regional and gender disparities.
vi
Contents
Introduction 1
1 Migration, Financing Education and Economic Growth: An Integrated
Analysis 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 A simple growth model with migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.1 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.2 Public ﬁnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.3 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.4 Dynamic equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Solving the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.1 Aggregate income with migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.2 Physical capital and human capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3.3 Output and migration rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Stationary competitive equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.1 Equilibrium migration rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.2 Stationary prices of factors, consumption, intergenerational transfers
and economic growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Calibration and computational analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.1 The equilibrium migration rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
vii
1.5.2 The tax rate and the economic growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5.3 The migrants’ wages, the parents’ degree of altruism and the economic
growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.4 The “subjective” migration costs and the economic growth rate . . . 33
1.6 Conclusions and ﬁnal comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2 Determinants of Remittances: Theory and Evidence from Households in
Ecuador 48
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Basic theoretical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2.2 Time proﬁle of remittances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.1 Reduced form of remittances equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.3 Empirical methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Conclusions and ﬁnal comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3 Human Capital Consequences of Civil War: Evidence from Guatemala
(with Rubiana Chamarbagwala) 79
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 Civil War in Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.1 Political History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
viii
3.2.2 Civilian Impacts of the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Data and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3.2 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4.1 Baseline Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4.2 Grade Completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4.3 Schooling Outcomes for Displaced or Migrant People . . . . . . . . . 106
3.4.4 Post-War Schooling Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Conclusion and ﬁnal comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4 Conclusions 138
Bibliography 143
ix
List of Tables
2.1 Ecuadorian Migrant Remittance Behavior by Number of Migrants within the
Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.2 Ecuador: Migrant and Non-migrant Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.3 Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant
Remits for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances
in U.S. Dollars for the OLS Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant
Remits for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances
in U.S. Dollars for the OLS Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5 Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant
Remits for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances
per Household Member (Receivers) in U.S. Dollars for the OLS Model . . . 77
2.6 Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant
Remits for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances
per Household Member (Receivers) in U.S. Dollars for the OLS Model . . . 78
3.1 Cohorts Unexposed and Exposed to the Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.2 Disparities in Educational Attainment: by Gender, Region, Sector, and Eth-
nicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
x
3.3 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Comparing Exposed with Unexposed Cohorts in
High and Low War Intensity Departments: Years of Schooling for Males . . 124
3.4 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Comparing Exposed with Unexposed Cohorts in
High and Low War Intensity Departments: Years of Schooling for Females . 125
3.5 Civil War Exposure and Years of Schooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.6 Civil War Exposure and Years of Schooling: Control Experiment . . . . . . 127
3.7 Completion of Primary School Grades: Using Human Rights Violations to
Measure Civil War Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.8 Completion of Secondary and High School Grades: Using Human Rights
Violations to Measure Civil War Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.9 Completion of Primary School Grades: Using Victims to Measure Civil War
Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.10 Completion of Secondary and High School Grades: Using Victims to Measure
Civil War Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.11 Control Experiment Using Human Rights Violations to Measure Civil War
Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.12 Control Experiment for Completion of School Grades Using Victims to Mea-
sure Civil War Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.13 Schooling of Migrant and Non-migrant Males . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.14 Schooling of Migrant and Non-migrant Females . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.15 Cohorts Used in Post-War Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.16 Probability of Completing Primary School Grades for Post-War Cohorts . . 137
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Migration Rate at Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.2 Labor Income Tax Rate Eﬀect on Economic Growth for Diﬀerent Values of
the Contribution of Private Investment in Education (훿) to Human Capital
Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.3 Labor Income Tax Rate Eﬀect on Economic Growth for Diﬀerent Values of
the “Subjective” Migration Costs (휂) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.4 Host Country Real Wages Eﬀect on Equilibrium Migration Rate and Eco-
nomic Growth Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.5 Degree of Human Capital Altruism Eﬀect on Equilibrium Migration Rate
and Economic Growth Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6 Degree of Physical Capital Altruism Eﬀect on Equilibrium Migration Rate
and Economic Growth Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.7 Preference for Living in the Source Country Eﬀect on Economic Growth for
Diﬀerent Values of the Contribution to Human Capital Formation of Private
Investment in Education (훿) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1 Map of Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.2 Number of Killings and Disappearances in Guatemala: 1960-1996 . . . . . . 116
xii
3.3 Number of Victims and Human Rights Violations Per 1000 Population in
Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.4 Years of Schooling of Males Born Between 1920 and 1983 in High War In-
tensity (HWI) and Low War Intensity (LWI) Departments . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.5 Years of Schooling of Females Born Between 1920 and 1983 in High War
Intensity (HWI) and Low War Intensity (LWI) Departments . . . . . . . . . 119
3.6 1964 Enrollment Rates, Availability of Water and Electricity in 1964, and
Rank of Departments (by Number of Human Rights Violations) . . . . . . . 120
3.7 1964 Enrollment Rates, Availability of Water and Electricity in 1964, and
Rank of Departments (by Number of Victims) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
xiii
Introduction
This dissertation examines three topics related to migration and human capital formation
in developing countries. The ﬁrst chapter studies the conditions under which exposure
to international migration can have a positive eﬀect on economic growth. There are four
numerical ﬁndings associated with the eﬀects that government expenditure on education
(and, hence, the tax rate) has on growth in this chapter.
First, the economic growth rate is nonmonotonically correlated with the tax rate. For
low levels of taxation there is not enough human capital and for high levels of taxation there
is not enough physical capital. In this framework, growth depends on public education
expenditures as a share of output, the physical-human capital ratio and private investment
in human capital. When taxes are used to ﬁnance public education, government expenditure
on public education unambiguously lowers both the physical-human capital ratio and private
investment in education. The crowding out of physical capital and private investment
in education diminishes, and even reverses, the positive direct eﬀect of public education
expenditures on growth.
Second, the economic growth rate for an economy with migration is higher than the
economic growth rate for an economy without migration for any level of the tax rate. There
are both direct and indirect eﬀects of the tax rate on physical-human capital ratio and
private investment in education. When taxes increase, both physical-human capital ratio
and private investment in education decrease. This is the direct eﬀect. The indirect eﬀect
works as follows: when taxes increase, the prospective migrant workers are more likely to
move from the low real wages country (the source country) to the high real wages country
(the host country) and, therefore, both the private investment in education and physical
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capital are encouraged by the migrants’ higher labor income earned in the destination coun-
try. Therefore, indirectly this positively aﬀects physical and human capital formation in the
source country. Even though the total eﬀect of the tax rate on the physical-human capital
ratio and private investment in education is unambiguously negative for both economies,
the economy with migration and the economy without migration, the magnitude of the
negative eﬀect of the tax rate is lower for an economy with migration than for a closed
economy.
Third, the eﬃcient level of government expenditure is lower for an economy without
migration than for an economy with migration when exposure to international migration
positively aﬀects growth. Fourth, the maximizing-growth tax rate is lower for an econ-
omy with low migration costs than for an economy with high migration costs because the
former economy would face a relatively high migration rate. Another ﬁnding of this chap-
ter suggests that if the migration rate is suﬃciently high, the lower the contribution of
private investment in education to human capital accumulation, the higher the likelihood
that exposure to international migration negatively impacts economic growth in the source
countries.
The second chapter develops a simple analytical model with altruistically motivated re-
mittances to analyze the determinants of remittances using household data from Ecuador. In
the model it is assumed that an individual migrant takes as given the amount of remittances
sent by all other migrants within the same household and that migrants are exogenously
located in diﬀerent host countries. When the migrant opportunity cost of forgone household
labor income is taken into account, this model suggests that migrant remittance behavior
and household migration size are non-monotonically correlated. The empirical part of this
chapter provides evidence that migrant remittances are a non-increasing function of the
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number of migrants within the household in Ecuador. Moreover, it shows robust evidence
in favor of altruistically motivated remittance behavior and it shows that the size of re-
mittances decreases over time since migration. Finally, it ﬁnds that Ecuadorian migrants
who moved to Spain were less likely to remit and remit less than those migrants whose
destination country was the United States.
Finally, in the third chapter, which is coauthored by Rubiana Camarbagwala, we com-
bine data from the 2002 National Population Census and the distribution of the number
of human rights violations and victims across 22 departments to examine how Guatemala’s
36-year-long civil war aﬀected human capital accumulation. The year of birth and the
department of birth jointly determine an individual’s exposure during school age to three
diﬀerent periods of the civil war, namely the initial period (1960-1978), the worst period
(1979-1984), and the ﬁnal period (1985-1996). We ﬁnd a strong negative impact of the civil
war on the education of the two most disadvantaged groups, namely rural Mayan males and
females. Among rural Mayan males, those who were school age during the three periods
of the civil war in departments where more human rights violations were committed com-
pleted 0.27, 0.71, and 1.09 years less of schooling respectively whereas rural Mayan females
exposed to the three periods of the war completed 0.12, 0.47, and 1.17 years less of schooling
respectively. Given an average of 4.66 and 3.83 years of schooling for males and females,
these represent declines of 6, 15, and 23 percent for males and 3, 12, and 30 percent for
females. Our results are robust to the inclusion of indicators for department of residence,
year of birth, and controls for diﬀerent trends in education and human development in war
aﬀected and peaceful departments of Guatemala and suggest that the country’s civil war
may have deepened gender, regional, sectoral, and ethnic disparities in schooling.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 studies the conditions under which
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exposure to international migration can have a positive eﬀect on economic growth. Chapter
2 examines the determinants of remittances using household data from Ecuador. Chapter
3 investigates how Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war aﬀected human capital accumulation
and Chapter 4 concludes.
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1 Migration, Financing Education and Economic
Growth: An Integrated Analysis
1.1 Introduction
A number of papers have analyzed the link between government expenditure on education
and economic growth by building endogenous growth models where public education ex-
penditures directly inﬂuence human capital accumulation and consequently aﬀect long-term
growth. Examples include Glomm & Ravikumar (1992, 1998), Glomm (1997), Kaganovich
& Zilcha (1999), and Blankenau & Simpson (2004). Another set of studies have examined
the relationship between migration and growth by developing models where migration aﬀects
the availability of high-skilled workers in the source countries and hence aﬀects economic
growth. Among those studies, Miyagiwa (1991) develops a model with scale economies in
advanced education to analyze human capital formation for both host and source countries
and concluded that a “brain drain” will impact upon the availability of intermediate skilled
workers in the source country. Stark et al. (1998) suggest that potential migration raises
the return on human capital that will in turn raise the average level of human capital in the
source country (“brain gain”). Chen (2006) analyzes the impact of exogenous international
migration on the economic growth of a source country in a stochastic setting. The model
accounts for endogenous fertility decisions and distinguishes between public and private
schooling systems. This study ﬁnds that relaxation of restrictions on the emigration of
high-skilled workers will damage the economic growth of a source country in the long run,
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although a “brain gain” may happen in the short run. Furthermore, the growth rate of a
source country under a private education regime will be more sensitive to the probability
of migration than a country under a public education regime.
This paper proposes a simple two-period overlapping generation growth model, with en-
dogenous international migration, intergenerational transfers and human capital technology
based on private investment in, and real government expenditure on, education, to examine
the implications of being exposed to international migration for economic growth in the
source countries. In particular, this paper attempts to understand the association between
migration and the way of ﬁnancing human capital in the source countries.
This analysis depart from the migration and growth literature in three ways. First,
migration decisions are endogenously determined. Individuals derive utility from joining
the labor market in the source country. This preference captures the fact that workers are
likely to have a preference for their native country’s life-style because of cultural factors,
family relationships, and so on. According to the United Nations (2002), ninety seven
percent of the world’s population remain in the country where they were born. Some
studies have asked “Why have more people not emigrated?”1 Lucas (2005) points out:
“One plausible answer is that state controls on migration limit legal movements and even
restrict undocumented ﬂows by imposing a cost on irregular entry. More generally, the
ﬁnancial costs of international relocation can be prohibitive for many. Yet ﬁnancial and
legal barriers alone may not suﬃce to explain the limitations observed on international
migration. In reality, many people simply prefer to stay at home in familiar surroundings,
with friends and family. This last concern may oﬀer important insights into two well-
observed patterns in international migration, namely the tendency not to move far and the
1Hammar & Tamas (1997), Freeman (1993) and Lucas (2005) pose this question. The ﬁrst two studies
are related to migration to the U.S. from Mexico, whereas Lucas (2005) is a more general approach.
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propensity to move where others have gone before” (p. 26 in Chapter II). The preference
for joining the labor market in the source country plays a relevant role in making migration
decisions and this paper recognizes this fact.
Second, the paper allows private voluntary transfers by assuming that migration deci-
sions are household decisions and not individual decisions.2 Remittances have been widely
studied in the literature.3 These private transfers might imply a positive eﬀect of exposure
to migration for the source country. The ﬂow of remittances from migrants to their relatives
in the source country has exhibited a rapid and accelerating rate of growth.4 It surpasses
foreign aid and is the largest source of foreign capital for several labor-exporting countries.
These private transfers may encourage physical-human capital investment in the source
countries. Some empirical studies suggest that remittances might have a positive eﬀect on
human capital formation, Hanson & Woodruﬀ (2003) on Mexico and Cox & Ureta (2003)
on El Salvador, whereas Osili (2007), using matched data (migrants and their relatives)
from Nigeria, ﬁnds that remittances are likely oriented toward savings.
This paper also assumes that migration decisions are made in adulthood and, since
individuals acquire some education level when young, migration decisions might involve a
migration cost for the labor-exporting countries. Government taxation of labor income is
used to fund public expenditure on education in this paper. The key diﬀerence between this
paper and those studies without migration, such as those of Glomm & Ravikumar (1992)
and Kaganovich & Zilcha (1999), among others, is that while all young individuals who
received free public education are taxed as adults in an economy without migration, this
2Some of the leading papers dealing with migration decision theory are Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969)
and Borjas (1987, 1989), in which the migration decision is a function of two main variables: wage diﬀerential
and migration cost.
3See Lucas & Stark (1985), Funkhouser (1995) and a literature review in Docquier & Rapoport (2006).
4According to World Bank data the share of remittances as a percentage of gross domestic product
has grown steadily through the last three decades. By the end of the 1970s remittances for all developing
countries represented only around 0.5 percent of the GDP while in 2006 it reached around 2.0 percent.
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paper recognizes that only individuals who stay in the source country when older are taxed.
The migrant workers are not taxed, even though they may have acquired free education in
the source country when young.5
In general, international migration may imply various costs. For the source countries,
these costs include the loss of the skilled migrants’ positive impact on society and the re-
sources used to educate them. Migrants are likely to suﬀer from the separation from family,
friends, and culture, and from the lack of eﬀective legal protection. Costs for destination
countries include the perceived threat to cultural identity and the eﬀect of the migrants’
competition with the natives for the same jobs (O¨zden & Schiﬀ 2006). This paper takes into
account the costs involved in the departure of migrant workers from the source countries.
There are four numerical ﬁndings in this paper associated with the eﬀects on growth of
government expenditure on education (and, hence, tax rate). First, the economic growth
rate is nonmonotonically correlated with the tax rate. For low levels of taxation there
is not enough human capital and for high levels of taxation there is not enough physical
capital. Similar to the Blankenau & Simpson (2004) setting, in this framework, growth
depends on public education expenditures as a share of output, the physical-human capital
ratio and private investment in human capital. When taxes are used to ﬁnance public
education, government expenditure on public education unambiguously lowers both the
5As discussed by Lucas (2005), p. 16 in Chapter IV), there are two components related to the ﬁscal
eﬀects of emigration, namely “the loss of any net contribution that the educated migrants would have made
to the ﬁscal balance, had they remained at home; and the fact that education is subsidized, and hence the
view that emigration also exports the returns on this public investment”. Related to the forgone income tax
revenue associated with migrant workers, a computation study for India by Desai et al. (2003), concludes:
“foregone income tax revenues associated with the Indian-born residents in the U.S. comprise one-third
of current Indian individuals income tax receipts. Depending on the method for estimating expenditures
saved by the absence of these emigrants, the net ﬁscal loss associated with the U.S. Indian-born resident
population ranges from 0.24% to 0.58% of Indian GDP in 2001.” A paper by Desai et al. (2009), related to
Indian migrant workers as well, ﬁnds that conservative estimates indicate that the annual net ﬁscal impact
to India of high-skilled emigration to the U.S. is one-half of 1% of gross national income (or 2.5% of total
ﬁscal revenues). Hence, as Lucas concludes: “the balance of the outcomes is far from obvious in general,
and will depend critically upon the direct and indirect tax systems in place as well as patterns of public
spending across socioeconomic groups. One should not expect a uniform answer.”
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physical-human capital ratio and private investment in education. The crowding out of
physical capital and private investment in education diminishes, and even reverses, the
positive direct eﬀect of public education expenditures on growth.
Second, the economic growth rate for an economy with migration is higher than the
economic growth rate for an economy without migration for any level of taxation. There
are both direct and indirect eﬀects of the tax rate on physical-human capital ratio and
private investment in education. When taxes increase, both physical-human capital ratio
and private investment in education decrease. This is the direct eﬀect. The indirect eﬀect
works as follows: when taxes increase, the prospective migrant workers are more likely to
move from the low real wages country (the source country) to the high real wages country
(the host country) and, therefore, both the private investment in education and physical
capital are encouraged by the migrants’ higher labor income earned in the destination coun-
try. Therefore, indirectly this positively aﬀects physical and human capital formation in the
source country. Even though the total eﬀect of the tax rate on the physical-human capital
ratio and private investment in education is unambiguously negative for both economies, the
economy with migration and the economy without migration, the magnitude of the negative
eﬀect of the tax rate is lower for an economy with migration than for a closed economy. The
obvious diﬀerence between this economies with and without migration is that the indirect
eﬀect for the latter does not exist because labor supply is ﬁxed. Hence, one expects that
any increase of taxes would have a stronger negative eﬀect on the physical-human capital
ratio and private investment in education in a closed economy than in an open economy.
According to Miyagiwa (1991), there are two issues that have dominated the literature on
“brain drain”. The ﬁrst is the welfare eﬀects of migration. If the migration rate is suﬃ-
ciently small in size, it does not aﬀect the welfare of the residents in the source country, but
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at a certain level emigration is welfare-reducing to those left behind. The second issue is
the identiﬁcation of the appropriate policies to compensate for the welfare losses suﬀered by
the non-migrant workers. Bhagwati’s proposal calls for income transfers, via taxation, from
the skilled migrants living in developed countries to those left behind. Private transfers
from migrants to those left behind may play the role of the income transfers via taxation
proposed by Bhagwati, encouraging economic growth in the economy with migration and,
therefore, reducing, or even reversing, the negative eﬀect suggested by the “brain drain”
literature.
The third numerical ﬁnding of this paper concerning taxation and growth is that the
eﬃcient level of government expenditure is lower for an economy without migration than
for an economy with migration when exposure to international migration positively aﬀects
growth. Fourth, the growth-maximizing tax rate is lower for an economy with low migration
costs than for an economy with high migration costs because the former would face a
relatively high migration rate.
Another ﬁnding of this paper suggests that if the migration rate is suﬃciently high,
the lower the contribution of private investment in education to human capital accumula-
tion, the higher the likelihood that exposure to international migration negatively impacts
economic growth in the source country.
If private transfers are allowed, exposure to international migration is more likely to
encourage economic growth in the labor-exporting countries only if the contribution of
private investment in education to the overall production of human capital is not too low
and the migration rate is not too high. Given the observed data on migration rates (Docquier
& Marfouk 2006) and the empirical evidence of the contribution of government expenditure
on education (Coleman 1966, Card & Kruger 1992) to human capital formation, there is
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a potential gain in economic growth for developing countries if developed countries tend
toward the relaxation of immigration policies as predicted by O¨zden & Schiﬀ (2006).
The next section describes the theoretical model and states the equilibrium deﬁnition.
Section 3 solves the model. Section 4 shows stationary equilibrium results. Section 5 shows
calibration and computational analysis, from which are obtained the main results of this
paper. Finally, section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
1.2 A simple growth model with migration
Consider an overlapping generations economy. In every period the economy produces a
single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption and investment. The good is
produced using physical capital and human capital. The stock of physical capital in every
period is the total income in the preceding period net of consumption and human capital
investment, while the stock of human capital in every period is determined by the aggregate
public expenditure on education and the proportion of income allocated to human capital
formation. Migrants move to a higher wage country, where immigrants from their particular
source country represent only a small fraction of the total population and hence are unable
to aﬀect real wages in that country. The migrants do not carry physical capital from the
source country to the host country. Prices are assumed to be the same across the source
and the host countries.6
6This assumption does not change any of the substantive predictions of the model used here. Djajic
(1989) and Dustmann (1997, 1999) use international migration models in which it is assumed that prices are
higher in the host country relative to prices in the source country. This issue is not considered here, mainly
to maintain simplicity and partially because it would be more relevant if we were modeling return migration
as analyzed by Djajic (1989) and Dustmann (1997, 1999).
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1.2.1 Firms
Producers face competitive output and input markets and maximize proﬁts. The produc-
tion process occurs within a period according to a neoclassical, constant returns-to-scale,
Cobb-Douglas technology using physical capital and human capital as inputs. The output
produced at time 푡, 푦푡, is given by
푦푡 = 퐴퐾
훼
푡 퐻
1−훼
푡 , (1.1)
where퐾푡 and퐻푡 represent physical and human capital, respectively, employed in production
at time 푡, 훼 ∈ (0, 1) and the constant 퐴 > 0 denotes the total factor productivity. Physical
capital depreciates fully after one period. Given the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor,
푤ℎ푡 , and the gross rate of return to capital, 1 + 푟푡, producers in period 푡 determine the level
of employment of capital and the number of eﬃciency units of labor so as to maximize
proﬁts. That is, {퐾푡, 퐻푡} = arg max[퐴퐾훼푡 퐻1−훼푡 − (1 + 푟푡)퐾푡 − 푤ℎ푡퐻푡]. The ﬁrms’ inverse
demand for factors of production is then
1 + 푟푡 = 훼퐴퐾
훼−1
푡 퐻
1−훼
푡 (1.2)
푤ℎ푡 = (1− 훼)퐴퐾훼푡 퐻−훼푡 . (1.3)
1.2.2 Public ﬁnance
Labor income taxation is the sole source of government revenue. A constant fraction
휏 ∈ (0, 1) of labor income generated in the source country in period 푡 + 1 is collected
by the government in order to ﬁnance public education, while the rest, 1 − 휏 , is used for
consumption and future income. Labor income generated by migrant workers is not taxed
here. As discussed by Wilson (2008), government taxation of the migrants’ labor income
would require the developed countries’ cooperation, which implies a number of administra-
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tive obstacles. Hence, only labor income of non-migrant workers is taxed in this economy.7
Public education is provided free of charge equally for all individuals.
Government taxation of labor income thus results in tax revenue, 휏푤ℎ푡퐻푡, at time 푡. It
is used to fund public expenditure on education, 퐸푡. As will be apparent below, the key
diﬀerence between this intergenerational transfer and that considered in a model without
migration, such as those of Glomm & Ravikumar (1992) and Kaganovich & Zilcha (1999),
among others, is that while all young individuals who received free public education are
taxed as adults in an economy without migration, in this model only individuals who stay
in the source country when older are taxed. The migrant workers are not taxed, even
though they acquired free education in the source country when young. To the best of
our understanding, the cost of educating migrant workers has not been taken into account
before in the literature on migration and economic growth. Here it is assumed that the
government budget is balanced in each time period 푡,
퐸푡 = 휏푤
ℎ
푡퐻푡. (1.4)
1.2.3 Households
In every period a generation consists of a continuum of cohesive social groups or households
(i.e. extended families) of measure 1 and each of these social groups is endowed with
one unit of labor supply (i.e. 푙 = 1). Each household across generations is composed of
the same number of parents and the same number of children. This assumption means
that there is no population growth. Individuals within households live for two periods.
Individuals within, as well as across, generations are identical in their preferences and innate
abilities. Preferences of individuals who are born in period 푡 are deﬁned over second period
7Mirrlees (1982) examines a nonlinear income tax model in which both residents and emigrants are taxed.
He ﬁnds that emigrants should be taxed at relatively high rates.
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consumption, 푐푡+1, a transfer to their oﬀspring used to ﬁnance physical capital investment,
푏푡+1, a transfer to their oﬀspring used to ﬁnance private investment in education, 푒푡+1,
8
and, given the fact that people generally prefer living in their country of origin, a joy of
living in the source country in the second period of life, 푙ℎ,푡+1. Preferences are represented
by a log-linear utility function
푢푡 = (1− 휃 − 휇) ln 푐푡+1 + 휃 ln 푒푡+1 + 휇 ln 푏푡+1 + 휂 ln 푙ℎ푡+1, (1.5)
where 휃, 휇 ∈ (0, 1). The preference for joining the labor force in the source country captures
the fact that workers are likely to have a preference for their native country’s life-style
because of cultural factors, family relationships, and so on.9
In period 푡 individuals receive two types of transfers, 푏푡 and 푒푡, and acquire human
capital. In this model parents decide the allocations of human capital investment, 푒푡, and
physical capital investment, 푏푡, to their oﬀspring. As noted by Glomm (1997), in many
developing countries the number of years school is attended is very low. Hence, if a child
attends school for few years one might assume that the relevant educational choices are made
by the parent and not by the child.10 Notice also that ﬁrst period consumption may be
thought of as part of the consumption of the parent. Individuals devote their ﬁrst period to
the acquisition of human capital. Individuals within a household equally share the amounts
they inherit from their preceding generation. In the second period of their lives individuals
join the labor market, either as migrant workers or non-migrant workers, allocating the
8This form of altruistic bequest motive (i.e. “joy of giving”) is the common form in the recent literature on
income distribution and growth. Under the form of “joy of giving”, individuals simply allocate their wealth
optimally between their own consumption and bequests to their oﬀspring. This approach is supported
empirically by Altonji et al. (1997).
9An alternative way of introducing these preferences for living and working in the source country is to
apply a discount factor, 0 < 휅 < 1, to the host country wage rate when comparing it with the source country
wage rate (Stark et al. 1998, Docquier & Rapoport 2006).
10I conjecture that qualitative results would remain intact if parents endow a total transfer, 푇푡, and then
the children allocate the total transfer 푇푡 between human capital investment and savings in the ﬁrst period.
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resulting labor income, along with their return on capital, between consumption and the
two types of transfers to their children. Hence, migrant workers and non-migrant workers
within the same household behave altruistically toward their children within the household.
The amount of productive human capital (measured in eﬃciency units of labor), which is
available to an individual in the second period of her life, is an increasing function of the
real government expenditure on education, 퐸푡 > 0, and of the amount that a household
chooses to allocate to human capital accumulation, 푒푡 > 0. The number of eﬃciency units
of human capital of each member of generation 푡 in period 푡+ 1, ℎ푡+1, is given by:
ℎ푡+1 = 퐵푒
훿
푡퐸
1−훿
푡 , (1.6)
where 퐵 > 0 is a constant.11
The labor supply of a household which is exposed to international migration in period
푡 is 1 = 푙ℎ,푡 + 푙푚,푡, where 푙ℎ,푡 > 0 represents the fraction (and the number) of individuals
from this household in the source country and 푙푚,푡 ≥ 0 denotes the fraction (and the num-
ber) of workers from the same household in the host country. In this model zero ﬁnancial
migration costs is assumed and therefore all the ﬁrst period household income is allocated
between human and physical capital investment. Including ﬁnancial migration costs would
not aﬀect the main ﬁndings of this basic model. Sjaastad (1962) distinguishes two types
of private migration costs: the out-of-pocket or ﬁnancial costs and the non-money costs
(forgone earnings and “psychic” or “subjective” costs of changing one’s environment). In
this paper the forgone earnings costs are internalized by assuming that migration decisions
are household decisions, whereas the “subjective” costs are incorporated indirectly in the
preferences of living in the source country. In the second period of life, members of genera-
11As follows from the human capital production function, human capital accumulation is active in 푡 + 1
as long as 푒푡 > 0 and 휏푡 ∈ (0, 1).
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tion 푡 join the labor force as either non-migrants in the source country or migrant workers
in the host country. Non-migrant workers earn the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor,
푤ℎ푡+1, and migrant workers earn the exogenous constant wage rate, 푤
푚.12 The host country
wage rate, 푤푚, is deﬁned net of any migration-related costs and taxes in the host country.
The interpretation of the assumption that the host country wage rate is exogenous is that
the source country is small in the sense that it has only a negligible impact on wages in the
host country. In addition, a household derives income from capital ownership, 푏푡(1 + 푟푡+1).
The household’s second-period income, 퐼푡+1, is hence
퐼푡+1 = (1− 휏)(1− 푙푚,푡+1)푤ℎ푡+1ℎ푡+1 + 푙푚,푡+1푤푚ℎ푡+1 + 푏푡(1 + 푟푡+1). (1.7)
Real wages in the host country is independent of migration, while real wages in the source
country is positively associated with the migration rate. Mishra (2007) uses data from the
U.S. and the Mexico Population Census (1970-2000) to investigate the impact of interna-
tional migration on wages in Mexico and ﬁnds that emigration has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on Mexican wages: a 10 percent decrease in the number of Mexican workers due to
emigration in a skill group increases the average wage in that skill group in Mexico by 4
percent. Notice also that we assume that human capital is perfectly transferable between
the source country and the host country and all earnings in the foreign country go into the
household’s income.13
12Even though the real wages in the host country are assumed constant, as will be seen later, the conver-
gence of wages across the source countries and the host countries does not occur in this model because of the
individuals’ preference for joining the labor market in the source country. Here, the wage rate per eﬃciency
unit of labor in the host country is assumed constant for simplicity, but if this assumption is modiﬁed so
that it can grow constantly over time, the main ﬁndings of this paper would remain unchanged.
13Under the assumption that labor income is always higher in the host country than in the source country,
assuming that human capital is partially transferable would not alter the main results of this paper, but
would complicate the solution of the model. One also might assume that only a fraction, △ ∈ [0, 1], of
labor income in the host country goes into the household’s income, but it would not aﬀect the qualitative
predictions of this paper because, as will be apparent later, this is just a scale parameter. In addition, notice
that 푐푡+1 denotes the household consumption, which includes the migrant and the non-migrant consumption.
This is possible because prices are assumed to be the same across the source and the host countries.
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The household problem is to allocate second period income between consumption, 푐푡+1,
and transfers to the oﬀspring, 푏푡+1 and 푒푡+1, so as to solve the following maximization
problem (P1):
푣푡 = 푀푎푥{푐푡+1,푒푡+1,푏푡+1,푙푚,푡+1} (1− 휃 − 휇) ln 푐푡+1 + 휃 ln 푒푡+1 + 휇 ln 푏푡+1 + 휂 ln(1− 푙푚푡+1)
푠.푡.
푐푡+1 + 푒푡+1 + 푏푡+1 = (1− 휏)(1− 푙푚,푡+1)푤ℎ푡+1ℎ푡+1 + 푙푚,푡+1푤푚ℎ푡+1 + 푏푡(1 + 푟푡+1),
ℎ푡+1 = 퐵푒
훿
푡퐸
1−훿
푡 ,
given {휏, 퐸푡, 푒푡, 푤ℎ푡+1, 푤푚}.
1.2.4 Dynamic equilibrium
Given the initial transfers, 푏0 and 푒0, a dynamic competitive equilibrium is a collection of the
sequences of individual household decisions {푒푡+1, 푏푡+1, 푐푡+1, 푙푚,푡+1, ℎ푡+1}∞푡=0, the sequences
of aggregate amounts of physical capital and eﬀective labor {퐾푡, 퐻푡}∞푡=0, the sequences of
factor prices {푤ℎ푡 , 1+푟푡+1}∞푡=0, and the sequence of real government expenditure on education
{퐸푡}∞푡=0 such that:
1. For each 푡 = 0, 1, . . . , the collection {푒푡+1, 푏푡+1, 푐푡+1, ℎ푡+1, 푙푚,푡+1} solves the individual
household maximization problem (P1),
2. Capital markets clear, so the aggregate stocks of physical and human capital are given,
respectively, by the following relationships:
퐾푡+1 = 푏푡 (1.8)
퐻푡 = (1− 푙푚,푡)ℎ푡, (1.9)
3. Factor markets are competitive, hence according to equations (3.2) and (2.3) the factor
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prices are determined by their marginal products:
1 + 푟푡 = 훼퐴퐾
훼−1
푡 [(1− 푙푚,푡)ℎ푡]1−훼, (1.10)
푤ℎ푡 = (1− 훼)퐴퐾훼푡 [(1− 푙푚,푡)ℎ푡]−훼, (1.11)
4. Government expenditure per young individual on education is determined according
to the following relationship:
퐸푡 = 휏푡(1− 훼)푦푡. (1.12)
Since physical capital is completely depreciated and the migrant workers do not carry phys-
ical capital from the source country to the host country, expression (2.8) is the right equi-
librium condition for this economy.14
1.3 Solving the model
Maximizing P1 with respect to 푐푡+1, 푒푡+1, 푏푡+1 and 푙푚,푡+1 gives the optimal consumption
and optimal transfers, 푒푡+1 and 푏푡+1, of generation 푡,
푐푡+1 = (1− 휃 − 휇)[(1− 휏)(1− 푙푚,푡+1)푤ℎ푡+1ℎ푡+1 + 푙푚,푡+1푤푚ℎ푡+1 + 푏푡(1 + 푟푡+1)], (1.13)
푒푡+1 = 휃[(1− 휏)(1− 푙푚,푡+1)푤ℎ푡+1ℎ푡+1 + 푙푚,푡+1푤푚ℎ푡+1 + 푏푡(1 + 푟푡+1)], (1.14)
푏푡+1 = 휇[(1− 휏)(1− 푙푚,푡+1)푤ℎ푡+1ℎ푡+1 + 푙푚,푡+1푤푚ℎ푡+1 + 푏푡(1 + 푟푡+1)], (1.15)
and the following relationship:
휂
1− 푙푚,푡+1 =
푤푚ℎ푡+1 − (1− 휏)푤ℎ푡+1ℎ푡+1
[(1− 휏)(1− 푙푚,푡+1)푤ℎ푡+1ℎ푡+1 + 푙푚,푡+1푤푚ℎ푡+1 + 푏푡(1 + 푟푡+1)]
, (1.16)
which at equilibrium determines the migration rate in period 푡+ 1.
14Similar to Galor et al. (2009), in this model it is assumed that the parents care about the physical
capital ownership of their oﬀspring. Equilibrium condition (2.8) is analogous to the standard capital market
equilibrium condition, namely that the aggregate savings in the current period are equal to the aggregate
physical capital in the next period. The diﬀerence here is that the income allocation decision to physical
capital is made by parents instead of the younger generation. As will be apparent later, the aggregate level
of intergenerational transfers, 푏푡+1, is a fraction 휇 of the aggregate income in the period 푡+ 1.
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1.3.1 Aggregate income with migration
Substituting expressions (2.10) and (2.11) and using equilibrium condition (2.8) into (1.16)
one obtains
[(1 + 휂)(1− 휏)(1− 훼) + 훼휂]푦푡+1 = 푤푚ℎ푡+1 − (1 + 휂)푤푚푙푚,푡+1ℎ푡+1, (1.17)
solving for labor income in the host country:
푤푚ℎ푡+1 =
[(1 + 휂)(1− 휏)(1− 훼) + 훼휂]
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡+1 푦푡+1. (1.18)
Let 퐼˜푡+1 be the aggregate income (total income generated in the source country plus labor
income generated in the host country), after some algebraic manipulations, equilibrium
conditions (2.10) and (1.14) and expressions (1.18) and (2.7) yield aggregate income with
migration, 퐼˜푡+1, as a function of income generated in the source country, 푦푡+1, and the
migration rate, 푙푚,푡+1:
퐼˜푡+1 =
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡+1
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡+1
]
푦푡+1. (1.19)
Notice that if 푙푚,푡+1 = 0 in (1.19), it simpliﬁes to aggregate income of an economy without
migration (closed economy). Hence, (1.19) summarizes the two main income sources in the
labor-exporting countries, namely the labor income generated abroad by migrant workers
and the income (labor and physical capital ownership) generated domestically by non-
migrant agents.15 The aggregate income, 퐼˜푡+1, is indirectly associated, throughout 푙푚,푡+1,
with the host country real wages, 푤푚. This implicit association will be apparent below.16
15Notice that (1.19) can be written as 퐼˜푡+1 =
(
[1− 휏(1− 훼)] + 푙푚,푡+1 [(1+휂)(1−휏)(1−훼)+훼휂]1−(1+휂)푙푚,푡+1
)
푦푡+1, where
the ﬁrst term inside the brackets is the proportion of income net of taxes generated by non-migrant agents
and the second term is the proportion of income generated abroad by migrant workers.
16See expression (1.26). Henceforth, the expressions that depend on the migration rate, 푙푚,푡+1, also
indirectly depend on the host country real wages, 푤푚.
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1.3.2 Physical capital and human capital
The aggregate level of intergenerational capital transfer in period 푡, as follows from (1.15)
and using equilibrium conditions (2.8)-(2.11), is a fraction 휇 of the aggregate level of income
퐼˜푡. The capital stock in period 푡+ 1, 퐾푡+1, is therefore
퐾푡+1 = 휇
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡
]
푦푡, (1.20)
which is independent of the migration rate in period 푡 + 1, but it depends on the migra-
tion rate in period 푡, in which the household decisions are made. The government’s real
expenditure on education per young individual in period 푡, 퐸푡, is given by (2.12), whereas,
as follows from (1.16) and using equilibrium conditions (2.8)-(2.11), the private investment
in education, 푒푡, is a fraction 휃 of the aggregate level of income 퐼˜푡. The private investment
in education in the source country in period 푡+ 1 is hence
푒푡 = 휃
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡
]
푦푡, (1.21)
which is independent of the migration in period 푡+ 1, but dependent on the migration deci-
sion in period 푡. The key diﬀerence between this economy with migration (open economy)
and an economy without migration (closed economy) is that while in a closed economy both
the public expenditure on education, 퐸푡, and the private investment in education, 푒푡, are
correlated only with the aggregate income in period 푡, 푦푡, in an open economy the pub-
lic education expenditure is correlated only with aggregate income generated in the source
country, 푦푡, and the private investment in education is correlated with the aggregate income
generated domestically, 푦푡, and with the migration rate, 푙푚,푡.
The individual stock of human capital available in period 푡+ 1, ℎ푡+1, is therefore
ℎ푡+1 = 퐵
[
휃
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡
]훿
[휏(1− 훼)]1−훿푦푡. (1.22)
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Notice that if 푙푚,푡 = 0 in (1.22), it simpliﬁes to the law of motion of human capital of a
closed economy.
1.3.3 Output and migration rate
As follows from (1.20) and (1.22), output in period 푡+1, 푦푡+1 = 퐴(1− 푙푚,푡+1)1−훼퐾훼푡+1ℎ1−훼푡+1 ,
is
푦푡+1 = 퐴˜휏
(1−훼)(1−훿)(1− 푙푚,푡+1)1−훼
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡
]훼+훿(1−훼)
푦푡, (1.23)
where 퐴˜ ≡ 퐴퐵1−훼휇훼휃훿(1−훼)(1 − 훼)(1−훼)(1−훿). Notice that output, 푦푡+1, depends on the
migration rate in period 푡 + 1, 푙푚,푡+1. Hence, we need to ﬁnd an expression of 푙푚,푡+1 in
terms of predetermined variables. As follows from (1.20) and (1.22), the individual physical-
human capital ratio, 푘푡+1 ≡ 퐾푡+1/ℎ푡+1, is
푘푡+1 = 퐵˜
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡
[1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡]휏
]1−훿
, (1.24)
where 퐵˜ ≡ 휇
퐵휃훿(1−훼)(1−훿) . Since 푦푡+1 = 퐴(1 − 푙푚,푡+1)1−훼ℎ푡+1푘훼푡+1, (1.18) can be rewritten
as: [
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡+1
(1− 푙푚,푡+1)(1−훼)
]
=
[
(1 + 휂)(1− 휏)(1− 훼) + 훼휂
푤푚
]
퐴푘훼푡+1. (1.25)
Substituting (1.24) into (1.25), we ﬁnd the relationship of the migration rate in period
푡+ 1 with the migration rate in period 푡
[
1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡+1
(1− 푙푚,푡+1)(1−훼)
]
= 퐶˜
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡
[1− (1 + 휂)푙푚,푡]
]훼(1−훿)
, (1.26)
where 퐶˜ ≡
[
(1+휂)(1−휏)(1−훼)+훼휂
푤푚
]
퐴퐵˜훼
휏훼(1−훿) ∈ (0, 1). Equation (1.23) summarizes the direct
relationship between the aggregate output and exogenous parameters and how it indirectly
depends, through the migration rate given by (1.26), on exogenous parameters as well.
Equation (1.26) summarizes how the migration rate in period 푡+ 1 implicitly depends upon
21
exogenous parameters and on the migration rate in period 푡. The next section analyzes
these relationships at stationary competitive equilibrium.
1.4 Stationary competitive equilibrium
This section investigates the change in migration decisions and the stationary growth equi-
librium when exogenous parameters change. In particular, it analyzes the role of the tax
rate (public education policy), 휏 , the host country real wages, 푤푚, the preferences param-
eter, 휂, (preferences of living in the source country), the parents’ degree of human capital
altruism, 휃, and the parents’ degree of physical capital altruism, 휇. A competitive equi-
librium is stationary if the migration rate does not change over time and hence the prices
of factors (i.e. physical capital and human capital) and the proportional allocations of
the households’ income between consumption and intergenerational transfers remain un-
changed as well. In addition, given that the economy’s aggregate production function and
the production function of human capital exhibit constant return-to-scale technologies, the
economy grows at a constant rate, 훾. The ﬁrst part of this section shows how the station-
ary equilibrium migration rate is determined and the relationship between this variable and
the exogenous parameters of interest. The second part shows the relationship between the
stationary equilibrium migration rate and the rest of the endogenous variables. Due to the
fact that there is not a closed form solution for the equilibrium migration rate and that the
algebraic expressions showing the relationships between the exogenous parameters and the
economic growth rate may not be suﬃciently informative (transparent), the next section
shows these associations using numerical solutions.
22
1.4.1 Equilibrium migration rate
Lemma 1. Provided that 푙푚,푡 ∈ [0, 11+휂 ), 푡ℎ푎푡 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙푚,푡 < 1 ∀푡 ≥ 0 such that 퐼˜푡 > 0
and provided that 퐶˜ ∈ (0, 1), the fraction of migrant workers of the economy, 푙∗푚, is uniquely
determined by expression (1.26):
푙푚,푡 = 푙
∗
푚(휏, 푤
푚, 휂, 휇, 휂, 퐴),
where ∂푙
∗
푚
∂휏 > 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂푤푚 > 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂휂 < 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂휇 < 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂휃 > 0 and
∂푙∗푚
∂퐴 < 0.
Proof. Substituting 푙푚,푡+1 = 푙푚,푡 = 푙
∗
푚 into (1.26), it follows that[
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
(1− 푙∗푚)(1−훼)
]
= 퐶˜
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
[1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚]
]훼(1−훿)
. (1.27)
Now, (1.27) can be written
푓(푙∗푚) ≡
[1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚]1+훼(1−훿)
(1− 푙∗푚)(1−훼)[1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚]훼(1−훿)
= 퐶˜, (1.28)
and since the left hand side of (1.28) is strictly decreasing in 푙∗푚, for each 푡 there is a
unique solution 푙푚,푡 = 푙
∗
푚 that satisﬁes (1.26) in equilibrium. Provided that 퐶˜ ∈ (0, 1) and
1 > (1 + 휂)푙∗푚, the suﬃcient conditions for having a unique solution are that 휏 ∈ (0, 1) and
휂 > 0 (see appendix 1). Since ∂퐶˜∂휏 < 0,
∂퐶˜
∂푤푚 < 0,
∂퐶˜
∂휂 > 0,
∂퐶˜
∂휇 > 0,
∂퐶˜
∂휃 < 0 and
∂퐶˜
∂퐴 > 0, and
additionally since ∂푓(푙
∗
푚)
∂휏 > 0 and
∂푓(푙∗푚)
∂휂 < 0, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem
that ∂푙
∗
푚
∂휏 > 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂푤푚 > 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂휂 < 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂휇 < 0,
∂푙∗푚
∂휃 > 0, and
∂푙∗푚
∂퐴 < 0 (see appendix 1).■
1.4.2 Stationary prices of factors, consumption, intergenerational trans-
fers and economic growth rate
This section shows the relationship between the stationary equilibrium migration rate and
the rest of the endogenous variables: individual physical-human capital ratio, prices of
factors, income allocations between consumption and intergenerational transfers, and eco-
nomic growth rate. The individual physical-human capital ratio remains unchanged over
time. As follows from (1.24), the individual physical-human capital ratio is constant over
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time, 퐾푡ℎ푡 ≡ 푘푡 = 푘∗. That is,
푘∗ = 퐵˜
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
[1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚]휏
]1−훿
, (1.29)
where 퐵˜ ≡ 휇
퐵휃훿(1−훼)(1−훿) and 푘
∗ is strictly decreasing in 휏 . There is both direct and indirect
eﬀect of 휏 on 푘∗. Noting (1.29), it is obvious that the direct eﬀect of 휏 on 푘∗ is negative. That
is, when 휏 increases, it reduces the physical capital investments and, hence, it negatively
aﬀects the physical-human capital ratio. On the other hand, since 1 > 휏(1−훼) +훼/(1 + 휂)
for all 휏 ∈ (0, 1), 푘∗ is positively associated with 푙∗푚 and, since 푙∗푚 is positively related to
휏 , the indirect eﬀect of 휏 on 푘∗ is positive. This indirect eﬀect works as follows: when
휏 increases, the prospective migrant workers are more likely to move from the low real
wages country (the source country) to the high real wages country (the host country) and,
therefore, the private investment in education and physical capital are encouraged by the
migrants’ higher labor income earned in the destination country. Therefore, indirectly this
positively aﬀects physical and human capital formation in the source country.
For the set of values of exogenous parameters such as those shown in the next section,
the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect and, hence, one might expect that 푘∗ is strictly
decreasing in 휏 . This result is qualitatively similar to the relationship between 푘∗ and 휏
reported in comparable frameworks for a closed economy. The obvious diﬀerence between
this economy and a closed economy (i.e. 푙∗푚 = 0) is that the indirect eﬀect for a closed
economy does not exist because labor supply is ﬁxed. Hence, one expects that any increase
of 휏 would have a stronger negative eﬀect on the physical-human capital ratio in a closed
economy than in an open economy. When taxes increase, a larger fraction of prospective
migrant workers will move to the host country (i.e. they escape the taxation burden) and
only those with strong preferences for joining the local labor market would remain in the
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source country. Thus, the negative eﬀect of 휏 on 푘∗ would be partially oﬀset by the higher
potential income of migrant workers in the destination country.
The prices of factors are uniquely determined and remain constant over time. From
(2.10) and (2.11), it follows that
1 + 푟∗ = 훼퐴(1− 푙∗푚)(1−훼)푘∗−(1−훼), (1.30)
푤ℎ
∗
= (1− 훼)퐴(1− 푙∗푚)−훼푘∗훼, (1.31)
where 푘∗ is given by expression (1.29). The proportions in the allocation of aggregate income
between consumption, 푐푡, and intergenerational transfers, 푒푡 and 푏푡, remain constant over
time as well. As follows from (1.19), the aggregate income, 퐼˜푡, is a constant proportion of
domestically generated aggregate income, 푦푡, and noting equations (1.13)-(1.15), it follows:
푐∗푡 = (1− 휃 − 휇)퐼˜푡 = (1− 휃 − 휇)
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
]
푦푡, (1.32)
푒∗푡 = 휃퐼˜푡 = 휃
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
]
푦푡, (1.33)
푏∗푡 = 휇퐼˜푡 = 휇
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
]
푦푡. (1.34)
By the same token, these optimal allocations are negatively associated with 휏 . Finally,
from (1.23), the economy grows at a constant rate 훾 ≡ 푦푡+1푦푡 as follows:
훾 = 퐴˜휏 (1−훼)(1−훿)(1− 푙∗푚)1−훼
[
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
]훼+훿(1−훼)
, (1.35)
where 퐴˜ ≡ 퐴퐵1−훼휇훼휃훿(1−훼)(1− 훼)(1−훼)(1−훿).
Notice that one cannot obtain a closed form solution for the prices of factors, for the
income allocations between consumption and intergenerational transfers, and for the eco-
nomic growth rate because the stationary equilibrium migration rate, 푙∗푚, does not have a
closed form solution. However, using the Implicit Function Theorem one can characterize
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the relationship between the exogenous parameters and the endogenous variables. Some ex-
ogenous parameters such as 휏, 휃, 휇 and 휂 have a direct and an indirect eﬀects on economic
growth, whereas 푤푚 only has an indirect eﬀect through the migration rate, 푙∗푚. The direct
eﬀect is evident from a simple inspection of (1.35) and the indirect eﬀect comes from the
relationship between the economic growth rate, 훾, and the migration rate shown by (1.35)
and the relationship between the migration rate and exogenous parameters shown by (1.27).
For instance, the direct eﬀect of the labor income taxation rate, 휏 , on the economic growth
rate is given by ∂훾∂휏 and the indirect eﬀect of 휏 on 훾, applying the chain rule, is given by
∂훾
∂푙∗푚
∂푙∗푚
∂휏 . Hence, the total eﬀect of 휏 on 훾 is given by
∂훾
∂휏 +
∂훾
∂푙∗푚
∂푙∗푚
∂휏 . The same applies for the
rest of the exogenous parameters, 휂, 휃, 휇, and 푤푚.
1.5 Calibration and computational analysis
This section provides numerical simulations to illustrate the relationships between exoge-
nous parameters and both the stationary migration rate and the economic growth rate.
The set of exogenous parameters is chosen so that the economic growth rate would be
4 percent annually for a closed economy (without migration) and so that the condition
푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 1/(1 + 휂)) is satisﬁed for an economy with migration. For the baseline model
(closed economy), it is assumed that 휃 = 0.35, 휇 = 0.35, the capital’s share of income is
standard 훼 = 0.4, and 휏 = 0.20 and the choices of the scale parameters 퐴 and 퐵 ensure
a pre-migration economic growth rate of 4 percent per year.17 The baseline value 휂 = 2
is chosen so that the migration rate 푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 0.33), which replicates the data on migration
for most of the developing countries.18 As discussed by Glomm & Ravikumar (1998) and
17Here, it is assumed that the time-span of one generation is 30 years. Hence, one can alternatively
say that the calibration yields an economic growth rate for a closed economy at the level of (1.04)30 per
generational period.
18See table 5.3 in Docquier & Marfouk (2006)
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Blankenau & Simpson (2004), the appropriate value of 1− 훿 is debatable. Estimates range
from 0 (Coleman 1966) to 0.12 (Card & Kruger 1992). Loosely following Glomm & Raviku-
mar (1998), the strategy here is to explore three diﬀerent values: 1 − 훿 = 0.05, 0.15 and
0.25. We will, however, choose as a benchmark the case 1−훿 = 0.15. Given the uncertainty
about the preference parameters, a sensitivity analysis is carried out in order to show a
better picture of the relationship between the economic growth rate and these parameters.
1.5.1 The equilibrium migration rate
The graphical analysis begins with ﬁgure (1.1), which illustrates the stationary migration
rate for this economy, as established in Lemma 1. The left hand side of equation (1.28) is
represented by the 푓(푙∗푚) curve, whereas the right hand side is represented by the horizontal
lines, 퐶˜퐴 and 퐶˜퐵. The intersections of the 푓(푙∗푚) curve and the horizontal lines, 퐶˜퐴 and
퐶˜퐵, show the stationary equilibria migration rates, 푙퐴푚 and 푙
퐵
푚, respectively. Figure (1.1)
illustrates an exogenous change of the constant 퐶˜, which might be, for example, a result
of an exogenous change of the host country real wages. An exogenous increase of the host
country migration real wages, 푤푚, implies that the constant 퐶˜ declines from 퐶˜퐴 to 퐶˜퐵, and
then the stationary equilibrium migration rate increases from 푙퐴푚 to 푙
퐵
푚. The main numerical
ﬁndings are discussed below.
1.5.2 The tax rate and the economic growth rate
From Lemma (1), the migration rate is increasing in 휏 . Given that the host country real
wages are constant over time, when the taxation rate increases, the labor income net of taxes
in the source country declines and, hence, more prospective migrant workers are likely to
migrate. Figure (1.2) compares the relationship between growth and tax rates for a closed
and an open economy. There are four main numerical ﬁndings associated with the eﬀects
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of 휏 on growth.
First, ﬁgure (1.2) shows that the growth rate for an open economy is higher than the
growth rate for a closed economy. When taxes increase, a larger fraction of prospective
migrants will move to the host country. Then, private transfers will increase and, conse-
quently, private investments in human and physical capital will rise as well. As discussed
above, even though the total eﬀect of 휏 on the physical-human capital ratio and the private
investment in education is negative for both economies (closed and open), the magnitudes
of the negative eﬀects of 휏 are lower for an open economy than for a closed economy. Hence,
as shown by ﬁgure (1.2), the growth rate for an economy with migration is higher than the
growth rate for an economy without migration at all levels of 휏 . This ﬁnding contrasts with
the typical ﬁndings discussed in the literature on “brain drain”.
Miyagiwa (1991) mentions two issues that have dominated the literature on “brain
drain”. The ﬁrst is the welfare eﬀects of migration. If the migration rate is suﬃciently
small in size, it does not aﬀect the welfare of the residents in the source country, but a
ﬁnite level of emigration is welfare-reducing to those left behind. The second issue is the
identiﬁcation of the appropriate policies to compensate for the welfare losses suﬀered by
the non-migrant workers. This is the Bhagwati’s proposal, which calls for income transfers
via taxation from the skilled migrants living in developed countries to those left behind. As
noted in this paper, private transfers from migrants toward non-migrants may play the role
of the income transfers via taxation proposed by Bhagwati, encouraging economic growth in
the economy with migration and, therefore, reducing, or even reversing, the negative eﬀect
suggested by the “brain drain” literature.
As an illustrative case, however, this paper also can reproduce an economy in which
exposure to international migration negatively aﬀects growth as typically suggested by
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the literature on “brain drain”. This is possible when both the contribution of private
investment to human capital formation and migration costs are too low (i.e. 훿 = 0.1 and
휂 = 0.1) so that the migration rate is suﬃciently high.19 If the migration rate is too high
(due to the low migration costs, 휂 is almost zero), the loss of tax revenues is signiﬁcantly
large. The loss of tax revenues, combined with the fact that the education is subsidized,
yields an economic growth rate for an economy with migration that is lower than that for
an economy without migration at all levels of 휏 ∈ (0, 0.99). Hence, if the contribution
of government expenditure on education to human capital formation is too high (0.90),
migration also exports the returns on this public investment.
Second, the economic growth rate is nonmonotonically associated with 휏 (government
expenditure on education). The relationship between the migration rate and the tax rate
is an expected ﬁnding, whereas the relationship of growth with government expenditure on
education might not be an obvious result.
Empirical evidence of the eﬀects that government expenditure on education has on
economic growth using macro-level data is mixed.20 A theoretical study by Blankenau &
Simpson (2004), which develops a framework similar to that developed in this paper for
a closed economy, shows that the positive direct eﬀect of public education spending on
growth can be diminished, or even negated, when other determinants of growth (i.e. the
physical-human capital ratio and private investment in education) are negatively aﬀected
by general equilibrium adjustments.
19Notice that the value assumed for 훿 in this case is signiﬁcantly lower than that found by Coleman (1966)
and Card & Kruger (1992), between 0.88 and 1. Therefore, this experiment is just an instructive example.
The ﬁgure for this case is not reported in the paper.
20Blankenau et al. (2007), among others, using panel data from 23 developed countries over the period
1960-2000, ﬁnd a positive relationship between public education expenditures and growth only when con-
trolling for the government budget constraint. Barro & Sala-i Martin (1999) also ﬁnd a positive relationship
between government education spending and growth. Easterly & Rebelo (1993) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of
government education expenditure on growth only for some speciﬁcations, while Levine & Renelt (1992)
conclude that government education expenditures are not robustly correlated with growth rates.
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Similar to the Blankenau & Simpson (2004) setting (i.e. 푙∗푚 = 0), in this framework
growth depends on public education expenditures as a share of output, the physical-human
capital ratio and per capita private investment in human capital. When taxes are used
to ﬁnance public education, government expenditure on public education unambiguously
lowers both the physical-human capital ratio and the private investment in education.21 The
crowding out of physical capital and private investment in education diminishes and even
reverses the positive direct eﬀect of public education expenditures on growth. In general,
the direct eﬀect of 휏 on growth depends only on the relative contribution of government
expenditures to the overall human capital formation (i.e. 1− 훿, in this paper), whereas the
indirect eﬀects of 휏 on growth, throughout the physical-human capital ratio and the private
investment in human capital, vary with the level of government expenditures, the method
of ﬁnance expenditures and the rest of the exogenous parameters.
Hence, for low levels of government expenditure on education (i.e. low tax rates),
there is not enough human capital in the economy, whereas for high levels of government
expenditure on education there is not suﬃcient physical capital in the economy. The ﬁndings
for a closed economy are shown by the dashed curve of ﬁgure (1.2) for three diﬀerent
values of 1 − 훿. Panels (a), (b) and (c) correspond to 1 − 훿 = 0.05, 1 − 훿 = 0.15, and
1−훿 = 0.25, respectively. The three cases show that for low levels of government expenditure
on education the economic growth rate is increasing in 휏 and for relatively high levels of
government expenditures growth is decreasing in 휏 . The values of 휏 that maximize growth
rates are 휏∗ = 0.05, 휏∗ = 0.15 and 휏∗ = 0.25 for panels (a), (b) and (c), respectively.22
21If 푙∗푚 = 0, a simple inspection of (1.29) and (1.33) shows this negative association.
22Notice that in this paper, if 푙∗푚 = 0, then from (1.35) the eﬃcient government expenditure on education
in an economy without migration is 휏∗ ≡ arg max 훾 = ∂훾
∂휏
= 1− 훿. An equivalent expression can be obtained
from (1.35) if 푙∗푚 > 0, but it would be a complicated expression because 푙
∗
푚 depends on 휏 as well (see appendix
1). Hence, we use here calibration to determine the eﬃcient government expenditure on education.
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Third, the growth-maximizing tax rate (eﬃcient level of government expenditure) is
lower for an economy without migration than for an economy with migration when expo-
sure to international migration positively aﬀects growth. Even though the nonmonotonic
relationship between growth and 휏 is qualitatively similar for both a closed and an open
economy, the quantitative results diﬀer between both economies.23 For an open economy,
ﬁgure (1.2) shows that growth is increasing in 휏 even for relatively high values of 휏 . The
values of 휏 that maximize the growth rate are signiﬁcantly higher for an open economy
(휏∗∗) than those for a closed economy (휏∗). As follows from ﬁgure (1.2), the values of
휏∗∗ that maximize the economic growth for an open economy are equal to 0.70, 0.77 and
0.81, when 1 − 훿 is equal to 0.05, 0.15 and 0.25, respectively. Therefore, for low levels of
government expenditure on education (i.e. low tax rates), there is still not enough human
capital (but higher than in the closed economy), whereas for high levels of government ex-
penditure on education there is still not suﬃcient physical capital (but higher than in the
closed economy). If exposure to international migration positively aﬀects economic growth
in the source country, the level of eﬃcient government expenditure on education in an open
economy is higher than the level of eﬃcient expenditure on public schooling in a closed
economy.
Finally, the lower the preference for joining the labor market in the source country
(“subjective” migration costs), 휂, the lower the growth-maximizing tax rate (eﬃcient level
of government expenditure). High taxes encourage migration and only those with strong
preferences for joining the local labor market (i.e. high 휂) will stay in the source country.
Figure (1.3) shows the relationship between the economic growth rate and the tax rate for
three diﬀerent values of 휂. The “subjective” migration cost, 휂, is equal to 5, 2 and 0.10
23The level of expenditure on public schooling that maximizes the stationary equilibrium economic growth
rate in the source country is 휏∗ ≡ arg max 훾 = ∂훾
∂휏
+ ∂훾
∂푙∗푚
∂푙∗푚
∂휏
.
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for the ﬁgures of panel (a), panel (b) and panel (c), respectively. Since the migration rate
is increasing in 휏 , these calibrations yield strictly increasing equilibrium migration rates
between 5 and 13.2% when 휂 = 5, between 21.7 and 30.3% when 휂 = 2 and between 87.6
and 90.7% when 휂 = 0.1. The values of 휏 that maximize the economic growth rates are
equal to 0.9, 0.82 and 0.59 when the values of 휂 are 5, 2 and 0.10, respectively. Hence, the
eﬃcient level of government expenditure is positively associated with 휂. This might suggest
that the easier it is to escape from the taxes of the source countries the higher is the cost
in terms of taxation revenue when taxation rates increase for these countries. This, then,
would lower the optimal taxation rate.
1.5.3 The migrants’ wages, the parents’ degree of altruism and the eco-
nomic growth rate
Recall that migrants move to a higher wage country, where immigrants from their particular
source country represent only a small fraction of the total population and hence are unable
to aﬀect real wages in the host country. Figure (1.4) shows that both the migration and the
economic growth rate are positively correlated with 푤푚. A higher migration rate implies
that private investment in human capital and physical-human capital increases in 푤푚 as
well.
While the migration rate is positively associated with the parents’ degree of human
capital altruism, 휃, it is negatively correlated with the parents’ degree of physical capital
altruism, 휇. The migration rate is positively correlated with the parents’ degree of human
capital altruism because, in this economy, the migrant workers are allowed to carry the
human capital acquired in the source country when young to a country with higher human
capital return when older. But, migrant workers are not allowed to carry physical capital.24
24Most of the migrant workers from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean countries to the U.S. do
not carry any physical capital.
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Since a higher degree of the parents’ physical capital altruism implies greater physical capital
inherited by the children and, hence, higher income from physical capital ownership in the
source country when older, a lower migration rate is implied.
Figure (1.5) and ﬁgure (1.6) show those relationships. Figure (1.5) shows that the
economic growth rate is an increasing function of the parents’ degree of human capital
altruism, 휃. When 휃 increases, the private investment in human capital increases. Since
migration is positively associated with 휃 and potential migrants move to a country with
higher human capital return, physical capital investment grows as well. Notice from (1.35)
that there are two eﬀects of 휃 on 훾, namely a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect through
푙∗푚. The direct eﬀect of 휃 on 훾 is a positive eﬀect. For standard values of 휏 and 훼, as those
used to compute ﬁgure (1.5), the migration rate is positively associated with the economic
growth rate. Since the migration rate is also positively associated with 휃 (see appendix 1),
it follows that the indirect eﬀect of 휃 on 훾 is positive as well. Figure (1.6), as expected,
shows that the economic growth level is also an increasing function of the parents’ degree
of physical capital altruism, 휇.
1.5.4 The “subjective” migration costs and the economic growth rate
Even though there is a large gap in potential labor income between the source countries and
the developed countries, the observed data on migration show relatively low migration rates
for most of the developing countries.25 Hence, the “subjective” migration cost parameter,
휂, may play a major role in the decision to migrate.26 The numerical exercise in this section
25See Lucas (2005) for a further discussion and see Docquier & Marfouk (2006) for the observed data on
migration. According to Docquier & Marfouk (2006), the migration rate of Caribbean, Central American
and South American countries is 15.3, 11.9 and 1.6 percent, respectively.
26The “subjective” migration cost, 휂, can be thought of as a more general migration costs deﬁnition, which
may include ﬁnancial costs and any cost imposed by the immigration policies of the destination countries
such as visa requirements, border enforcement, restrictions on health and education services for immigrants,
etc.
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shows how the migration rate and the economic growth rate are driven in this model by
휂 for diﬀerent contributions of private education to overall production of human capital in
the source countries.
As follows from Lemma (1), the migration rate is negatively associated with 휂 and, as
follows from ﬁgure (1.7), the economic growth rate is nonmonotonically correlated with this
parameter. Although the relationship between the migration rate and 휂 is as expected, the
relationship of growth and 휂 may not be so obvious. The “subjective” migration costs, 휂,
aﬀect economic growth through private investment in education, the physical-human capital
ratio and the migration rate.27 For low levels of migration induced by relatively high levels
of migration costs (i.e. 휂), the indirect eﬀect of 휂 on economic growth, through private
investment in education and the physical-human capital ratio, dominates so that growth
increases in 휂. In contrast, when migration costs are relatively low (i.e. the migration rate
becomes suﬃciently high), the negative eﬀects, through the migration rate, on economic
growth are large enough to oﬀset the positive eﬀect so that the growth rate falls in 휂.28
Hence, there is a range of relatively low values of 휂 (i.e. high levels of migration) in which
the economic growth rate of an economy with migration is decreasing in 휂. As follows from
(1.7), the values of 휂 that maximize the economic growth rate are 0.03, 0.12 and 0.21 when
the values of 1− 훿 are 0.95, 0.85 and 0.75, respectively.
Provided that the migration rate is suﬃciently high, the lower the contribution of pri-
vate investment in education to human capital accumulation, the higher the likelihood that
exposure to international migration negatively impacts economic growth in the source coun-
try. If, as Bhagwati proposed more than thirty years ago, the migrants’ labor income were
27Notice from (1.29) and (1.33) that ∂푘
∗
∂휂
> 0 and ∂푒
∗
∂휂
> 0 and, since ∂푘
∗
∂푙∗푚
∂푙∗푚
∂휂
< 0 and ∂푒
∗
∂푙∗푚
∂푙∗푚
∂휂
< 0, the
total eﬀect of 휂 on 푘∗ and 푒∗ is ambiguous.
28Notice that if 휂 is suﬃciently large, the equilibrium rate tends to zero and the economic growth rate is
similar to that for a closed economy.
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taxed, the negative impact on economic growth would not occur in this economy. If the
government were allowed to collect taxes from the migrant workers, the expenditure on
public education would be higher in the source country and, therefore, non-migrant workers
would always be better oﬀ. However, as noted by Wilson (2008), the major obstacle to
the implementation of Bhagwati’s proposal to allow developing countries to tax migrants
residing in developed countries is the administrative problems associated with collecting
this tax in the absence of the developed countries’ cooperation.
Summing up, if private transfers are allowed, exposure to international migration is more
likely to encourage economic growth in the labor-exporting countries only if the contribution
of private investment in education to the overall production of human capital is not too low
and the migration rate is not too high. Given the observed data on migration rates (i.e.
from Mexico, Central America and Caribbean countries to the U.S.) and the contribution
of private investment in education to human capital formation, there is a potential gain in
economic growth for developing countries if developed countries tend to relax immigration
policies as predicted by O¨zden & Schiﬀ (2006).29
1.6 Conclusions and ﬁnal comments
This paper developed an endogenous growth model with intergenerational transfers and in-
ternational migration to investigate how exposure to international migration aﬀects physical-
human capital formation and, hence, economic growth in the source countries. Migrants
29O¨zden & Schiﬀ (2006) suggest that the imbalance between demographic trends in developed countries
and developing countries might allow the relaxation of immigration policies in developed countries in the
future and this points toward signiﬁcant potential economic gains from migration. They point out that “the
labor forces in many developed countries are expected to peak around 2010 and decline by around 5 percent
in the following two decades, accompanied by a rapid increase in dependency ratios. Conversely, the labor
forces in many developing countries are expanding rapidly, resulting in declines in dependency ratios.” The
authors continue: “For instance, it has been estimated that an increase in the number of migrants equal
to 3 percent of the labor force of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries would result in global welfare gains that surpass those obtained from the removal of all trade
barriers, with signiﬁcant gains for all parties involved”. Also see Walmsley & Winters (2005).
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move to a higher wage country, where immigrants from their particular source country rep-
resent only a small fraction of the total population and hence are unable to aﬀect real wages
in the host country. The migrants do not carry physical capital from the source country
to the host country. The human capital technology depends on private investment in, and
real government expenditure on, education. Individuals behave altruistically toward their
children and derive utility of living in the source country when older. The preference for
joining the labor force in the source country captures the fact that workers are likely to
have a preference for the country of their origin life-style because of cultural factors, family
relationships, and so on.
Numerical simulations illustrated the relationships between exogenous parameters and
the stationary migration rate and economic growth rate, in which were used reasonable
values of the preference parameters and the parameters of the human capital and production
functions. The main ﬁndings from comparative statics are as follows: (i) the migration
rate is strictly increasing in the labor income taxation rate, whereas the economic growth
rate is nonmonotonically associated with this parameter; (ii) the migration rate is strictly
decreasing in the preference for joining the labor market in the source country, while the
economic growth rate is nonmonotonically correlated with that parameter; (iii) both the
migration and the economic growth rates are strictly increasing in the host country real
wages; (iv) both the migration rate and economic growth are strictly increasing in the
parents’ degree of human capital altruism; and (v) while the migration rate is strictly
decreasing in the parents’ degree of physical capital altruism, economic growth is strictly
increasing in it.
Some particular results in this paper require a comprehensive analysis of the relation-
ships between economic growth and the critical parameters, the preference for joining the
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labor market in the source country and the contribution of private investment in education
to the human capital formation in the source county. This paper might be the ﬁrst attempt
to understand the association between migration and the way of ﬁnancing the human capi-
tal of migrant workers in the source countries. If private transfers are allowed, exposure to
international migration is more likely to encourage economic growth in the labor-exporting
countries only if the contribution of private investment in education to human capital for-
mation is not too low and the migration rate is not too high. Given the observed data on
migration rates and the contribution of private investment in education to human capital
formation, there is a potential gain in economic growth for developing countries if developed
countries tend toward the relaxation of immigration policies.
Since in the analytical model of this paper individuals within, as well as across, gener-
ations are identical in their preferences and innate abilities, the results might change if one
assumes heterogeneity in innate abilities. The ﬁndings would critically depend on whether
it is assumed that high or low-skilled workers are more likely to emigrate. If high (low)
skilled workers are more likely to emigrate, then the likelihood of adverse economic conse-
quences may be magniﬁed (contracted) due to the fact that the government expenditure on
education per student would decrease (increase).
An extension of the theoretical analysis developed in this paper would be to assume a
small open economy with perfect capital mobility. Since labor taxes are not a relatively
important source of government revenue in labor-exporting countries, future work would
also include a wider range of taxes such as the value added and tariﬀs. These taxes are much
more important than labor taxes in non-OECD countries. The results in this paper might
be aﬀected if, instead of assuming a log utility function and a Cobb-Douglas human capital
technology, one assumes a more general speciﬁcation for those functions. Therefore, the
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results should be read taking into account the potential limitation of those speciﬁcations.
Here, research is required.
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Appendix 1
Let us rewrite equation (1.28) as follows:
[1+훼(1−훿)] log[1− (1+휂)푙∗푚]− (1−훼) log(1− 푙∗푚)−훼(1−훿) log[1−휏(1−훼)−훼푙∗푚] = log 퐶˜,
(1.36)
where log 퐶˜ = log[(1 + 휂)(1− 휏)(1− 훼) + 훼휂]− log푤푚 + log퐴+ 훼[log휇− log퐵 − 훿 log 휃−
(1− 훿) log(1− 훼)]− 훼(1− 훿) log 휏 .
From the derivative of (1.36) with respect to 푙∗푚 one can obtain
1− 훼
1− 푙∗푚
+
훼2(1− 훿)
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
− [1 + 훼(1− 훿)](1 + 휂)
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
⪋ 0. (1.37)
Rewriting (1.37), we get
1− 훼
1− 푙∗푚
+
훼2(1− 훿)
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
− 훼(1− 훿)(1 + 휂)
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
⪋ (1 + 휂)
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
, (1.38)
1− 훼
1− 푙∗푚
+
[
훼
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
− (1 + 휂)
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
]
훼(1− 훿) ⪋ (1 + 휂)
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
, (1.39)
1− 훼
1− 푙∗푚
+
[
훼− [1− 휏(1− 훼)](1 + 휂)
[1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚][1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚]
]
훼(1− 훿) ⪋ (1 + 휂)
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
. (1.40)
Then, multiplying both sides of (1.40) by 1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚,
(1− 훼)[1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚]
1− 푙∗푚
+
[
훼− [1− 휏(1− 훼)](1 + 휂)
[1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚]
]
훼(1− 훿) ⪋ (1 + 휂), (1.41)
dividing both sides of (1.41) by 1 + 휂 and subtracting the ﬁrst term of the LHS from both
sides, one gets
[
훼/(1 + 휂) + 휏(1− 훼)− 1
[1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚]
]
훼(1− 훿) ⪋ 1− (1− 훼)[1− (1 + 휂)푙
∗
푚]
(1− 푙∗푚)(1 + 휂)
. (1.42)
Now, since 휏 ∈ (0, 1), 휂 > 0 and 1 > (1+휂)푙∗푚, (1.42) can be written as a strict inequality
as follows: [
훼/(1 + 휂) + 휏(1− 훼)− 1
[1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚]
]
훼(1− 훿) < [1− (1 + 휂)푙
∗
푚]훼+ 휂
(1− 푙∗푚)(1 + 휂)
. (1.43)
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Since the RHS of (1.43) is always positive and the LHS is always negative, it follows
that 푓(푙∗푚) is strictly decreasing with respect to 푙∗푚. Using the Implicit Function Theorem
to obtain the relationship of the exogenous parameters of interest, 휏, 푤푚, 휂, 휃 and 휇, and
the equilibrium migration rate, 푙∗푚, from (1.36) we obtain
∂푙∗푚
∂휏
= 휙1/휑 > 0, (1.44)
∂푙∗푚
∂푤푚
= 휙2/휑 > 0, (1.45)
∂푙∗푚
∂휂
= 휙3/휑 < 0, (1.46)
∂푙∗푚
∂휃
= 휙4/휑 > 0, (1.47)
∂푙∗푚
∂휇
= 휙5/휑 < 0, (1.48)
∂푙∗푚
∂퐴
= 휙6/휑 < 0,
where, from (1.37) we get:
휑 ≡ 1− 훼
1− 푙∗푚
+
훼2(1− 훿)
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
− [1 + 훼(1− 훿)](1 + 휂)
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
< 0,
휙1 ≡ − (1 + 휂)(1− 훼)
(1 + 휂)(1− 훼)(1− 휏) + 훼휂 −
훼(1− 훿)
휏
− 훼(1− 훿)(1− 훼)
1− 휏(1− 훼)− 훼푙∗푚
< 0,
휙2 ≡ − 1
푤푚
< 0,
휙3 ≡ (1− 훼)(1− 휏) + 훼
(1 + 휂)(1− 훼)(1− 휏) + 훼휂 +
[1 + 훼(1− 훿)]푙∗푚
1− (1 + 휂)푙∗푚
> 0,
휙4 ≡ −훼훿
휃
< 0,
휙5 ≡ 훼
휇
> 0,
휙6 ≡ 1
퐴
> 0.
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Figure 1.1: Migration Rate at Equilibrium
41
Figure 1.2: Labor Income Tax Rate Eﬀect on Economic Growth for Diﬀerent Values of the
Contribution of Private Investment in Education (훿) to Human Capital Formation
Calibration: 휏 ∈ [0.01, 0.99], 휃 = 0.35, 휇 = 0.35, 훼 = 0.4, 휂 = 1.5 and the scale parameters are 퐴 = 2.88, 퐵 = 10
and 푤푚 = 10. The equilibrium migration rate satisﬁes the condition 푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 1/1+휂). Thus, the maximum attainable
migration rate is 40%. The contribution of private investment in education, 훿, is equal to 0.95, 0.85 and 0.75 for the
ﬁgures of panel (a), panel (b) and panel (c), respectively. This calibration yields a strictly increasing equilibrium
migration rate between 16.4 and 25% for panel (a), between 10.9 and 33.7% for panel (b) and between 4.6 and 33%
for panel (c), and an economic growth rate for a closed economy at the level of 4% per year if 휏 = 0.2 and 훿 = 0.85.
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Figure 1.3: Labor Income Tax Rate Eﬀect on Economic Growth for Diﬀerent Values of the
“Subjective” Migration Costs (휂)
Calibration: 휏 ∈ [0.01, 0.99], 휃 = 0.35, 휇 = 0.35, 훿 = 0.85, 훼 = 0.4, and the scale parameters are 퐴 = 2.9, 퐵 = 20
and 푤푚 = 10. The equilibrium migration rate satisﬁes the condition 푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 1/1 + 휂). The “subjective” migration
cost, 휂, is equal to 5, 2 and 0.10 for the ﬁgures of panel (a), panel (b) and panel (c), respectively. This calibration
yields a strictly increasing equilibrium migration rate between 5 and 13.2% for panel (a), between 21.7 and 30.3% for
panel (b) and between 87.6 and 90.7% for panel (c), and an economic growth rate for a closed economy at the level
of 4% per year if 휏 = 0.2 and 훿 = 0.85.
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Figure 1.4: Host Country Real Wages Eﬀect on Equilibrium Migration Rate and Economic
Growth Rate
Calibration: 푤푚 ∈ [4, 20], 휏 = 0.2, 휃 = 0.35, 휇 = 0.35 훿 = 0.85, 훼 = 0.4, 휂 = 2.0, and the scale parameters are
퐴 = 2.88, and 퐵 = 10. The equilibrium migration rate satisﬁes the condition 푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 1/1 + 휂). Thus, the maximum
attainable migration rate is 33.3%. This calibration yields a strictly increasing equilibrium migration rate between
11.3 and 29.1% and an economic growth rate for a closed economy at the level of 4% per year.
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Figure 1.5: Degree of Human Capital Altruism Eﬀect on Equilibrium Migration Rate and
Economic Growth Rate
Calibration: 휃 ∈ [0.01, 0.5], 휏 = 0.2, 휇 = 0.35, 훿 = 0.85, 훼 = 0.4, 휂 = 2, and the scale parameters are 퐴 =
2.88, 퐵 = 10 and 푤푚 = 10. The equilibrium migration rate satisﬁes the condition 푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 1/1 + 휂). Thus, the
maximum attainable migration rate is 33.3%. This calibration yields a strictly increasing equilibrium migration rate
between 2.9 and 25.8% and an economic growth rate for a closed economy at the level of 4% per year if 휃 = 0.35.
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Figure 1.6: Degree of Physical Capital Altruism Eﬀect on Equilibrium Migration Rate and
Economic Growth Rate
Calibration: 휇 ∈ [0.01, 0.5], 휏 = 0.2, 휃 = 0.35, 훿 = 0.85, 훼 = 0.4, 휂 = 2, and the scale parameters are 퐴 =
2.88, 퐵 = 10 and 푤푚 = 10. The equilibrium migration rate satisﬁes the condition 푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 1/1 + 휂). Thus, the
maximum attainable migration rate is 33.3%. This calibration yields a strictly decreasing equilibrium migration rate
between 31.2 and 23.6% and an economic growth rate for a closed economy at the level of 4% per year if 휇 = 0.35.
46
Figure 1.7: Preference for Living in the Source Country Eﬀect on Economic Growth for
Diﬀerent Values of the Contribution to Human Capital Formation of Private Investment in
Education (훿)
Calibration: 휂 ∈ [0.01, 5], 휃 = 0.35, 휇 = 0.35, 훼 = 0.4, 휏 = 0.2, and the scale parameters are 퐴 = 2.88, 퐵 = 10
and 푤푚 = 10. The equilibrium migration rate satisﬁes the condition 푙∗푚 ∈ (0, 1/(1 + 휂)). The contribution of private
investment in education, 훿, is equal to 0.95, 0.85 and 0.75 for the ﬁgures of panel (a), panel (b) and panel (c),
respectively. This calibration yields an economic growth rate for a closed economy at the level of 4% per year if 휂 = 2
and 훿 = 0.85.
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2 Determinants of Remittances: Theory and
Evidence from Households in Ecuador
2.1 Introduction
According to World Bank data the share of remittances as a percentage of gross domes-
tic product has grown steadily through the last three decades. By the end of the 1970s
remittances for all developing countries represented only around 0.5 percent of the GDP
while in 2006 it reached around 2.0 percent. Remittances have become the second-largest
source of international ﬁnancial resources for developing countries, after foreign direct in-
vestment, and in many cases (i.e. countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Haiti, Dominican Republic, etc) are the largest source of external inﬂows. Because of these
facts, there has been increased interest by scholars, policy makers and international ﬁnan-
cial agencies in analyzing the relationship between migration, remittances and economic
development. Understanding the determinants of migrant remittance behavior can help to
predict the future pattern of remittance ﬂows for developing countries.
The ﬁrst part of this paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze individual mi-
grant decisions about whether to remit or not and, conditional upon remitting, the size of
the remittance. This model provides answers to questions such as “Who remits?” “Why?”
and “How much?”. In particular, the analytical model emphasizes the relationship be-
tween individual migrant remittance behavior and the number of migrants within the same
household. Using household data from Ecuador, the second part of this paper presents an
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empirical analysis to assess the determinants of remittances. Although Ecuador is a small
Andean country of approximately 13.9 million people, Ecuadorians are one of the largest
immigrant groups in metro New York and the second largest immigrant group in Spain.1
A massive emigration from Ecuador occurred between 1999 and 2004 as a response to the
national economic crisis of 1998 and 1999, caused by the closure of the banks, devaluation
(from 5,000 sucres to 25,000 sucres to the dollar), company bankruptcies and ﬁnancial in-
stability. During these two years, Ecuador’s Gross Domestic Product fell by 27 percent,
while per capita household consumption was lower in 1999 than 10 years earlier.2 According
to the Central Bank of Ecuador, from 1996 to 2006 remittances grew at an average rate
of 19 percent annually, and since 1999 have become the second-largest source of foreign
income after oil exports, exceeding oﬃcial development aid and foreign direct investment.
In 2006 remittances totaled 2.9 billion dollars, which represented 7.0 percent of GDP and
22.2 percent of total exports of goods and services.
According to the 2004 “Demographic, Maternal and Infant Health Survey” (ENDE-
MAIN), Ecuadorian migrants are spread across 30 countries, of which the most signiﬁcant
destination countries are Spain, the U.S. and Italy, respectively. Most of the migrants are
close relatives of the household head (80 percent are parents, children or spouses). The
survey includes migrants who left the country between 1960 and 2004. Most of those left
between 1999 and 2004 (more than 70 percent). While the preferred countries during the
last surge of migration were European such as Spain and Italy, the U.S. was a secondary
destination. For instance, of the total number of Ecuadorian migrants living in Spain,
around 90 percent arrived between 1999 and 2004. During the 1980’s most of the Ecuado-
rian migrants paid intermediaries, coyotes or a document forger, for clandestine passage
1Jokisch (online).
2IDBAme´rica (online).
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to the United States, whereas the vast majority of the migrants during the last massive
migration chose Spain. The main reason for this was an existing agreement between Spain
and Ecuador that allowed Ecuadorians to enter the country as tourists without visas (the
law changed in 2003). The main motivations for leaving were to search for work or to accept
a job oﬀer in the destination country.
There is a growing body of literature which focuses on the microeconomic motives
behind remittances (Lucas & Stark 1985, Funkhouser 1995, Agarwal & Horowitz 2002,
Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006, Osili 2007). These surveys list three basic motives for
remittances: altruism, insurance (indemnifying the human and social development of the
family left behind against income shocks), and investment (asset accumulation back home
as part of the migration life-cycle planning).3 This paper contributes both theoretically and
empirically to this branch of the literature.
Similar to Funkhouser (1995), this study proposes a behavioral model of remittances
based on altruism. It is assumed that an individual migrant takes as given the amount
of remittances sent by all other migrants within the same household (Nash assumption).
Existing studies have used the Nash assumption as well, but have not formally stated and
tested this assumption. They predict that the individual remittance behavior is negatively
associated with the number of other migrants within the same household.4 There are several
implications from the model in this paper. First of all, the relationship between individual
remittance behavior and the number of other migrants within the same household is not
theoretically determined. Whereas remittances decrease with the number of migrants within
3For a more comprehensive review of these arguments, see Lucas & Stark (1985) and the survey in
Docquier & Rapoport (2006).
4See Funkhouser (1995) and Agarwal & Horowitz (2002). Since here it is assumed that migrants from
the same household make a voluntary contribution to ﬁnance consumption in that household, non-migrant
consumption might be thought of as a public good, where the possibility of migrants that free ride exists in
this framework.
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the same household due to the Nash assumption (more remittances sent by the others
migrants, less remittances sent by one), remittances increase with the number of migrants
because the household’s labor income is negatively aﬀected by the reduction of the labor
supply in the source country. Whether remittances increase or decline will depend on which
eﬀect dominates. The key diﬀerence between this model and previous analytical frameworks
based on altruism is that, when the migrant opportunity cost of forgone household labor
income is taken into account, this model suggests that migrant remittance behavior and
household migration size are non-monotonically correlated. Hence, this relationship may
be empirically addressed. Next, migrants who do not remit are those with relatively low
labor income, a low degree of altruism toward relatives left behind, or both.5 On the other
hand, migrants who remit are those with relatively high labor income, a high degree of
altruism, or both. An associated prediction would be that migrants who migrate to higher
earnings countries are more likely to remit and, when they do so, remit more than those who
migrate to lower earnings countries. Finally, this model predicts that individual migrant
remittances are a decreasing function of household labor income.
Another relationship to be analyzed is the migrant remittance behavior and the time
since migration. The time proﬁle of remittance behavior would depend on the earnings
proﬁles of the migrants and the households. Whether remittances increase or decline with
time after migration will depend on the relative changes over time in the migrant’s wages
and the household’s income. A greater amount of time since the migration implies more
labor market experience, which in turn implies higher wages and higher remittances. On the
other hand, higher household income over time implies lower remittances. The relationship
5Since the migrant’s degree of altruism is an unobservable parameter, it is empirically approximated by
a vector of observable variables that measure the degree of proximity between migrants and relatives left
behind.
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between migrant worker remittances and the length of stay in the host country might be
non-monotonic over time.
Using household data from Ecuador, this paper presents an empirical analysis that tests
the main predictions of the theoretical model. The empirical work provides evidence that
migrant remittances are a non-increasing function of the number of migrants within the
household. Moreover, it shows robust evidence both for altruistically motivated remittance
behavior and for the fact that the size of remittances decreases over time since the migration.
Finally, the empirical section shows that Ecuadorian migrants who moved to Spain were
less likely to remit and remit less than those migrants whose destination country was the
United States, which might reﬂect the lower unemployment rate and the higher potential
earnings in the United States relative to Spain.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 includes a basic theoretical
framework and reduced form equation for the migrants’ remittance behavior; section 3
discusses the empirical strategy and results; and the last section oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2.2 Basic theoretical framework
2.2.1 The model
Consider a two-agent model: the migrant and the non-migrant. The individual migrant
worker is represented by 푖 = 1, 2, ..., 푙푚 from household 푗 who lives and works in a foreign
country 푓 = 1, 2, ..., 퐹,; the non-migrant refers to household 푗 = 1, 2, ..., 푆 in the source
country, which can consist of one or more individuals. There are several assumptions in
this framework. First, it ignores the reasons for the migration decision, which implies that
6See World Bank (online).
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the migrants are exogenously located in diﬀerent host countries.7 Second, each migrant is
altruistic toward the non-migrant members of her own family,8 which means that migrant 푖,
in addition to choosing her own consumption 푐푓푖 , has to decide how much money to transfer
to her relatives in the source country (remittance size 푎푖푗). Next, an individual migrant 푖
takes the amount of remittances sent by all other migrants within the same household 푗
as given (Nash assumption), which is denoted as 푎−푖푗 . Prices are the same across the host
countries and the source country, and are normalized to 1.9 Finally, all income in the source
country is consumed and all migrant income net of remittances is consumed as well in the
host country.
Thus, each migrant 푖 from household 푗 in host country 푓 , who values both her own
utility and the utility of household 푗 in the source country, seeks to maximize a log utility
7Some of the leading papers dealing with migration decision theory are Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969)
and Borjas (1987, 1989), in which the migration decision is a function of two main variables: wage diﬀerential
and migration cost. Similar representations also can be found in Carrington et al. (1996), where the authors
construct a discrete time model of equilibrium migration with endogenous moving costs. In this setup the
cost of moving also depends on the stock of migrants already settled in the host country, which captures the
“networks externality” eﬀect.
8For a general discussion about the diﬀerent motives for remitting covered in the literature, see Lucas
& Stark (1985) and Docquier & Rapoport (2006). In addition to the altruistic behavior of migrants, these
authors include other motives for remitting such as exchange, investment and inheritance-seeking. Under
the exchange motive, for instance, the migrants’ remittances may be viewed as repayments of loans used to
ﬁnance the moving costs or the migrants’ investment in human capital. Investment and inheritance-seeking
motives are deﬁned by Lucas & Stark (1985) as self-interest motives.
9This assumption does not change any of the substantive predictions of the model considered here. Djajic
(1989) and Dustmann (1997, 1999) consider international migration models in which it is assumed that prices
are higher in the host country relative to prices in the source country. This issue is not considered here,
mainly to maintain simplicity and partially because it would be more relevant if we were modeling return
migration as analyzed by Djajic (1989) and Dustmann (1997, 1999).
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function as follows:
푉 = 푀푎푥{푎푖푗 ,푐푓푖푗}
푙표푔(푐푓푖푗) + 휃푙표푔(푐
ℎ
푗 ) (2.1)
푠.푡.
푐푓푖푗 + 푎푖푗 = 푤
푓 (2.2)
푐ℎ푗 =
(푙ℎ푗푤
ℎ + 푎푖푗 + 푎−푖푗)
푛푗
(2.3)
푎푖푗 ≥ 0, (2.4)
for all 푖 = 1, ..., 푙푚, 푓 = 1, ..., 퐹 , and 푗 = 1, ..., 푆, taking as given non-migrant consumption
푐ℎ푗 , the amount of remittances sent by all other migrants within the same household 푎−푖푗 ,
the exogenous migrant’s labor income 푤푓 , and the exogenous household’s total labor income
푙ℎ푗푤
ℎ, where 푙ℎ푗 is the number of working members within household 푗 in the source country,
푤ℎ denotes real wages in the source country, 푛푗 is the number of individuals in household
푗 (including children), and 휃 ∈ (0, 1) represents a taste parameter that characterizes het-
erogeneous preferences for each migrant. This taste parameter, in particular, represents
the migrant’s degree of altruism toward her relatives in the source country. Expressions
(3.1)-(2.4) represent the migrant utility function, migrant budget constraint, non-migrant
budget constraint and the non-negative of remittances condition, respectively.10
The utility maximization problem is:
푀푎푥{푎푖푗}푙표푔(푤
푓 − 푎푖푗) + 휃푙표푔
(푙ℎ푗푤
ℎ + 푎푖푗 + 푎−푖푗)
푛푗
푠.푡.
푎푖푗 ≥ 0.
This maximization problem yields a continuous function called the 푖푡ℎ migrant best
10This approach looks similar to that discussed in the literature of private provision of public goods. See
Bergstrom et al. (1986), Andreoni (1988, 1990) and Kotchen & Moore (2007).
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response function:
푎푖푗 = 푚푎푥{
(휃푤푓 − 푙ℎ푗푤ℎ − 푎−푖푗)
(1 + 휃)
, 0}. (2.5)
As expected, the individual migrant 푖’s best response function for remittances is a decreasing
function of the amount of remittances sent home by all other migrants within the same
household, 푎−푖푗 . Now, let 푙푚푗 denote the number of migrants within household 푗 such that
the total household labor supply is 푙푗 = 푙
푚
푗 + 푙
ℎ
푗 . Then, under the assumption of a symmetric
equilibrium, let 푎푗 = 푙
푚
푗 푎푖푗 denote the total amount received by household 푗 in equilibrium.
As follows from (2.5), the individual migrant’s optimal amount of remittances sent to her
relatives left behind is
푎푖푗 = 푚푎푥{
휃푤푓 − (푙푗 − 푙푚푗 )푤ℎ
(푙푚푗 + 휃)
, 0} ≡ 푎(휃, 푤푓 , 푙푚, 푙). (2.6)
From (2.6), remittances are an increasing function of the migrant’s labor income, 푤푓 , and
of the migrant’s degree of altruism toward non-migrants, 휃, and a decreasing function of the
household labor income, 푤ℎ. The relationship between the migrant worker remittances and
the number of migrants within the same household, however, is ambiguously determined.
When household migration increases exogenously, the amount of remittances sent by all
other migrants within the household increases, while migrant 푖’s best response function
would predict that migrant 푖’s remittances would decline. The latter prediction might
be counter-balanced, however, by a decrease in the household labor income due to the
lower household labor supply in the source country (i.e. forgone migrant wages in the
source country), which would imply that remittances increase when household migration
increases.11 As follows from (2.6), the derivative of remittances with respect to migration
11Here, the exogenous change of household migration might be a strong assumption, but it can be thought
of as a remarkable change in the immigration policies of a host country that would allow migrant workers
with particular qualiﬁcations or from a speciﬁc source country to move to that host country without any
signiﬁcant moving cost. For example, Mexican workers who live next to the Mexican-U.S. border might
easily migrate to the U.S. if border enforcement policy in the U.S. was markedly changed.
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size is given by
∂푎
∂푙푚
=
푤ℎ − 휃(푤푓 − 푤ℎ)
(푙푚 + 휃)2
. (2.7)
Since wage diﬀerential is positive, 휃 > 푤
ℎ
(푤푓−푤ℎ) , which implies that migrant remittances
are negatively associated with migration size. When 휃 < 푤
ℎ
(푤푓−푤ℎ) , migrant remittances
are positively associated with the number of migrants within the household. Hence, the
relationship between remittance behavior and migration size depends on the wage gap
and the unobservable migrant’s degree of altruism. If the migrant’s degree of altruism is
suﬃciently large (small) and there is a large (small) wage gap between host country 푓 and
the migrant source country, it is more likely that remittance behavior and migration size
are negatively (positively) correlated. Since the relationship between migration size and
individual migrant remittance behavior is not determined, the empirical work of this paper
examines this relationship.
To close the model, let 푤푓
∗
(휃) be a critical level of migrant labor income such that the
migrant equilibrium remittances for each individual 푖 from household 푗 is given by
푎∗푖푗 =
⎧⎨⎩
(휃푤푓−(푙푗−푙푚푗 )푤ℎ)
(푙푚푗 +휃)
푖푓 푤푓 > 푤푓
∗
=
(푙푗−푙푚푗 )푤ℎ
휃
0 푂푡ℎ푒푟푤푖푠푒,
(2.8)
where the inequality condition on the right side of (2.8) states that if the actual migrant labor
income is greater than her critical level
(푙푗−푙푚푗 )푤ℎ
휃 , then migrant 푖 sends a positive amount of
remittances to her relatives in the source country. There are several implications from (2.8).
First, individual remittance behavior is ambiguously associated with the number of other
migrants within the same household, which is a direct consequence of the Nash assumption
and the altruistically motivated migrant remittance behavior (see equation 2.7). Hence,
this relationship may be empirically addressed. Second, migrants with diﬀerent tastes have
diﬀerent critical levels of income. Conditional on the household labor income and the
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number of migrants within the same household, the decision to remit or not to remit (free
rider) depends on whether the actual migrant labor income is greater than (does remit) or
less than (does not remit) her critical level of labor income. Migrants who do not remit
are those with relatively low labor income, a low degree of altruism toward their relatives
left behind, or both. On the other hand, migrants who remit are those with relatively
high labor income, a high degree of altruism, or both. Third, since individual migrants
stay in diﬀerent host countries, migrants who migrate to higher earnings countries are more
likely to remit and, they remit more than those who migrate to lower earnings countries.
Finally, this model predicts that individual migrant remittances are a decreasing function
of household labor income.
2.2.2 Time proﬁle of remittances
Moving beyond the predictions of the one period model described above, this section dis-
cusses the time proﬁle of migrant remittance behavior. A survey conducted by Multilateral
Investment Fund and Pew Hispanic Center in 2003 found that 42 percent of migrant work-
ers from Latin American countries (about six million people) send remittances home on a
regular basis. However, the observed probability of remitting is not constant across that
population but is instead higher among more recently arrived migrant workers. While half
of all Latin American migrant workers who have been in the United States for 10 years or
less are regular remittance senders, the observed probability for those who have been there
between 10 and 20 years is about 40 percent and for those between 20 and 30 years it is
about 20 percent, suggesting that the likelihood of remitting declines over time. However,
from a theoretical view the relationship between remittance behavior and the duration of
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the migration is ambiguously determined.12
In order to address the time proﬁle of remittances, we construct a multi-period model,
similar to that described above, in which all income is spent in each period by both the mi-
grants and the non-migrants (i.e. there is no saving and no intertemporal discount factor).
The optimal solution for remittances is similar to that shown by expression (2.8), except
that it would have a script 푡 denoting time, 푎∗푖푗,푡.
13 Without any loss of generality for sim-
plicity, we can assume that migrant labor income and household labor income can vary over
time while household migration is maintained constant over time. Migrant labor income can
increase over time with labor market experience in the host country while household labor
income can increase over time as household members improve their educational attainment
over time, gain labor market experience or increase household labor supply over time (chil-
dren become adults). Moreover, we assume that no moral hazard is involved in the sense of
household members reducing eﬀort over time. Then, the time proﬁle of remittance behavior
would depend on the earnings proﬁles of the migrants and the households. Whether remit-
tances increase or decline over time will depend on the relative changes in the time proﬁle
of the migrant’s wages and the household’s income. A greater number of years since the
migration implies more labor market experience, which in turn implies higher wages and
higher remittances. On the other hand, higher household income over time implies lower
remittances. Thus, the relationship between migrant worker remittances and the length of
stay in the host country might be non-monotonic over time.
12Funkhouser (1995) examines this relationship in a multi-period model. He shows that migrant remittance
behavior and time since migration are ambiguously determined.
13That is,
푎∗푖푗,푡 =
{
(휃푤
푓
푡 −(푙푗,푡−푙푚푗 )푤ℎ푡 )
(푙푚푗 +휃)
푖푓 푤푓푡 > 푤
푓∗
푡 =
(푙푗,푡−푙푚푗 )푤ℎ푡
휃
0 푂푡ℎ푒푟푤푖푠푒.
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2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Reduced form of remittances equation
The reduced form expression for the binary choice variable determining the fraction of
migrants who do remit and the size of remittances is given by:
푎∗푖푗 = 푚푎푥{푎∗([푊푖, 푅푖푗 , 푍푗 , 푙푚푗 ] ≡ 푋), 0}, (2.9)
for 푖 = 1, ...,푀 and 푗 = 1, ..., 푆. The set of observable variables included in (2.9) is
used to approximate equation (2.8) as follows. First, 푊푖 denotes a vector that includes
all characteristics of the individual migrant 푖 that determine migrant wages in the host
country, including years of experience in the host country, destination country (wages vary
across developed countries), motivation for leaving the source country and the migrant’s
education level prior to migration. Next, 푅푖푗 is a vector that represents migrant 푖’s status
within household 푗 (i.e. the migrant is the household head’s spouse, parent, child, etc.) and
is used to approximate migrant 푖’s degree of altruism toward household 푗.14 푍푗 is a vector
that includes all characteristics of household 푗 that determine its labor income (education
level of household’s head, ratio of children to adults within the household and gender of
household’s head). Finally, 푙푚푗 represents the number of migrants within household 푗.
According to the discussion above, there are ﬁve testable hypotheses associated with the
migrant’s decision to remit and the amount to be transferred to her relatives in the source
country. First, migrants with higher labor income are more likely to remit and tend to remit
more. Second, households with lower income tend to receive more remittances. Third,
both the likelihood of remitting and remittance size are positively related to the degree
of proximity between the migrants and the remaining household members in the source
14Usually the unobservable migrant’s degree of altruism is approximated by a vector of observable variables
that measure the degree of proximity between individual migrants and their families in the source country,
which is the case in Lucas & Stark (1985), Funkhouser (1995) and Osili (2007), among others.
59
country. Fourth, the relationship between migrant worker remittances and the length of
stay in the host country might be non-monotonic over time. Fifth, remittances per migrant
are ambiguously associated with the number of migrants within the same household.
2.3.2 Data
The data used in this paper come from a national household survey entitled “Demographic,
Maternal and Infant Health Survey” (ENDEMAIN) undertaken by the Center of Popula-
tion Studies and Social Development in Ecuador in 2004. The empirical work focuses on
households with at least one migrant, which comprise around 10 percent of the households
sample covered in the Ecuadorian household survey. The sample includes migrants age 15
or older. The Ecuadorian households in this survey have from one to ﬁve migrants. The
survey provides information about each of the household members in Ecuador and about
each of the migrants within the household. The migrants’ data includes information about
the length of migration, the host country, the status within the household, the motivation
for migration, the years of schooling prior migration and the individual amount of remit-
tances sent by each of them. Table 2.1 presents the migrant remittance behavior by the
number of migrants within the households, with the remittances expressed in U.S. dollars.
The ﬁrst column shows the full sample migrant remittance behavior, whereas columns (1)
to (5) show the statistics for individuals who come from households with 1, 2, 3 4, and 5
migrants, in that order. Panel (A) of table 2.1 shows the amount of remittances, including
those who remit (remitter) and those who do not remit (non-remitter), to have averaged
1,164 and 353 dollars sent per migrant and received per household member, respectively.15
Panel (B) shows the amount of remittances of only those who remit to have averaged 1,870
15Remittances received per household member were computed as the the ratio of the individual migrant
amount of remittance to household size in Ecuador.
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and 567 dollars sent per migrant and received per household member, correspondingly. The
percent of migrants who remit by number of migrants within the household range from 55
to 66 percent, with the average being 62 percent.
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of migrant characteristics and household char-
acteristics. Ecuadorian migrants are spread across 30 countries, of which the most signiﬁcant
destination countries are Spain, the U.S. and Italy, respectively. Most of the migrants are
close relatives of the household head (80 percent are parents, children or spouses). The
survey includes migrants who left the country between 1960 and 2004. Most of those left
between 1999 and 2004 (more than 70 percent), which might be associated with the volatile
macroeconomic situation of the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s. While the preferred coun-
tries during the last surge of migration were European such as Spain and Italy, the U.S. was
a secondary destination. For instance, of the total number of Ecuadorian migrants living in
Spain, around 90 percent arrived between 1999 and 2004. The main motivations for leaving
were to search for work or to accept a job oﬀer in the destination country. Since there are
some diﬀerences of remittance behavior of Ecuadorian migrants according to the host coun-
try, the number of migrants within the same household and the years since migration, in
the empirical work we take into account those factors that aﬀect the likelihood of remitting
and the size of remittances.
2.3.3 Empirical methodology
Using household data from Ecuador, this study attempts to answer questions such as Who
remits? Why? and How much?. In particular, the empirical work emphasizes the relation-
ship between individual migrant remittance behavior and the number of migrants within the
same household. This section explores two diﬀerent ways to introduce household migration
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into the econometric model. First, similarly to Funkhouser (1995) and Agarwal & Horowitz
(2002), household migration enters linearly into the regression model by using the number
of migrants within the household. Second, in order to explore the potentially non-linear
relationship between remittances and household migration, it uses indicators for the number
of migrants within the household (i.e. 1 if household has 1 migrant, 1 if household has 2
migrants, etc.). The non-linear approach allows one to investigate whether remittance be-
havior changes between migrants who come from households with 1 migrant and those from
households with 2, between migrants who come from households with 2 migrants and those
from households with 3, and so on. Both sets of regressions are reported in the empirical
results section.
Since migrant remittance behavior implies a two-step decision (see equation (2.8)), the
decision to remit or not and, conditional upon remitting, the amount decision, let’s consider
a censoring from below (zero) or from the left mechanism in which is observed
푎 =
⎧⎨⎩
푎∗ 푖푓 푎∗ > 0
0 푖푓 푎∗ ≤ 0.
(2.10)
Censoring can be fully parametrically speciﬁed. We consider maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) given censoring from zero.16 For 푎 > 0 the density of 푎 is the same as that for 푎∗, so
푓(푎 ∣ 푥) = 푓∗(푦 ∣ 푥), where 푥 represents the set of exogenous variables deﬁned in expression
(2.10). For 푎 = 0, the density is equal to the probability of observing 푎∗ ≤ 0, or equal to
퐹 ∗(0 ∣ 푥). Hence, the censoring mechanism can be written
푓(푎 ∣ 푥) =
⎧⎨⎩
푓∗(푎 ∣ 푥) 푖푓 푎 > 0
퐹 ∗(0 ∣ 푥) 푖푓 푎 = 0.
(2.11)
16According to the theoretical model, the altruistically motivated remittances are allowed only in one
direction, namely from migrants to non-migrants, but not from non-migrants to migrants.
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Now, let an indicator variable be introduced
푑 =
⎧⎨⎩
1 푖푓 푎 > 0
0 푖푓 푎 = 0,
(2.12)
and therefore the conditional density given censoring from zero is given by
푓(푎 ∣ 푥) = [푓∗(푎 ∣ 푥)]푑[퐹 ∗(0 ∣ 푥)](1−푑). (2.13)
For a sample of 푁 independent observations, the censored MLE for the migrant remittance
behavior maximizes
푙푛퐿푁 (훽)
푁∑
푖=1
= 푑푖푙푛푓
∗(푎푖 ∣ 푥푖, 훽) + (1− 푑푖)푙푛퐹 ∗(0 ∣ 푥푖, 훽), (2.14)
where 훽 are the parameters of the distribution of 푎∗. The censored MLE is consistent and
asymptotically normal, provided that the density of the uncensored variable is correctly
speciﬁed 푓∗(푎푖 ∣ 푥푖, 훽).17 A few econometric issues arise in the estimation of expression
(2.14), however. First, since there is a considerable number of zeros on the left side of
(2.14), 38 percent of migrants do not remit, one has to take into account the zero-inﬂated
issue. Second, since the Tobit estimation makes a strong assumption that the same proba-
bility mechanism generates both the zeros and the positive value of remittances, the Tobit
estimates are biased if there is heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the participation regres-
sion and/or outcome regression. To account for these econometric issues, the zero-inﬂated
nature of the dependent variable and the biased estimates from the standard Tobit model,
a censored or two-part model is used, which is more ﬂexible to allow for the possibility
that the zero and positive values are generated by diﬀerent mechanisms.18 Hence, the two-
part estimation employs a logit regression for the censoring mechanism (decision to remit or
17For a further discussion see Cameron & Trivedi (2005, 2009).
18The distribution that applies to 푎푖 is a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions. Under such
circumstances, there are a variety of models that could be estimated to account for the combined nature of
the distribution of 푎푖. See Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo (2006) for a discussion on those alternative models.
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not) and, conditional on the outcome (amount decision) being observed, it uses a log-normal
model for remittance size.19 The two parts are assumed to be independent and estimated
separately as shown in the next section.20 Moreover, since correlation among error terms of
all migrants experiencing the same shocks within a given host country may bias the sample
errors downward, all standard errors (휀푖푗푓 ) are clustered by the migrant’s host country.
The econometric work estimates the following model to examine the determinants of
remittance behavior:
푎푖푗푓 =
⎧⎨⎩
훼+ 훽푙푚푗 + 훿푅푖푗 +푊푖훾 + 푍푗휂 + 휀푖푗푓
푚푎푥{푎∗푖푗푓 , 0},
(2.15)
where 푎푖푗푓 is a binary variable which takes the value of one or zero for the migrant decision
to remit or not to remit and, conditional on the sending of remittances, it measures the
annual amount of remittances sent by individual migrant 푖 to household 푗 from host country
푓 , 푙푚푗 is the migration size or the indicator of the number of migrants from household 푗,
푅푖푗 is a dummy indicating migrant 푖’s relationship with the household head in the source
country, 푊푖 is a vector of dummy variables that includes all characteristics of migrant 푖
including her host country, length of stay, education level prior to migration and motives
for leaving the source country, and 푍푗 denotes a vector of household characteristics, which
includes the gender of the household’s head and the ratio of children to adults within the
household.
19Here, to ensure a positive value for the dependent variable, the density should be that for a positive-
valued random variable, such as the log-normal, or an appropriate density such as the normal truncated
distribution from below at zero. Also, in a random utility model (RUM), which is compatible with the
theoretical model discussed in this paper, assuming that the random component of both utilities are extreme
value type I distributed, it can be shown that the resultant distribution is a logistic distribution for the
censoring mechanism. Hence, the logistic distribution assumption for the censoring mechanism is a proper
assumption here, but also one can assume a probit model and the estimates would be unchanged.
20Allowing for the errors to be correlated as assumed in the sample selection model (MLE and the two-step
Heckman sample selection model) does not aﬀect the main ﬁndings of the empirical work shown in the next
section. This is because both the inverse Mill’s ratio and the correlation between errors of the decision to
remit or not and the amount decision regression (휌) are statistically insigniﬁcant (results can be provided
upon request to the author).
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2.3.4 Results
The main results of the estimates of the determinants of remittances in Ecuador are shown
in tables 2.3-2.6, in which we report the estimates of the two-part model of equation (2.15).
The dependent variable for the logit regression model is equal to 1 if the migrant remits
and equal to 0 if the migrant does not remit. For the OLS regression model, the dependent
variable in tables 2.3 and 2.4 is the log of the annual amount of remittances, in U.S. dollars,
sent per each migrant, whereas in tables 2.5 and 2.6 the dependent variable is the annual
amount of remittances, in U.S. dollars, received per household member in Ecuador. Columns
(1) and (2) show the average marginal probability computed from the logit regression model
for the decision to remit or not to remit and columns (3) and (4) report the estimates of OLS
regression to examine the determinants of the amount of remittances.21 The only diﬀerence
between columns (1) and (2) and between columns (3) and (4) of those tables is that
columns (1) and (3) report the standard-robust errors and columns (2) and (4) report the
cluster-robust standard errors at the migrant host country level. Tables 2.3 and 2.5 provide
the estimation results for the model with linear household migration (size of migration),
whereas table 2.4 and 2.6 give the results for the model with non-linear household migration
(dummies for the number of migrants within the household).
The estimates shown by table 2.3 are qualitatively similar to those ﬁndings reported by
table 2.5, while the estimates of table 2.4 are also similar to those results shown by table
2.6.22 Therefore, the estimates shown in this paper seem to be robust to an alternative
21Notice that the estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) of tables 2.3 and 2.5 are the same because
the dependent variable for the logit regressions is the same in both tables, namely equal to 1 if the migrant
remits and equal to 0 if the migrant does not remit. For the same reason, the estimates in columns (1) and
(2) of tables 2.4 and 2.6 are the same.
22Notice that the same regressors that are statistically signiﬁcant in table 2.3 are signiﬁcant in table 2.5 as
well. In general, the same applies for the estimates reported by tables 2.4 and 2.6, except for the coeﬃcients
of the regressors of both “migrant’s host country is Italy” and “migrant’s status within the family is not a
close relative”. The migrant’s host country coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant in table 2.4, but it is not in
table 2.6 and the migrant’s status within the household is not statistically signiﬁcant in table 2.4, but it is
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measure of remittance size.
The results for Ecuadorian migrants are generally supportive of the predictions of the
model. Tables 2.3 and 2.5 show that there is a negative relationship between migrant re-
mittance behavior and the migration size within the same household. Both the decision to
remit and the size of remittance are negatively associated with migration size and are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant.23 If the migration size increases by 1 migrant, the likelihood of sending
or receiving remittances decline, on average, 2 percent and the amount sent per migrant
and received per household member decline, on average, 13.7 and 18.5 percent, respectively.
Even though this result may be consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model, it
might require a deeper inspection.24 It could be induced by the large diﬀerence between the
amount sent by individual migrants who come from households with one migrant and the
amount sent by those who come from households with more than one migrant. In fact, the
average amount of remittances sent by those individuals who are the sole migrants within
their households is almost twice as large as that sent by those who come from households
with 2, 3 and 4 migrants (see table 2.1).
In order to show a more complete picture of the relationship between migrant remittance
behavior and household migration, tables 2.4 and 2.6 show the estimates of indicators for
those coming from households with 2, 3, 4, or 5 migrants, where the omitted group is
migrants who are the sole migrants within their households. As expected, the amount of
remittance sent by individual migrants who come from households with 2 to 5 migrants
in table 2.6.
23Henceforth the magnitude results shown here are taken from tables 2.4 and 2.6. The estimates of the
logit regressions are the same in both tables, but the estimates of the OLS regression are diﬀerent, namely,
the estimates of table 2.4 refer to amount sent per migrant and the estimates of table 2.6 refer to the amount
received per household member in Ecuador.
24The theoretical model described above predicts that more migrants implies lower remittances by the
Nash assumption. If this eﬀect overcomes the implied reduction of household income due to the forgone
earnings, then migrant remittance behavior and migration size would be negatively associated.
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is signiﬁcantly lower than that sent by individuals who are the sole migrants within their
household. As follows from table 2.4, the migrants who come from households with 2, 3, 4
and 5 migrants remit 32.1, 35.2, 23.9 and 34.4 percent less, respectively, than the migrants
who come from households with one migrant. Similarly from table 2.6, the amount received
per household member with 2, 3, 4, and 5 migrants is 43.6, 46.1, 36.7 and 89.4 percent
lower, in that order, than the amount received by those individuals from households with
only one migrant, in that order. However, only those individuals who come from households
with 4 migrants have a statistically signiﬁcant lower likelihood of remitting than those from
households with only 1 migrant (-13.7 percent). A closer inspection of the estimates of the
remittance size regression reveals that coeﬃcients for migrants who come from households
with 2, 3 and 4 migrants are not statistically diﬀerent.25 However, migrants who come from
households with 5 migrants tend to remit a signiﬁcantly lower amount of remittances than
those migrants who come from households with 2, 3 or 4 migrants.
These ﬁndings suggest that remittance size and household migration are no increasing
associated. Hence, it seems that when migration size changes from 2 to 3 and from 3
to 4 migrants within the same household, the forgone household income due to migration
might have a positive eﬀect on altruistically motivated remittances, which compensates
for the negative eﬀect of the increased number of migrants on the individual amount of
remittances. If there is a positive selection of migrants in the sense that the more educated
individuals within the household are those who migrate, then one would expect that the
forgone household income due to migration is higher than when there is a negative selection.
According to the Ecuadorian data of households with at least 1 migrant, prior to migration
the individuals who left had a higher education level than those relatives left behind. The
25One cannot reject the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal.
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average years of schooling of the migrants was 3.5 years higher than the non-migrants.
Moreover, the higher the migration rate within a household, the more the labor supply
of that household is reduced.26 The results of allowing a non-linear relationship between
migrant remittance behavior and household migration are partially distinguished from those
reached when there is a linear relationship (tables 2.3 and 2.5) and also contrast with
the predictions of rent-seeking literature.27 Summarizing, the empirical evidence discussed
above suggests that migrant worker remittance behavior is a non-increasing function of the
number of migrants within the household.
This paper also ﬁnds robust evidence in favor of altruistically motivated remittance
behavior. There are several signs that remittances might be altruistically motivated. First,
households headed by females are more likely both to receive and to receive more remittances
than households whose heads are males. If the households’ heads are females, they are on
average, 11.4 percent more likely to receive remittances than households headed by males
and when the former do receive remittances, the amount sent per migrant and received
per household member is 34.4 and 66.9 percent higher, respectively, than the amount sent
to and received by the latter households. The facts that the female labor participation
rate is likely lower than the male labor participation rate in developing countries and that
female wages are likely lower than those earned by their male counterparts support the
altruistically motivated remittance hypothesis. Second, households with higher ratios of
children to adults are more likely to receive remittances and in greater amounts. When
the percentage of children within the households increases 1 percent, the probability of
26Here, migration rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of migrants within the household to the total
number of individuals age 15 or older within the household (including migrants).
27As pointed out by Docquier & Rapoport (2006), if we allow for multiple migrants competing for inheri-
tance, then “we would expect remittances per migrant to ﬁrst increase and then decrease with the number
of other migrants as the eﬀect of competition is oﬀset by the decrease in one’s probability of inheritance”.
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sending or receiving remittances increases 0.2 percent and the amount sent per migrant
and received per household member increases 1.2 and 0.8 percent, respectively. A higher
child ratio means lower labor income per individual within the household and this result
implies that such households are more likely to receive remittances and to receive more than
households with a lower ratio of children to adults. According to the Ecuadorian data, of
the sample of households with at least one migrant, less than 7 percent of the children were
involved in household labor activities or in remunerated labor.
The migrant’s status within the household is also relevant in determining remittance
behavior. Migrants who are not spouses, parents or children of the remaining household
head are less likely to send money and send less than those who are. When the migrant
is not a close relative of the household’s head, the likelihood of sending remittances is 24.6
percent lower than when migrants are close relative. The amount received per household
member from migrants who are not close relatives is 25.6 percent lower than the amount
received from migrants who are close relatives. Migrants whose motivation for migration
was studying or unifying the family are less likely to remit (-15.2 percent) and remit less
than migrants whose motivation for migration was the search for work or accepting a labor
oﬀer in the host country. The elasticity of the amount sent per migrant and received per
household member with respect to the migrant’s left for studying or unifying family is
equal to 44.0 and 41.9 percent, respectively. Finally, the migrant’s years of schooling are
not signiﬁcantly correlated with the probability to remit, but of those migrants who remit,
the more educated persons tend to send a higher amount of remittances.28 The elasticity
of the amount sent per migrant and received per household member with respect to the
28This ﬁnding is similar to that found by Osili (2007), where remittances are more likely motivated by
investment motives or saving motives in the source country. It is also consistent with the predictions of
repayment-motivated remittances.
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migrant’s years of schooling is equal to 3.4 and 4.4 percent, respectively.
Also of note, while the relationship between the likelihood of remitting and the length
of time since migration seems to show a kind of U-inverse-shaped curve (increasing at the
beginning of the stay in the host country and declining later), the relationship between the
amount of remittances and the length of stay appears to show a U-shaped curve.29 The
migrant’s host country also seems to be important in explaining migrant worker remittance
behavior. Ecuadorian migrants who moved to Spain are 1.7 percent less likely to remit
and remit 22.7 percent less than those migrants whose destination country was the United
States, which might reﬂect the lower unemployment rate and the higher potential earnings
in the United States relative to Spain. According to World Bank data, while the per capita
income in the U.S. was 36,451 dollars in 2004 (constant 2000 U.S. dollars), the per capita
incomes in Spain was 15,356 dollars in 2004. Likewise, the unemployment rates in the U.S.
and Spain in 2004 were 6 percent and 11 percent, respectively. The fact that European
countries such as Spain and Italy were choices for Ecuadorian migrants, despite the lower
potential earnings there relative to the U.S., could reveal the depth of the decline of per
capita income in Ecuador during the last migration surge (1999 to 2004). Thus, it might
suggest that the extent of the income diﬀerential became suﬃciently high that migration to
Spain and Italy was then proﬁtable, which perhaps would not happen given a predominance
of long term economic conditions. As a matter of fact, before 1999 the preferred destination
29Additional estimations using dummies instead of years of stay show that migrants who left the source
country within 5 years tend to remit more than those migrants who stayed in the host country for more than
5 years. However, the probability to remit is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the migrant’s years of stay in the
host country. Lucas & Stark (1985) link duration of migration with remittances as follows: “If out of sight,
out of mind were the rule, one should expect remittances to fade with duration of absence. If repayment of
school costs were the target, again remittances should ultimately cease”, whereas ? investigate repayments
of international migration costs instead of education costs in Pakistan. Therefore, another competing hy-
pothesis that may justify the remittance behavior reported here would be “repayment motives”, which may
include repayments of incurred moving costs or repayments of education costs. A further discussion can be
seen in Docquier & Rapoport (2006), in which the authors contrast predictions of competing hypotheses.
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country for Ecuadorian migrants was the U.S..
2.4 Conclusions and ﬁnal comments
The analytical model developed in this paper analyzes the determinants of individual mi-
grant remittance behavior and extends the altruism-based frameworks proposed by Lucas
& Stark (1985) and Funkhouser (1995). This model predicts that migrants with higher
labor income are more likely to remit and tend to remit more, households with lower in-
come tend to receive more remittances, both the likelihood of remitting and remittance size
are positively related to the degree of proximity between the migrants and the remaining
household members in the source country and the relationship between migrant worker re-
mittances and the length of stay in the host country might be non-monotonic over time.
It also demonstrates that when forgone household labor income is taken into account the
individual migrant remittance is a non-increasing function of household migration size. The
main ﬁndings in the empirical part of this paper are generally supportive of the predictions
of the model.
Future research related with remittances might be focused on the consequences of re-
mittances for developing countries. Remittances may prove poverty-alleviating and reduce
inequality, either directly through ﬂows to the poor, if not the poorest, or indirectly through
a stimulant eﬀect on the local economy. Moreover, remittances may have long-term eﬀects
by overcoming liquidity constraints and allowing investment in the education and health
care of receiving families. Similarly, remittances create a stable source of income which
has a positive eﬀect on exchange reserves and the balance of payments and might enhance
ﬁnancial development in small cities or towns of the source country. As foreign exchange
inﬂow, remittances enter the economy in a diﬀerent way than private capital inﬂows, for-
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eign investment or ﬁnancial aid, and, until now, there is no systematic study for a better
understanding of those diﬀerences. In fact, macroeconomic eﬀects remain poorly modeled
and poorly understood. Particularly lacking are models that may facilitate the evaluation
of both migration and remittance eﬀects. However, many nations, like Ecuador, presume
major beneﬁts from remittance inﬂow and some actively promote additional ﬂow, both
through eﬀorts to lower transfer fees and through oﬀers of alternatives for investment with
government and international agency support.
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Table 2.1: Ecuadorian Migrant Remittance Behavior by Number of Migrants within the
Household
Full Number of Migrants within
Variables Sample the Household
One Two Three Four Five
A. Remitter and Non-Remitter
Remittances Per Migrant 1,164 1,539 879 843 808 749
Remittances Per Household Member 353 490 257 261 201 146
Number of Observations 1529 705 389 202 149 84
B. Only Remitter
Remittances Per Migrant 1,870 2,369 1,500 1,281 1,469 1,234
Remittances Per Household Member 567 754 438 397 365 241
Number of Observations 952 458 228 133 82 51
C. Percentage of Migrants Who Remit 0.62 0.65 0.59 0.66 0.55 0.61
Data Source: 2004 Demographic, Maternal, and Infant Health Survey, Center of Population Studies and
Social Development, Ecuador. Remittances are expressed in U.S. dollars
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Table 2.2: Ecuador: Migrant and Non-migrant Characteristics
Full Number of Migrants
Variables Sample within the Household
One Two Three Four Five
A. Household Characteristics
Size of Migration 2.030 1 2 3 4 5
Migration Rate 0.337 0.235 0.360 0.452 0.470 0.584
1 if Household’s Head is Female 0.332 0.381 0.254 0.356 0.281 0.309
Years of Schooling 6.5 7.4 6.2 5.9 5.2 5.0
Percentage of Children within the Household 19.25 21.92 17.05 15.1 21.1 13.4
B. Migrant Characteristics
B1. Length of Migration
1 if from 0 to 1 year 0.147 0.173 0.118 0.173 0.114 0.071
1 if from 2 to 5 years 0.599 0.639 0.614 0.475 0.510 0.654
Years since Migration 4.9 4.4 5.3 5.3 5.8 5
B2. Host Country
1 if Host Country is Spain 0.454 0.496 0.437 0.381 0.463 0.345
1 if Host Country is Italy 0.057 0.069 0.061 0.039 0.040 0.011
1 if Host Country is Other (27 others) 0.068 0.093 0.061 0.034 0.053 0
B3. Status within the Household
1 if Migrant is not a Close Relative 0.207 0.194 0.205 0.287 0.154 0.226
B4. Motive for Migration
1 if Left for Studying or Unifying Family 0.170 0.180 0.179 0.138 0.100 0.238
B5. Education
Years of Schooling 9.8 10.1 9.8 8.9 10.0 9.3
Data Source: 2004 Demographic, Maternal, and Infant Health Survey, Center of Population Studies and
Social Development, Ecuador. Total annual and average annual remittances are expressed in U.S. dollars.
Household size was computed by adding up the number of migrants within the household and the number
of individuals age 15 or older within the household who stay in Ecuador.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant Remits
for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances in U.S. Dollars for the
OLS Model
Two Part Model
Variable Logit Model (AME) OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Household Characteristics
Size of Migration -0.020** -0.020*** -0.137*** -0.137***
(0.0098) (0.0076) (0.0374) (0.0409)
1 if Household Head is Female 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.347*** 0.347***
(0.0248) (0.0156) (0.0923) (0.1179)
Ratio of Children to Adults 0.0022*** 0.002*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0026) (0.0012)
B. Migrant Characteristics
Length since Migration 0.017** 0.017*** -0.062*** -0.062***
(0.0088) (0.0051) (0.0228) (0.0206)
Length since Migration Squared -0.001* -0.001*** 0.002** 0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Host Country is Spain -0.023 -0.023*** -0.201* -0.201***
(0.0269) (0.0075) (0.1031) (0.0328)
Host Country is Italy -0.009 -0.009 -0.152 -0.152**
(0.0527) (0.0102) (0.1920) (0.0560)
Host Country is Other (27 others) -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.151 -0.151
(0.0512) (0.0730) (0.2471) (0.2107)
Migrant is not a Close Relative -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.224* -0.224*
(0.0301) (0.0444) (0.1295) (0.1169)
Left for Studying or Unifying Family -0.149*** -0.1493*** -0.459*** -0.459*
(0.0336) (0.0551) (0.1423) (0.2392)
Years of Schooling -0.004 -0.0042 0.035*** 0.035**
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0115) (0.0123)
Constant 0.756*** 0.756** 6.644*** 6.644***
(0.2537) (0.3140) (0.1986) (0.0656)
Observations 1529 1529 952 952
Pseudo R2 0.0868 0.0868
R-Squared 0.1144 0.1144
Data Source: 2004 Demographic, Maternal and Infant Health Survey, Center of Population Stud-
ies and Social Development, Ecuador. While columns (1) and (3) report robust standard errors,
columns (2) and (4) report cluster-robust standard errors at the migrant host country level. Co-
eﬃcients of the logit model are the average marginal eﬀect (AME), which are computed using the
added command 푚푎푟푔푒푓푓 . * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant Remits
for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances in U.S. Dollars for the
OLS Model
Two Part Model
Variable Logit Model (AME) OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Household Characteristic
Household has 2 Migrants -0.051* -0.051 -0.321*** -0.321***
(0.0298) (0.0451) (0.1106) (0.0548)
Household has 3 Migrants 0.016 0.016 -0.352** -0.352***
(0.0390) (0.0612) (0.1461) (0.1033)
Household has 4 Migrants -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.239 -0.239**
(0.0428) (0.0441) (0.1480) (0.1131)
Household has 5 Migrants -0.037 -0.037 -0.686*** -0.686*
(0.0535) (0.0446) (0.1986) (0.3503)
1 if Household Head is Female 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.344*** 0.344***
(0.0250) (0.0136) (0.0924) (0.1123)
Ratio of Children to Adults 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0014)
B. Migrant Characteristics
Length since Migration 0.0191** 0.019*** -0.066*** -0.066***
(0.0089) (0.0047) (0.0229) (0.0195)
Length since Migration Squared -0.001* -0.001*** 0.002** 0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Host Country is Spain -0.017 -0.017** -0.227** -0.227***
(0.0268) (0.0078) (0.1043) (0.0383)
Host Country is Italy -0.004 -0.0042 -0.161 -0.161**
(0.0521) (0.0128) (0.1928) (0.0588)
Host Country is Other (27 others) -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.178 -0.178
(0.0521) (0.0748) (0.2514) (0.2138)
Migrant is not a Close Relative -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.209 -0.209
(0.0300) (0.0408) (0.1317) (0.1302)
Left for Studying or Unifying Family -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.440*** -0.440*
(0.0335) (0.0484) (0.1419) (0.2132)
Years of Schooling -0.003 -0.003 0.034*** 0.034**
(0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0116) (0.0143)
Constant 0.614** 0.614* 6.588*** 6.588***
(0.2403) (0.3649) (0.1935) (0.1514)
Observations 1529 1529 952 952
R-squared 0.1194 0.1194
Pseudo R2 0.0914 0.0914
Data Source: 2004 Demographic, Maternal and Infant Health Survey, Center of Population Stud-
ies and Social Development, Ecuador. While columns (1) and (3) report robust standard errors,
columns (2) and (4) report cluster-robust standard errors at the migrant host country level. Co-
eﬃcients of the logit model are the average marginal eﬀect (AME), which are computed using the
added command 푚푎푟푔푒푓푓 . * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant Remits
for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances per Household Member
(Receivers) in U.S. Dollars for the OLS Model
Two Part Model
Variable Logit Model (AME) OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Household Characteristics
Size of Migration -0.020** -0.020*** -0.185*** -0.185***
(0.0098) (0.0076) (0.0370) (0.0307)
1 if Household Head is Female 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.675*** 0.675***
(0.0248) (0.0156) (0.0923) (0.1421)
Ration of Children to Adults 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0026) (0.0015)
B. Migrant Characteristics
Length since Migration 0.017** 0.017*** -0.057** -0.057**
(0.0088) (0.0051) (0.0224) (0.0247)
Length since Migration Squared -0.001* -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Host Country is Spain -0.023 -0.023*** -0.121 -0.121***
(0.0269) (0.0075) (0.1031) (0.0406)
Host Country is Italy -0.0098 -0.009 -0.036 -0.036
(0.0527) (0.0102) (0.2057) (0.0443)
Host Country is Other (27 more) -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.059 -0.059
(0.0512) (0.0730) (0.2745) (0.2178)
Migrant is not a Close Relative -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.273** -0.273**
(0.0301) (0.0444) (0.1320) (0.1088)
Left for Studying or Unifying Family -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.440*** -0.440*
(0.0336) (0.0551) (0.1454) (0.2203)
Years of Schooling -0.004 -0.004 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0115) (0.0085)
Constant 0.756*** 0.756** 5.528*** 5.528***
(0.2537) (0.3140) (0.1975) (0.0629)
Observations 1529 1529 952 952
Pseudo R2 0.0868 0.0868
R-squared 0.1194 0.1194
Data Source: 2004 Demographic, Maternal and Infant Health Survey, Center of Population Stud-
ies and Social Development, Ecuador. While columns (1) and (3) report robust standard errors,
columns (2) and (4) report cluster-robust standard errors at the migrant host country level. Co-
eﬃcients of the logit model are the average marginal eﬀect (AME), which are computed using the
added stata command 푚푎푟푔푒푓푓 . * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at
1%.
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Table 2.6: Determinants of Remittance Behavior in Ecuador: Equal to 1 if Migrant Remits
for the Logit Model and the Log of Individual Migrant Remittances per Household Member
(Receivers) in U.S. Dollars for the OLS Model
Two Part Model
Variable Logit Model (AME) OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Household Characteristic
Household has 2 Migrants -0.051* -0.051 -0.436*** -0.436***
(0.0298) (0.0451) (0.1122) (0.0431)
Household has 3 Migrants 0.016 0.016 -0.461*** -0.461***
(0.0390) (0.0612) (0.1509) (0.0909)
Household has 4 Migrants -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.367** -0.367***
(0.0428) (0.0441) (0.1458) (0.1127)
Household has 5 Migrants -0.037 -0.037 -0.894*** -0.894***
(0.0535) (0.0446) (0.1943) (0.3011)
1 if Household Head is Female 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.669*** 0.669***
(0.0250) (0.0136) (0.0923) (0.1373)
Ratio of Children to Adults 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0015)
B. Migrant Characteristics
Length since Migration 0.019** 0.019*** -0.061*** -0.061**
(0.0089) (0.0047) (0.0226) (0.0234)
Length since Migration Squared -0.001* -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Host Country is Spain -0.0170 -0.017** -0.152 -0.152***
(0.0268) (0.0078) (0.1045) (0.0406)
Host Country is Italy -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.047 -0.047
(0.0521) (0.0128) (0.2058) (0.0487)
Host Country is Other (27 others) -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.090 -0.090
(0.0521) (0.0748) (0.2805) (0.2233)
Migrant is not a Close Relative -0.2469*** -0.246*** -0.256* -0.256**
(0.0300) (0.0408) (0.1342) (0.1121)
Left for Studying or Unifying Family -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.419*** -0.419**
(0.0335) (0.0484) (0.1449) (0.1894)
Years of Schooling -0.003 -0.003 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0116) (0.0102)
Constant 0.614** 0.614* 5.447*** 5.447***
(0.2403) (0.3649) (0.1939) (0.1165)
Observations 1529 1529 952 952
R-squared 0.1271 0.1271
Pseudo R2 0.0914 0.0914
Data Source: 2004 Demographic, Maternal and Infant Health Survey, Center of Population Stud-
ies and Social Development, Ecuador. While columns (1) and (3) report robust standard errors,
columns (2) and (4) report cluster-robust standard errors at the migrant host country level. Co-
eﬃcients of the logit model are the average marginal eﬀect (AME), which are computed using the
added stata command 푚푎푟푔푒푓푓 . * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at
1%.
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3 Human Capital Consequences of Civil War:
Evidence from Guatemala
(with Rubiana Chamarbagwala)
3.1 Introduction
The microeconomic impact of war on civilian populations can be substantial and persistent.
Not only can people living in war zones suﬀer injuries and have their property destroyed,
they may also be displaced from their homes, lose their means of survival, or be unable
to attend school, all of which may result in a permanent decline in their productivity and
earnings. Understanding which economic consequences of conﬂict are more profound or
persistent is important for implementing post-conﬂict reconstruction eﬀectively. Moreover,
since war costs tend to be disproportionately borne by the poor and most vulnerable pop-
ulations, conﬂict may intensify poverty and inequality (Quinn et al. 2007). Thus, evidence
of the negative consequences of war can help identify those populations that reconstruction
policy should target. This paper examines how Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war between
1960 and 1996 aﬀected human capital accumulation of individuals exposed to it and which
demographic groups were worst aﬀected.
There is a large literature that examines the aggregate eﬀects of armed conﬂict on
investment, income, and growth.1 One set of studies ﬁnds that populations quickly recover
back to pre-war trends. Cities that experienced heavy bombing during World War II were
1See Blattman & Miguel (2008) for an extensive survey of the causes and eﬀects of civil war.
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indistinguishable from those that were not bombed 20 to 25 years after the war in Japan
(Davis & Weinstein 2002) and in Germany (Brakman et al. 2004). After the Vietnam War,
Miguel & Roland (2005) ﬁnd that physical infrastructure, education, and poverty levels all
converged across regions within 25 years.
The cross-country literature also ﬁnds rapid recovery of postwar economies (Organski
& Kugler 1977, 1980, Przeworski et al. 2000). Compared to currency crises, banking crises,
and sudden shifts in executive power, Cerra & Saxena (2008) ﬁnd that while civil wars cause
the largest short-run fall in output (six percent on average), output also rebounds quickly
only in the case of civil war, recovering half of the fall within a decade. In countries aﬀected
by civil war, economic, social, and political development are also found to improve steadily
after a war (Chen et al. 2008). Evidence on the short-run eﬀects of war and violence also
exists. Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003) ﬁnd that terrorist violence in the Basque region of
Spain signiﬁcantly reduced economic growth relative to it’s neighboring regions. Justino &
Verwimp (2006) ﬁnd that 20 percent of the Rwandan population moved into poverty after
the genocide. In a study of African countries aﬀected by internal armed conﬂicts, Stewart
et al. (2001) ﬁnd that primary school enrollments decreased in only three out of eighteen
countries, but improved in ﬁve during civil conﬂicts and that on average, girls fared better
than boys since boys often serve in the army.
The recent availability of data from war regions has resulted in a growing empirical lit-
erature that estimates the microeconomic eﬀects of war on income, poverty, wealth, health,
and education, for both combatants and civilians. The long-term health eﬀects of war ap-
pear to be signiﬁcant. Alderman et al. (2004) ﬁnd that young children who suﬀered from
war-related malnutrition in Zimbabwe are signiﬁcantly shorter as adults and that this may
aﬀect their lifetime labor productivity. Akresh et al. (2007) ﬁnd a negative relationship
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between height-for-age z-scores and exposure to the Rwandan civil war, the eﬀect being
particularly strong for girls. In a similar paper, Akresh et al. (2009) ﬁnd that an addi-
tional month of war exposure in rural Burundi decreases children’s’ height-for-age z-scores
compared to non-exposed children.
There is growing body of research that estimates the impact of war on schooling and
labor market outcomes. Examining the eﬀect of Uganda’s civil conﬂict on combatants,
Blattman & Annan (2007) ﬁnd that male youth who were recruited into armed groups
received less schooling, are less likely to have a skilled job, and also earn lower wages.
de Walque (2006) ﬁnds that individuals with an urban, educated background are more likely
to have died during the Cambodian genocide period of 1975-1978 and as a result, males
of school age during that period have less education than previous or subsequent cohorts.
Akresh & de Walque (2008) ﬁnd a strong negative impact of the Rwandan genocide on
schooling, with children exposed to the civil war experiencing an 18.3 percent decline in
their average years of education. The authors ﬁnd a stronger negative eﬀect for males
and for the non-poor. For Central Asia, Shemyakina (2006) ﬁnds that adolescent Tajik
girls whose homes were destroyed during the civil war are less likely to obtain secondary
education and that this aﬀects their wages. Unlike Stewart et al. (2001), de Walque (2006),
and Akresh & de Walque (2008), Shemyakina (2006) ﬁnds that the civil war in Tajikistan
only decreased school enrollments of 12-16 year old girls living in high conﬂict intensity
areas but had no signiﬁcant impact on the education of boys or younger children.
In this paper, we examine the impact of Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war (1960-1996)
on childrens human capital accumulation. Even though the civil war lasted 36 years, the
worst period of the war began in 1979 and ended in 1984, during which over 90 percent of
the total human rights violations were committed. According to the Commission for His-
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torical Clariﬁcation (CEH) and Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REMHI), roughly
200,000 individuals lost their lives or disappeared, more than 500,000 people or 8.3 percent
of the 1983 population were displaced, and many Mayan villages were completely destroyed
as a result of the civil war (Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation 1999, Archdiocese of
Guatemala 1999, Perera & Chauche 1995)2. Of the cases of human rights violations docu-
mented by the CEH, 83 percent of fully identiﬁed victims were Mayan and 17 percent were
Ladino.3 The civil war in Guatemala began as a military rebellion that intensiﬁed during
the 1970s. The period between 1960 and 1978 was relatively peaceful, until the worst period
of the war began in 1979 and lasted until 1984. From 1985 onwards, the violence declined
rapidly, until the war ended in 1996. Most human rights violations were committed by the
state against the civilian population and left a large number of children orphaned and aban-
doned. Families and communities lost property and their means of survival. The increase
in military spending diverted necessary investments of public resources away from health
and education, resulting in the abandonment of social development.4 This accelerated the
deterioration of health and educational conditions in those areas most severely aﬀected by
the confrontation. In addition, the destruction of physical assets, including private and
community property, and the loss of infrastructure, such as bridges and electrical towers,
also represented considerable losses and amounted to over 6 percent of the country’s 1990
gross domestic product. These material losses frequently involved the total destruction of
family capital, especially among Mayan families, and particularly in the west and north-west
2The CEH was sponsored by the United Nations whereas the REMHI was sponsored by the Archdiocese
of Guatemala.
3According to the Guatemalan population census of 2002, 41 percent of the total population was self-
identiﬁed as Mayan and 59 percent was self-identiﬁed as Ladinos. Mayan refers to the native or indigenous
population and Ladinos are a socio-ethnic category that, in the Guatemalan case, represents a mix between
Spanish and Mayans.
4In 1985, public investment in physical capital reached its lowest level in the last 40 years and represented
only 2 percent of the country’s GDP.
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of Guatemala.
Given the length of the war, the economic consequences are estimated to be severe.
Based on its investigation of the economic costs of the armed confrontation and taking
only the 10-year period between 1980 and 1989, the CEH estimates that the total direct
quantiﬁable costs were equivalent to zero production in Guatemala for almost 15 months,
equal to 121 percent of the country’s 1990 GDP. The majority of the costs resulted from
the loss of production potential due to the death, disappearance, or forced displacement of
individuals who had to abandon their daily activities or from recruitment into the Patrullas
de Autodefensa Civil (PAC), the Army, or the guerrillas. The destruction of physical assets,
including private and community property, and the loss of infrastructure also represented
considerable losses. These material losses frequently involved the total destruction of family
capital, especially among Mayan families, and particularly in the west and north-west of
Guatemala.
We use the 2002 National Population Census and the distribution of the number of
human rights violations and victims across departments to examine the magnitude of the
war’s eﬀect on years of schooling and grade completion. Even though previous studies have
examined the eﬀect of civil war on schooling, this paper contributes to the literature in three
important dimensions. First, Guatemala’s civil war is unique in that it lasted 36 years and
had three distinct periods with varying levels of war intensity. This allows us to examine
the schooling outcomes of three cohorts who may have been diﬀerentially aﬀected by the
war, as illustrated in Table 3.1. The ﬁrst cohort was school age during the initial, relatively
peaceful period (1960-1978), the second cohort was school age during the worst period of
the war (1979-1984), and the third cohort was school age during the latter part of the
war (1985-1996), which again was relatively peaceful. We therefore expect a small impact
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of the war on the education of the ﬁrst and third cohorts but a fairly large eﬀect on the
schooling of the second cohort. Our empirical strategy enables us to assess the long-term
and incremental eﬀects of internal conﬂict, which is not possible with most civil wars since
they last a relatively short period of time.
Second, we estimate the eﬀect of the war on schooling outcomes for eight demographic
groups based on gender, urban-rural residence, and ethnicity in order to identify those
groups that were most aﬀected by the war. This is particularly relevant since most civil
wars target speciﬁc ethnic groups and as a result may aﬀect various demographic groups
diﬀerently. Moreover, since these eight groups generally represent varying levels of wealth,
we can examine the eﬀect of the war on more socio-economically privileged groups, namely
urban non-Mayans, as well as on socially excluded and poorer groups, namely rural Mayans.5
Since the majority of human rights violations occurred against the Mayan population in
rural areas, we expect that the civil war in Guatemala may have disproportionately aﬀected
the schooling of rural Mayan children.
Finally, we include an analysis of schooling outcomes for a cohort who was school age for
each of grades 1 to 6 during post-war years, that is from 1997 onwards. Since the war ended
in December 1996 and our data comes from the 2002 Census, we observe individuals who
were old enough to have had the opportunity to complete grades 1 to 6 after the war ended.
By comparing grade completion of these post-war cohorts to those who were primary school
age during the latter period of the war, we examine the speed of post-war recovery in terms
of education.
We ﬁnd a strong negative impact of the civil war on the education of rural Mayan
males and females, which supports the conclusion that internal armed conﬂict reinforces
5According to the poverty reduction strategy report (Secretaria Planiﬁcacion y Programacion 2006), 31
percent of Mayans and 14 percent of non-Mayans had an income less than $1 in 1989.
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poverty and social exclusion among the most vulnerable groups. Among rural Mayan males,
those who were school age during the three periods of the civil war in departments where
more human rights violations were committed completed 0.27, 0.71, and 1.09 years less of
schooling respectively whereas rural Mayan females exposed to the three periods of the war
completed 0.12, 0.47, and 1.17 years less of schooling respectively. Given an average of 4.66
and 3.83 years of schooling for males and females, these represent declines of 6, 15, and
23 percent for males and 3, 12, and 30 percent for females. Our results are robust to the
inclusion of indicators for department of residence, year of birth, and controls for diﬀerent
trends in education and human development in war aﬀected and peaceful departments
of Guatemala. Examining grade completion, we ﬁnd that it was primarily due to a lower
likelihood of completing primary school grades that rural Mayan males and females received
less schooling as a result of the war. This result is not surprising since only 25 percent of the
population in Guatemala receive more than a primary education. Finally, we ﬁnd that rural
Mayan males and females who were primary school age during post-war years in higher war
intensity departments were more likely to complete each of grades 1 through 6 or higher,
suggesting that at least primary school outcomes improved immediately after the war for
the two groups most aﬀected by it.
Our results show that Guatemala’s civil war had a negative impact on the human capital
accumulation of two of the most vulnerable demographic groups and may have lowered the
adult wages and labor productivity of these individuals. That rural Mayan children who
were school age during the ﬁnal, relatively peaceful period of the war received less schooling
than those who were school age during the most violent period is an interesting ﬁnding, for
which we provide two possible explanations. First, the war may have resulted in long-term
poverty among rural Mayans which lasted well after the violence declined. The sheer length
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of the war may have progressively worsened the poverty of vulnerable groups over time.
Second, children in our sample who were school age during the latter period of the war
may include individuals whose parents were displaced from their homes. If these displaced
families remained in or moved to higher war intensity departments and if their children
were born after they were displaced, then the education of these children may have been
most severely aﬀected by the war. Since the majority of displacements occurred among
rural Mayans during the worst period of the war (1979-1984), children in our sample who
were born in 1978-1983 and were school age in 1985-1996 may include a large number from
displaced families. Given that the loss of property and means of livelihood was greatest for
displaced families, it is likely that the poverty of these families was most severely aﬀected
by the war. Therefore, it is not surprising that educational outcomes are worst for rural
Mayan children who were school age during the latter period of the war.
Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war appears to have intensiﬁed gender, regional, sectoral,
and ethnic disparities in human capital accumulation. As Table 3.2 shows, among individu-
als born between 1920 and 1983, average schooling is 2.27 years higher in the 17 lowest war
intensity departments compared to the top ﬁve high war intensity departments, 3.74 years
higher in urban than in rural areas, and 3.15 years higher among non-Mayan than Mayan
people. Gender diﬀerences also exist, with female education lagging behind male education
throughout the entire country but especially in high war intensity departments and among
Mayans. Despite the negative consequences of the war, however, primary school outcomes
of the worst aﬀected groups improved among cohorts who were school age during post-
war years. While this ﬁnding is encouraging, we cannot be certain that this improvement
continued over time.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the historical context and
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impact of the civil war. Section 3.3 describes the data and empirical identiﬁcation strategy.
Section 3.4 presents the results and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Civil War in Guatemala
3.2.1 Political History
Located in Central America, Guatemala borders Mexico to the north and west, the Paciﬁc
Ocean to the southwest, Belize and the Caribbean Sea to the northeast, and Honduras and
El Salvador to the southeast. With a current population of 13,002,206. The country consists
of 22 geographical departments, which in turn consist of 331 counties. More than half of
Guatemalans are descendants of indigenous Mayans and a substantial proportion of the
population are of mixed European and indigenous ancestry and are known as Ladinos. Most
of Guatemala’s population is rural, though urbanization is accelerating. The predominant
religion is Roman Catholicism, into which many indigenous Guatemalans have incorporated
traditional forms of worship. Between 1960 and 1996, the country experienced a 36-year
civil war, the worst period of which occurred between 1979 and 1984.
After Spanish colonial rule for 300 years, Guatemala gained independence from Spain in
1821. An authoritarian state was then created which excluded the indigenous population,
was racist in its precepts and practices, and served to protect the economic interests of the
privileged minority. The state gradually evolved as an instrument for the protection of the
concentration of productive wealth in the hands of the non-Mayan population, guaranteeing
the continuation of social exclusion and injustice, which led to protest and political insta-
bility. Faced with movements proposing economic, political, social, or cultural change, the
state increasingly resorted to violence and terror in order to maintain social control.
Among the potential causes of the Guatemalan civil war was the chronic status quo of
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inequality and social exclusion that was inherited from the colonial period (Commission for
Historical Clariﬁcation 1999, Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999, Perera & Chauche 1995). For
example, in Quiche´, the department most aﬀected by the civil war and where almost 100
percent of the population is Mayan, by 1964 90 and 97 percent of households did not have
access to water and electricity, respectively.6 Other factors that may have played a relevant
role in the Guatemalan civil war was the global cold war confrontation and U.S. economic
interests. With the support of the CIA an authoritarian right-wing government was installed
in 1954, after overthrowing the popular elected liberal president Jacobo Arbenz. This
liberal president had started an extensive land reform program in 1952, which adversely
aﬀected big land owners and favored mainly Mayan and poor Ladinos. After six years
of authoritarian rule from 1954 to 1960, a group of junior military oﬃcers revolted in
1960. When they failed, several went into hiding and established close ties with Cuba,
forming the ﬁrst guerrilla group. This group became the nucleus of the forces that were in
armed insurrection against the government for the next 36 years. Throughout the armed
confrontation, insurgent groups adopted Marxist doctrine. On December 29 1996, the
Government of President Alvaro Arzu´ Irigoyen, together with the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG), with the participation of the United Nations as moderator
and with the support of the international community, concluded a long negotiating process,
by signing the Peace Accords.
The CEH found that state forces and related paramilitary groups were responsible for
93 percent of the violations documented by the CEH, including 92 percent of the arbitrary
executions and 91 percent of forced disappearances. Victims included men, women and
children of all social strata: workers, professionals, church members, politicians, peasants,
6This data is from the National Population Census of 1964.
88
students and academics; in ethnic terms, the vast majority were Mayans. According to the
CEH, 83 percent of fully identiﬁed victims were Mayan and 17 percent were Ladino.
Between 1962 and 1970, victims were mainly peasants, members of rural union organi-
zations, university and secondary school teachers and students, and guerrilla sympathizers.
Between 1971 and 1978, military operations were more selective and geographically dis-
persed. Victims included community and union leaders, catechists, and students. During
the most violent and bloody period of the entire armed confrontation, 1979 to 1984, mil-
itary operations were concentrated in Quiche´, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Alta and
Baja Verapaz, the south coast, and the capital. During this period, 91 percent of the total
human rights violations were committed, the victims being mainly Mayan and to a lesser
extent Ladino. Figure 3.2, which shows the number of human rights violations committed
by the state and guerrillas over the 1960-1996 period, reveals the sharp increase in these
violations between 1979 and 1984. Figure 3.3 shows the geographical distribution of the
victims of the civil war across Guatemala’s 22 departments. With almost 96 victims per
1000 population, Quiche´ experienced the worst of the war, followed by Baja Verapaz, Alta
Verapaz, Pete´n, and Huehuetenango. During the ﬁnal period, 1985 to 1996, operations were
selective and aﬀected the Mayan and Ladino population to a similar extent.
3.2.2 Civilian Impacts of the War
Civil war can aﬀect human capital accumulation through several channels. First, the forced
displacement of families as well as the loss of income-earning members in families may
reduce resources available to many households. In order to maintain certain consumption
levels, resources may be drawn away from schooling and towards more basic needs such
as food, shelter, clothing, and health. During the Guatemalan civil war, estimates of the
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number of displaced people vary from 500,000 to a million and a half people in the most
intense period from 1981 to 1983, all of whom lost relatives and property. Moreover, the
armed confrontation left a large number of children orphaned, abandoned, and their families
destroyed. Thus, it is likely that children were removed from schools and possibly even made
to engage in domestic or market work.
Second, infrastructure, such as schools and educational facilities, may be destroyed and
teachers may be killed. As a result, children may have to travel long distances to attend
school or stop attending school entirely. Third, since civilians are often the victims of armed
forces and militias, parents may withdraw their children from school in order to keep them
safe. A large number of children were among the direct victims of arbitrary execution,
forced disappearance, torture, rape, and other violations of their fundamental rights during
the civil war in Guatemala. This may have induced parents to stop sending their children
to school. Finally, the expected returns to schooling may fall as a result of civil wars, which
may discourage parents from sending their children to school. The destruction of existing
industries and lack of creation of new industries may result in a scarcity of skilled jobs,
making parents redistribute household resources away from individuals with lower expected
returns and toward those with higher ones.
Armed conﬂict may have a stronger impact on certain groups of individuals. While
previous analyses of school enrollments have found that males fare particularly badly since
they are more likely to become combatants (Stewart et al. 2001, de Walque 2006, Akresh
& de Walque 2008), it is also possible that the most vulnerable groups in the population
may be aﬀected the most. For example, Shemyakina (2006)’s study ﬁnds that females
rather than males received less secondary education in Tajikistan as a result of the civil
war. In this paper, we ﬁnd that Guatemala’s civil war had a strong negative eﬀect on the
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education of the two most disadvantaged groups – rural Mayan males and females. Thus,
the war appears to have deepened the poverty of the poorest groups, which aﬀected their
schooling. In addition, rural Mayan males may have been more likely to engage in conﬂict
and therefore less likely to attend school. Females, on the other hand, may have been
aﬀected for diﬀerent reasons. Since girls in Guatemala receive less schooling on average, get
married at an early age, and usually engage in household chores and child rearing rather
than market work, they may be more likely to receive less schooling than boys, especially
when resources become scarce. Parents may also withdraw their daughters from school in
order to protect them from being sexually assaulted, raped, and harassed.
Unlike many other civil wars, the war in Guatemala lasted 36 years. Thus, the eﬀect
of Guatemala’s civil war on human capital accumulation may be very diﬀerent from other
shorter wars. The loss of property and means of livelihood, the destruction of entire com-
munities and villages, and the forced displacement of families over a 36-year period may
have created several generations of individuals with deep-rooted poverty and inferior health
and educational outcomes. The post-war recovery of these and subsequent generations may
therefore have been slow and diﬃcult. We ﬁnd that schooling among rural Mayan males
and females deteriorated even more during the latter period of the war than during the
worst period. This indicates that the war may have resulted in long-term poverty among
rural Mayans which lasted well after the violence subsided.
3.3 Data and Estimation
3.3.1 Data
In this paper we attempt to measure the eﬀect that Guatemala’s civil war had on the edu-
cational achievements of cohorts who were exposed to the three periods of the war, namely
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the initial period (1960-1978), the worst period (1979-1984), and the latter period (1985-
1996). We use several sources of data for this study. Two data sources provide information
on the geographical intensity of the civil war in Guatemala. The ﬁrst source is from the
Commission of Historical Clariﬁcation and provides the number of human rights violations
and acts of violence across the country’s 22 departments (Commission for Historical Clari-
ﬁcation 1999). The second data source is from the Recovery of Historical Memory Project
and provides the number of victims in each of the country’s 22 departments (Archdiocese of
Guatemala 1999). Using the total population in each department from the 1983 National
Population Census, the year closest to the 1979-1984 period, we calculate the number of
victims and human rights violations relative to the population in these departments.7 As
can be seen in Figure 3.3, the six departments with the highest number of victims per 1000
population include Quiche´, Baja Verapaz, Alta Verapaz, Pete´n, Huehuetenango, and San
Marcos. The highest number of human rights violations per 1000 population occurred in
Quiche´, Baja Verapaz, Huehuetenango, Alta Verapaz, Chimaltenango, and Pete´n. We cat-
egorize as high war intensity departments the ﬁve departments that fall in both categories
– namely, Quiche´, Baja Verapaz, Alta Verapaz, Pete´n, Huehuetenango – and the remaining
17 departments as low war intensity.
Our third source of data is the 2002 National Population Census, which was published by
the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Guatemala. From the 2002 Census we get information
on an individual’s birth year, demographic characteristics, schooling, department of birth,
and department of residence in December 1996, when the peace accord was signed. Due
to the massive population displacement that occurred during the civil war, we restrict our
analysis to individuals who had the same department of birth and department of residence
7The 1983 Census was administered and published by the Direccio´n General de Estad´ısticas, Guatemala.
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at the time of the signing of the peace accord in December 1996, which allows us to identify
an individual’s department of schooling.8 Even though many of the individuals in this
restricted sample consist of non-displaced or non-migrant people, it is possible that some
individuals in this sample may have been born after their parents were displaced during the
war. This is especially true for individuals born during the worst period of the war, when
the majority of forced displacements occurred. Therefore, our sample most likely includes
non-displaced as well as displaced individuals, the latter group comprising younger cohorts,
especially those born in or after 1979 when the most violent period of the war began.
In order to allow for completion of schooling by 2002, we include individuals who were
born between 1920 and 1983. The youngest cohort – i.e. those who were born in 1983 – were
19 years old in 2002 and therefore had the opportunity to complete high school by the time
of the 2002 census.9 Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the average years of schooling for ﬁve diﬀerent
cohorts of eight demographic groups in high and low war intensity departments. The ﬁrst
two cohorts consist of individuals born between 1920 and 1930 and between 1931 and 1941,
all of whom were at least 19 years old at the start of the war in 1960 and therefore not
exposed to the civil war during their school age. The last three cohorts consist of individuals
who were school age during the three periods of the war. Individuals born between 1942
and 1960 were school age during the initial, relatively peaceful period of the war (1960-
1978) since they were at least 19 years old in 1979. Individuals born between 1961 and
1977 were school age during the worst period of the war (1979-1984) during some or all of
their primary, secondary, and high school years. The eldest children in this cohort were 18
8This restriction has two potential problems, which we address in Section 3.4.3.
9We top code an individual’s years of schooling to 12 years, that is we assign 12 years of schooling even
to individuals who completed more than 12 years by attending college, who constitute only 5 percent of our
sample. In Guatemala, primary school consists of grades 1 to 6, secondary school of grades 7 to 9, and high
school includes grades 10 to 12. Children usually attend primary school when they are between 7 and 12
years old, secondary school when they are 13 to 15 years old, and high school when they are between 16 and
18 years old.
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years old in 1979 whereas the youngest children were 7 years old in 1984. Individuals born
between 1978 and 1983 were school age during the latter part of the war (1985-1996) which
again was a relatively peaceful period.
As Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show, educational attainment improved over time for all eight
demographic groups in both high and low war intensity departments. This increase in
educational attainment reﬂects the general tendency in developing countries for schooling
outcomes to improve over time and suggests that children who were school age during
the civil war did not attain less schooling on average than their older cohorts. Another
characteristic of schooling in poor countries is that there tends be convergence in schooling
outcomes between less and more educated regions and groups over time. In Guatemala, we
see a pattern of regional convergence for the more privileged groups, namely urban non-
Mayan males and females. However, for the less privileged groups, such as rural Mayan
males and females, there is a widening divergence between high and low war intensity
departments, which may have been the result of the civil war.
From the 1964 National Population Census, we obtain information on three key variables
that measure the level of education and human development in the country’s 22 departments
at the start of the civil war.10 We use the enrollment rate of 7 to 17 year old children
to measure initial levels of schooling and the proportion of households without access to
water and electricity to measure diﬀerences in the provision of basic services. We use this
information to control for diﬀerent trends in education and human development across
departments.
10The 1964 Census was administered and published by the Direccio´n General de Estad´ısticas, Guatemala.
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3.3.2 Empirical Analysis
The year of birth and the department of birth jointly determine an individual’s exposure to
the civil war. The identiﬁcation strategy therefore exploits variation in the war’s intensity
across departments and which cohorts were school age during the three periods of the war,
which can be illustrated using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences tables. In Tables 3.3 and 3.4, we show
the average years of schooling for eight demographic groups who were school age during
the three periods of the civil war – those born in 1942-1960, 1961-1977, and 1978-1983 –
and individuals who had completed school age by 1960 – those born in 1920-1941. Columns
1 and 2 show the average years of schooling for these groups in the 5 high war intensity
departments (HWI) and 17 low war intensity departments (LWI), respectively.
Educational attainment is higher for younger cohorts compared to older ones in both
high and low intensity war departments. This is true for all eight demographic groups and
is consistent with the increasing trend in educational attainment that is observed in most
developing countries. Further, schooling in high war intensity departments is lower than that
in low war intensity departments for all cohorts in all groups. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
calculation shows statistically signiﬁcant increases of 0.34, 0.36, and 0.59 years of schooling
for each successive cohort exposed to the war compared to the unexposed cohort among
the most privileged group, namely urban non-Mayan males. A similar pattern is found for
urban non-Mayan females, with each successive exposed cohort obtaining 0.20, 0.47, and
0.64 additional years of schooling compared to the unexposed cohort. For all other groups
(except urban Mayan males), the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate is increasingly negative
for each successive cohort. Rural Mayan females are the worst aﬀected group, with each
successive exposed cohort obtaining 0.17, 0.60, and 0.93 less years of schooling compared to
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the unexposed cohort. Rural non-Mayan females, urban Mayan females, and rural Mayan
males also appear to be negatively aﬀected by the war.
These results provide preliminary evidence that the educational attainment of certain
groups, namely urban non-Mayan males and females, may not have been adversely aﬀected
by the civil war. On the other hand, more vulnerable groups and especially those that were
targeted as victims appear to have fared particularly badly. The exposed cohort was at
least 18 years old in 2002 and had completed their school age by 2002, the Census year.
The results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 therefore show that among disadvantaged groups, exposed
cohorts in high intensity war departments did not simply delay their education but actually
completed less schooling during their entire school age years.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate an empirical identiﬁcation strategy that relies on the com-
parison between educational attainment among cohorts who were school age and those who
had completed school age by 1960 in low and high war intensity departments. The change
in educational attainment between younger and older cohorts in low war intensity depart-
ments therefore acts as a control group for what the diﬀerence in educational attainment
between the cohorts should have looked like in the absence of the civil war. Building on
this preliminary analysis, we estimate Equation 3.1.11
푌푖푗푡 = 훼+
3∑
푐=1
훽푐푊푎푟푗 ∗ 퐶표ℎ표푟푡푐푡 + 훿푗 + 훾푡 + 휀푖푗푡 (3.1)
푌푖푗푡 is the number of years of education attained by individual 푖 who was born in department
푗 in year 푡. 푊푎푟푗 is a measure of the intensity of the war in department 푗, which we measure
in two alternate ways – the number of human rights violations and the number of victims in
a department relative to the population of the department in 1983.12 퐶표ℎ표푟푡푐푡 includes three
11This estimation equation is similar to the one used by Duﬂo (2001). We estimate all regressions with a
linear probability model. Alternatively, one can use a logit or probit model, which provide us with consistent
results that are available upon request.
12Speciﬁcally, we use the number of human rights violations per 10 people and alternatively the number
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cohorts, namely those born in 1942-1960 (퐶표ℎ표푟푡1푡 ), 1961-1977 (퐶표ℎ표푟푡
2
푡 ), and 1978-1983
(퐶표ℎ표푟푡3푡 ), with individuals born between 1920 and 1941 being the omitted group. The
interactions of a department’s war intensity with each of these three cohorts are the key
variables of interest and measure an individual’s exposure to the war. In order to control for
unobserved correlation of observations within departments and for a speciﬁc birth cohort,
we include department and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, 훿푗 and 훾푡 respectively. Including
department ﬁxed eﬀects purges all observed and unobserved department characteristics that
are constant across individuals from the same department, thereby removing any bias that
is generated by department characteristics. Year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects control for cohort-
speciﬁc shocks that may bias our results. 휖푖푐푗푡 is a random, idiosyncratic error term. Since
correlation among the error terms of all individuals in a given location experiencing the
same shocks may bias the OLS standard errors downward, all standard errors are clustered
by an individual’s county (Moulton 1986, 1990, Bertrand et al. 2004).
As discussed in Blattman & Miguel (2008), the validity of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences meth-
ods to examine the impact of war on microeconomic outcomes relies on the assumption of
similar underlying human development trends in war-aﬀected and peaceful regions of coun-
tries. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator in Equation 3.1 relies on the assumption that
there were similar underlying trends in education and human development in all depart-
ments and that in the absence of the civil war, trends in educational attainment would
have been similar in all departments. If, however, departments with higher war intensity
had systematically lower levels of education and development than departments with lower
war intensity prior to the start of the war in 1960, then lower educational attainment of
individuals in higher war intensity departments may not reﬂect the direct impact of the
of victims per 10 people in each department in 1983.
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war but instead the declining socio-economic conditions that contributed to the civil war
in the ﬁrst place. Given the availability of census data in 1964, only a few years after the
start of the war, we use information on enrollment and access to water and electricity from
the 1964 Census to control for diﬀerent trends in education and human development across
departments.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 plot the enrollment rate and proportion of households without access
to water and electricity in a department in 1964 against the rank of each department with
respect to the number of human rights violations and victims per 1000 population. The
positive relationship between enrollment rates and war intensity shows that departments
with a higher enrollment rate in 1964 had a lower number of human rights violations and
victims per 1000 population during the civil war. Similarly, the negative relationship be-
tween access to water and electricity and war intensity indicates that departments with
a higher proportion of households without these services in 1964 had a larger number of
human rights violations and victims per 1000 population during the civil war.
These ﬁgures show that the level of education and human development in a department
are highly correlated with the war intensity in that department and any decline in edu-
cational attainment that individuals experienced in higher war intensity departments may
be the result of pre-war disparities in development rather than a consequence of the war
itself. In Equation 3.1, we therefore include three sets of interactions – those between year
of birth indicators and a department’s enrollment rate in 1964, those between year of birth
indicators and the proportion of households without access to water in 1964, and those be-
tween year of birth indicators and the proportion of households without access to electricity
in 1964. These interactions explicitly control for diﬀerent trends in education and human
development across departments for individuals born in each year between 1920 and 1983,
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the inclusion of which constitutes a contribution of our paper to the existing literature.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimation
Table 3.5 presents regression results for Equation 3.1 using years of education as the depen-
dent variable. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are the coeﬃcients of the interaction
between each of three cohorts and a measure of war intensity in one’s department of birth.
The top panel of the table (Panel A) uses the population adjusted number of human rights
violations whereas the bottom panel (Panel B) uses the number of victims relative to pop-
ulation to measure civil war intensity in a department. In addition, F-test statistics and
their signiﬁcance levels are presented for three hypotheses that test whether or not the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the three co-
horts. Columns (1) to (8) show coeﬃcient estimates and robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors from regressions estimated for eight demographic groups. All regressions include
ﬁxed eﬀects for an individual’s department and year of birth as well as controls for diﬀerent
trends in education and human development across departments.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients in Panel A are positive for the two most priv-
ileged groups, namely urban non-Mayan males and females, and negative for three of the
poorer groups in Guatemala, namely rural Mayan males and females and rural non-Mayan
females. For all other groups, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients are statistically in-
signiﬁcant. Among urban non-Mayan males, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient is pos-
itive for the cohort born between 1942 and 1960 but statistically insigniﬁcant for the two
younger cohorts who were school age during the worst and latter periods of the war. Thus,
within a given department and for an individual of a given age, being of school age in a
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higher war intensity department during the initial period of Guatemala’s civil war (1960-
1978) implies an additional 1.25 years of schooling for urban non-Mayan males. The increase
in schooling, however, does not continue for the two younger cohorts among this group who
were school age during the worst and latter periods of the war. This suggests that while the
civil war did not lower schooling among urban non-Mayan males born between 1966 and
1983, it may have dampened any potential increase in schooling that may have occurred
among this group in the absence of the civil war.
We ﬁnd similar results for urban non-Mayan females, though the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
coeﬃcient is positive for the two older cohorts who were school age during the war. Those
born between 1942 and 1960 and those born between 1961 and 1977 in higher war intensity
departments have respectively 1.15 and 1.32 additional years of schooling. Thus, among
this group, even individuals who were school age during the worst period of the civil war in
higher war intensity departments obtained more schooling. That the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimate for the cohort who was school age during the latter period of the war is statistically
insigniﬁcant, once again suggests that any potential improvements in educational outcomes
for this group may have been weakened by the civil war.
Columns (4), (7), and (8) show a negative impact of the civil war for rural Mayan males
and rural non-Mayan and Mayan females. Among rural non-Mayan females, the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient is negative only for those born between 1942 and 1960 in higher war
intensity departments. For rural Mayan males and females, however, the eﬀect of the civil
war is negative and increasingly so for each successive cohort exposed to the civil war in
higher war intensity departments. Among rural Mayan males, the three cohorts have 0.27,
0.70, and 1.09 less years of schooling in higher war intensity departments. For rural Mayan
females, these ﬁgures are 0.12, 0.57, and 1.17. While the diﬀerence between 훽1 and 훽2 are
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not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for rural Mayan males, all coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other for rural Mayan females. These results are consistent
with the corresponding estimates in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, that were obtained without any
controls. The estimates reported in Panel B, where we use the population-adjusted number
of victims rather than the number of human rights violations to measure war intensity, are
qualitatively similar to those in Panel A, though the magnitude of the coeﬃcients vary.13
That we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the civil war on the educational outcomes of rural Mayan
children is not surprising for two reasons. First, the urban and non-Mayan population in
Guatemala are wealthier and more privileged than the rural and Mayan population. Second,
according to the CEH and REMHI, the majority of victims of the civil war were rural and
Mayan people (Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation 1999, Archdiocese of Guatemala
1999). Our results therefore conﬁrm that the civil war aﬀected the most vulnerable group
in Guatemala. While both males and females may receive less education when household
property is lost and economic resources become more scarce, males are more likely to become
combatants and therefore may attain even less schooling. Females, on the other hand, are
more likely to engage in household chores and child-rearing as adults rather than participate
in the labor market, making parents redistribute scarce resources away from their daughters’
education. In addition, since females are at greater risk of being sexually assaulted, raped,
and harassed during a civil war, parents may stop sending their daughters to school.
Perhaps the most interesting ﬁnding in Table 3.5 is that rural Mayan cohorts who
were school age during the latter, relatively peaceful period of the war obtained even less
schooling than those who were school age during the most violent period in higher war
13The exception is for rural non-Mayan males. Among this group, individuals who were school age during
the worst period of the war in higher war intensity departments (measured by the number of victims relative
to the population) have 0.39 additional years of schooling.
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intensity departments. We provide two possible explanations for this ﬁnding.
First, despite the decline in violence, poverty among the most vulnerable groups may
have intensiﬁed during the latter period of the civil war. The loss of property and means
of livelihood that these groups experienced during the worst period of the war may not
have been recovered after the worst period of the war came to an end. Exposure to such
a long-term war may have progressively worsened the poverty of vulnerable groups, which
may have further deteriorated schooling outcomes. Second, this result may be explained by
the inclusion of children of displaced parents in the 1978-1983 cohort. Since the majority
of displacements occurred during the worst period of the war (1979-1984) and among rural
Mayan populations, if displaced parents gave birth to their children after their displacement,
these children would be included in the 1978-1983 cohort of rural Mayan children in our
sample. Since these children were school age during the latter period of the war in 1985-1996
and because it is reasonable to expect that the loss of property and means of livelihood was
greatest for displaced families, the schooling of these children may have been most severely
aﬀected by the war. As discussed in DiGeorgio-Lutz & Hale (2004), the majority of families
in conﬂict aﬀected areas who ﬂed their homes during the early 1980s were displaced in
the mountains near their place of origin, thus remaining in departments with higher war
intensity. Thus, our sample of children who were born in 1978-1983 and were school age
in 1985-1996 may include a large number from displaced families. Therefore, it is not
surprising that educational outcomes are worst for rural Mayan children who were school
age during the latter period of the war.
That our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are robust to the inclusion of interactions
between year of birth indicators and the enrollment rate, availability of water, and availabil-
ity of electricity in 1964, suggests that our results are not driven by diﬀerent educational
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and human development trends across departments. In order to provide an additional check
and more credibility to our estimates, however, we estimate regressions for a control ex-
periment by dividing the pre-war cohorts into 2 groups, that is those born between 1904
and 1919 and those born between 1920 and 1941. In our control experiment, we use the
1904-1919 cohort as the omitted group and include the interaction of 푊푎푟푗 with the cohort
born between 1920 and 1941. Since individuals born between 1920 and 1941 were at least
19 years old by 1960, their schooling should not have been aﬀected by the war.
In Table 3.6 we present results of the control experiment. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimate for the 1920-1941 cohort in both Panels A and B are not statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for all eight demographic groups. Thus, there is no systematic diﬀerence
in the average years of schooling of younger and older cohorts not exposed to the war in
higher and lower war intensity departments. These results indicate that the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimates presented in Table 3.5 are not driven by inappropriate identiﬁcation
assumptions.
3.4.2 Grade Completion
Following the same logic as Table 3.5, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report results for completion
of grades 1 to 12 or higher using the number of human rights violations to measure war
intensity whereas Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present results using the number of victims to measure
war intensity. Since the results for grade completion are very similar using the number of
human rights violations and alternatively the number of victims to measure war intensity,
we focus on discussing the ﬁrst set of results (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). The objective of this
analysis is to determine at which level of schooling the civil war had the largest negative
impact and for which groups.
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Even though the results in Table 3.5 show a positive diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate
among urban non-Mayan males for the 1942-1960 cohort, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimate is negative for all three cohorts with respect to completion of grades 1
to 3 or higher. Among this group, the estimate for the 1978-1983 cohort is also negative for
completion of grades 4 and 5 or higher. Similarly, despite a positive diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimate for years of schooling for the 1942-1960 cohort among urban non-Mayan females,
the estimates are negative for the 1961-1977 and 1978-1983 cohorts for completion of grades
1 to 3 or higher. For completion of grade 6 or higher, the estimate becomes positive for the
1942-1960 cohort among both these groups. Moreover, for completion of grades 7 to 12 or
higher, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate is positive for all three exposed cohorts among
urban non-Mayans. These results, together with those presented in Table 3.5 show that
among the two most privileged groups, average years of schooling increased for exposed
cohorts and this increase was due to a greater probability of completing secondary and
high school grades (grades 7 to 12) rather than primary school grades. Among urban
non-Mayans, however, the youngest children in each exposed cohort appear to have been
negatively aﬀected by the war since they were less likely to complete grades 1 to 3 or higher.
For urban Mayan males and rural non-Mayan males, the likelihood of completing the
lower primary grades is greater for some exposed cohorts, which does not appear to aﬀect
average years of schooling for these individuals, as the results in Table 3.5 show. Among
rural non-Mayan females, however, the 1942-1960 cohort is less likely to complete grades 1
to 4 or higher, which is consistent with negative diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate we ﬁnd
for this group with respect to years of schooling.
For the two groups most negatively aﬀected by the war, we ﬁnd negative diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimates for exposed cohorts for completion of almost every grade. Among rural
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Mayan males, only the 1942-1960 exposed cohort is less likely to complete grades 2 and 3 or
higher. However, from grade 4 onwards, the 1961-1977 and 1978-1983 exposed cohorts are
also less likely to complete each grade or higher, with the negative diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimate being larger in magnitude for those individuals who were school age during the
latter period of the war. The estimates are largest for the last three grades of primary
school (grades 4, 5, and 6), followed by secondary school grades (grades 7, 8, and 9). Thus,
exposed rural Mayan males completed fewer years of schooling mostly due to their lower
likelihood of completing primary and secondary school. Moreover, similar to our ﬁndings for
years of schooling, the negative eﬀect of the war is strongest for those individuals exposed
to the latter period of the war.
For rural Mayan females, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate is negative and large
in magnitude for the 1978-1983 cohort for completion of all primary school grades. As
discussed in Section 3.4.1, this may be explained by deepening poverty among rural Mayans
and the inclusion of children of displaced parents in the 1978-1983 cohort. Even though the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are negative for the other two cohorts, they are not as
large in magnitude and are even statistically insigniﬁcant for the completion of some primary
school grades. For secondary and high school grades, the estimates are fairly small, though
still negative for exposed cohorts for most grades. These results indicate that it was mostly
due to a lower likelihood of completing primary school grades that rural Mayan females
completed fewer years of schooling.
The majority of individuals in Guatemala obtain either no education or some primary
education, with less than 25 percent of the population receiving more than primary edu-
cation. Moreover, completion of primary school is necessary for post-primary education.
Therefore, it is not surprising that rural Mayan males and females completed less schooling
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on average mostly as a result of their lower likelihood of completing primary school grades.
In order to see whether or not the regressions for grade completion are based on ap-
propriate identifying assumptions, we conduct a control experiment for completion of each
grade, similar to what we estimated for years of schooling. The coeﬃcient of the variable
(HRV * Born 1920-1941) is reported in Table 3.11 and the coeﬃcient of the variable (Vic-
tims * Born 1920-1941) is reported in Table 3.12. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant only for urban Mayan males for completion of grades 1
and 2 or higher and for rural Mayan females for completion of grade 7 or higher. Thus, it is
possible that our results are driven by inappropriate identifying assumptions for these three
regressions. However, given that less schooling of rural Mayan females is driven mostly by
their lower likelihood of completing grades 1 to 6 or higher, our control experiment does
not invalidate our main results.
3.4.3 Schooling Outcomes for Displaced or Migrant People
In this section, we examine how restricting our sample to those individuals who had the
same department of birth and residence in 1996 may potentially aﬀect our results. This
restriction allows us to identify an individual’s department of schooling. However, there are
two potential problems associated with it.
The ﬁrst potential problem is that we may falsely identify the birth department of those
individuals who temporarily migrated out of their birth department but returned to it before
the peace accord was signed in December 1996. This may have happened if, for example,
people in high war intensity departments wanted to escape the worst period of the war. If
these temporary migrants received more schooling in their place of refuge than they would
have in their birth place, we may underestimate the eﬀect of the civil war. On the other
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hand, if temporary migrants received less schooling in their place of refuge than they would
have in their birth place, we may overstate the direct eﬀect of the war. Even though it
is possible that temporary migrants may have returned to their birth place before the war
ended, there are several reasons why we believe that return migration before or after even
1996 may not be very likely.
First, it is unlikely that individuals who migrated out of high war intensity departments
in order to escape the violence would return before the peace accord was signed in December
1996 since there was no guarantee that the violence had ended before then. Even though
the number of displaced people is estimated to be roughly 1 million, only 324,187 of these
were resettled by December 1996 and the rest never returned to their original community
(DiGeorgio-Lutz & Hale 2004). Second, as discussed in DiGeorgio-Lutz & Hale (2004),
when people were displaced from their homes, they did so in groups and thus displacement
involved entire communities. Further, because most communities were forced to escape
from violent massacres, they lost most of their property and their homes. Thus, most dis-
placed populations did not have homes or property to return to. Further, the destruction
of entire villages made it impossible for displaced people to return home. For example, the
governments scorched-earth counterinsurgency war in the conﬂict zones between 1981 and
1983 completely destroyed more than 440 Mayan villages along with the Mayans ability to
engage in subsistence agriculture. Third, when complete destruction of villages did not oc-
cur, squatter groups occupied and continue to occupy them. Fourth, displaced populations
faced serious human rights violations should they attempt to return to their homes because
of the stigma of their alleged association as guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers who were
responsible for the armed confrontation. Despite these reasons, it is still possible that some
temporary migrants returned to their birth department before December 1996, in which
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case we may underestimate or overestimate the eﬀect of the war on educational outcomes.
We acknowledge this as a limitation of this paper and it should be considered in evaluating
our results.
The second potential problem of our restriction is that we do not examine the eﬀect of
the war on displaced people since we cannot identify the department in which they were
school age. Since displaced individuals who migrated out of high war intensity departments
may have been among the most severely aﬀected by the war, we may underestimate the
eﬀect of the war by excluding this group. However, because our data does not include the
entire migration history of individuals, we are unable to assess the eﬀect of the war on
displaced populations since we cannot identify their department of schooling.
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, our sample may include children who were born after
their parents were displaced. Since the majority of displacements occurred between 1979
and 1984, children born after 1979 and therefore included in the cohort of those born
between 1978 and 1983 may include the children of displaced parents. Our results show
that those born in 1978-1983 had worse schooling outcomes than those born in 1961-1977
even though the latter group was school age during the worst period of the war, which may
reﬂect the inclusion of children of displaced parents in the 1978-1983 cohort. Therefore,
even though we restrict our sample to individuals who have the same department of birth
and residence in December 1996, it may still include displaced individuals, especially among
the 1978-1983 cohort.
Even though some displaced individuals may be included in our sample, our restriction
excludes a large number of displaced individuals, especially among older cohorts. In Ta-
bles 3.13 and 3.14, we present schooling outcomes for migrants and non-migrants among
our eight demographic groups, separately for the top 5 high war intensity departments
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(Quiche´, Baja Verapaz, Alta Verapaz, Pete´n, and Huehuetenango) and the 17 low war in-
tensity departments. Migrants are deﬁned as those having a diﬀerent birth department
and department of residence in December 1996 whereas non-migrants are deﬁned as those
having the same birth department and department of residence in December 1996. Even
though some migrants have slightly worse schooling outcomes among urban non-Mayan
males and females, there is little diﬀerence between the schooling outcomes of migrants and
non-migrants among the two groups most aﬀected by the civil war, namely rural Mayan
males and females in high war intensity departments. This shows that rural Mayan males
and females from high war intensity departments who migrated or were displaced from their
birth place received similar levels of schooling on average than those who remained in their
birth place. Thus, it is unlikely that we underestimate the average eﬀect of the war on
educational outcomes by excluding migrants or displaced individuals from our sample.
3.4.4 Post-War Schooling Outcomes
In this section, we include an analysis of schooling outcomes for a cohort who was school
age for each of grades 1 to 6 during post-war years, that is from 1997 onwards. Table 3.15
describes the sample and cohorts that we use to examine completion of grades 1 to 6 or
higher. For completion of grade 1 or higher, we include individuals born between 1978
and 1995. We compare individuals born between 1978 and 1989, who were 7 years old
during the latter period of the war, to those born between 1990 and 1995. Individuals born
in 1990 were 7 years old in 1997 and therefore old enough to attend grade 1 during the
post-war period. Those born in 1995 were 7 years old in 2002 and therefore old enough to
be attending grade 1 at the time of the 2002 Census. For completion of grades 2 to 6 or
higher, the post-war cohorts consist of individuals born in 1989-1994, 1988-1993, 1987-1992,
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1986-1991, and 1985-1990 respectively. School age cohorts for each of grades 2 to 6 during
the latter period of the war (1978-1985) consist of those born in 1978-1988, 1978-1987,
1978-1986, 1978-1985, and 1978-1984 respectively. These cohorts were respectively 8, 9, 10,
11, and 12 years old during the latter period of the war.
We estimate Equation 3.2,
푌푖푗푡 = 훼+ 훽푊푎푟푗 ∗ 퐶표ℎ표푟푡푡 + 훿푗 + 훾푡 + 휀푖푗푡, (3.2)
where 퐶표ℎ표푟푡푡 includes individuals who were the appropriate age for each grade during the
post-war period from 1997 onwards. We present the results of these regressions in Table
3.16.
As shown in Panel A, for urban non-Mayan males, there is a greater likelihood of com-
pleting grades 1 to 4 or higher for post-war cohorts in higher war intensity departments.
Similar results are found for urban non-Mayan females for grades 1 to 3 and for rural
non-Mayan females for grades 1 to 4. For the two groups whose education was negatively
aﬀected by the war – rural Mayan males and females – there is a greater likelihood of com-
pleting each grade among post-war cohorts. Among rural Mayan males, post-war cohorts
in higher war intensity departments are between 11 and 13 percentage points more likely to
complete grades 1 to 6 or higher whereas for rural Mayan females these ﬁgures range from
4 to 13 percentage points. For rural Mayan females, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient
is negative and larger in magnitude for completion of grades 1 to 3 or higher whereas for
rural Mayan males, the estimate is fairly similar for all primary school grades. This most
likely reﬂects the fact that more males complete higher grades than females in Guatemala.
Using the number of victims to measure the intensity of the civil war (Panel B) provides
similar results, though the magnitude of the coeﬃcients are smaller. These results show that
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despite the negative consequences of the war, primary school outcomes of the worst aﬀected
groups improved among cohorts who were school age during post-war years. However, since
we can only examine primary school outcomes among a few post-war cohorts, we cannot be
certain that this improvement continued over time.
3.5 Conclusion and ﬁnal comments
In this paper, we investigate the impact of Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war (1960-1996) on
educational outcomes of individuals. The empirical identiﬁcation strategy uses a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach by comparing the diﬀerence in the schooling of cohorts who were
school age during the three periods of the war with those who had completed school age
by 1960 in departments that experienced higher and lower war intensity. Besides including
ﬁxed eﬀects for an individuals department of residence and year of birth, we also include
interactions between year of birth indicators and the 1964 enrollment rate as well as inter-
actions between year of birth indicators and the availability of water and electricity in a
department in 1964. These interactions allow us to control for diﬀerences in pre-war levels
of education and human development in higher and lower war intensity departments that
may have inﬂuenced levels and trends in educational attainment in these departments even
in the absence of the war.
We ﬁnd a strong negative impact of the civil war on the education of rural Mayan
males and females, which supports the conclusion that internal armed conﬂict reinforces
poverty and social exclusion among the most vulnerable groups. Among rural Mayan males,
those who were school age during the three periods of the civil war in departments where
more human rights violations were committed completed 0.27, 0.71, and 1.09 years less of
schooling respectively whereas rural Mayan females exposed to the three periods of the war
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completed 0.12, 0.47, and 1.17 years less of schooling respectively. Given an average of 4.66
and 3.83 years of schooling for males and females, these represent declines of 6, 15, and
23 percent for males and 3, 12, and 30 percent for females. Our results are robust to the
inclusion of indicators for department of residence, year of birth, and controls for diﬀerent
trends in education and human development in war aﬀected and peaceful departments
of Guatemala. Examining grade completion, we ﬁnd that it was primarily due to a lower
likelihood of completing primary school grades that rural Mayan males and females received
less schooling as a result of the war. This result is not surprising since only 25 percent of the
population in Guatemala receive more than a primary education. Finally, we ﬁnd that rural
Mayan males and females who were primary school age during post-war years in higher war
intensity departments were more likely to complete each of grades 1 through 6 or higher,
suggesting that at least primary school outcomes improved immediately after the war for
the two groups most aﬀected by it.
Understanding the mechanisms by which civil war aﬀects human capital formation and
accumulation is important in formulating eﬀective post-war policies to protect individuals
from the negative consequences of wars. While our analysis does indicate some likely mech-
anisms through which households responded to the civil war, our data does not allow us to
address whether or not it was through orphanhood that school age children in higher war
intensity departments received less education. As discussed in 3.2.2, civil war can result in
the displacement of families and the loss of property and means of livelihood. It can cause
the destruction of schools and infrastructure and delay the construction of new schools due
to the loss of capital and human resources. It can also heighten security fears, especially for
girls. Moreover, the destruction of existing industries and lack of development of new ones
may reduce the expected returns to education for both boys and girls. All these factors
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may discourage investment in human capital during a civil war and result in low levels of
human capital formation and accumulation among individuals exposed to war.
Our results indicate that exposure to Guatemala’s civil war had a large, negative, and
long-term eﬀect on the education of rural Mayan males and females who were school age
between 1960 and 1996. Moreover, each successive cohort exposed to the war during three
distinct period of violence and conﬂict obtained less and less schooling. These results can be
explained by a combination of factors. First, Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war increased
poverty among one of the poorest groups in the country. Due to the loss of property, their
means of livelihood and wealth, and the death of income-earning family members, rural
Mayan households may have reallocated limited resources away from educating sons and
especially daughters for whom expected returns to education are generally low and security
fears are high. In addition, rural Mayan males may have been more likely to become
combatants and therefore not attend school.
Second, the ﬁnding that cohorts who were school age after the bloodiest period of the
war have worse schooling outcomes than those who were school age during the most violent
period suggests that even though internal conﬂict subsided dramatically between 1985 and
1996, the poverty of aﬀected households may have worsened and that this adversely aﬀected
educational outcomes. This ﬁnding may also be driven by the inclusion of children of
displaced rural Mayan households in the cohort exposed to the latter period of the war.
Since displaced households most likely experienced the greatest loss of property and income,
their children may have fared particularly badly in terms of education.14
That the war had a negative impact on the education of males and females among the
14Note that our results cannot be explained by the possibility that a large number of educated individuals
were killed during the war since rural Mayan males and females constitute the least educated group in
Guatemala.
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most disadvantaged group shows that it worsened the position of rural Mayans amongst
the poorest groups by deteriorating their educational attainment. As Table 3.2 reveals, the
war may have reinforced already existing gender, regional, sectoral, and ethnic diﬀerences
in educational outcomes. Our post-war analysis indicates that at least primary school
outcomes improved for rural Mayan males and females who were school age after the signing
of the peace agreement in December 1996. While this result provides some evidence of post-
war recovery, at least in terms of primary education, we cannot be certain that subsequent
cohorts will experience similar improvements nor that existing educational disparities will
be narrowed in the near future.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Guatemala
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Figure 3.2: Number of Killings and Disappearances in Guatemala: 1960-1996
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Figure 3.3: Number of Victims and Human Rights Violations Per 1000 Population in De-
partments
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Figure 3.4: Years of Schooling of Males Born Between 1920 and 1983 in High War Intensity
(HWI) and Low War Intensity (LWI) Departments
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Figure 3.5: Years of Schooling of Females Born Between 1920 and 1983 in High War Intensity
(HWI) and Low War Intensity (LWI) Departments
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Figure 3.6: 1964 Enrollment Rates, Availability of Water and Electricity in 1964, and Rank
of Departments (by Number of Human Rights Violations)
120
Figure 3.7: 1964 Enrollment Rates, Availability of Water and Electricity in 1964, and Rank
of Departments (by Number of Victims)
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Table 3.1: Cohorts Unexposed and Exposed to the Civil War
Year of Period During Which Level of War
Birth School Age (7-19 years) Intensity
1920-1941 Pre-War Period (before 1960) None
1942-1960 Initial Period (1960-1978) Low
1961-1977 Worst Period (1979-1984) High
1978-1983 Latter Period (1985-1996) Low
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Table 3.3: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Comparing Exposed with Unexposed Cohorts in High
and Low War Intensity Departments: Years of Schooling for Males
Urban Non-Mayan Males Urban Mayan Males
HWI LWI Diﬀerence HWI LWI Diﬀerence
(HWI-LWI) (HWI - LWI)
Born 1978-1983 (Exposed 3) 8.4 8.47 -0.07 5.41 6.05 -0.64
(0.031) (0.008) (0.032) (0.027) (0.017) (0.032)
Born 1961-1977 (Exposed 2) 7.73 8.03 -0.30 4.40 4.88 -0.48
(0.027) (0.007) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
Born 1941-1960 (Exposed 1) 6.28 6.60 -0.32 2.54 3.07 -0.53
(0.037) (0.01) (0.039) (0.024) (0.014) (0.028)
Born 1920-1941 (Unexposed) 3.94 4.60 -0.66 1.20 1.76 -0.56
(0.050) (0.016) (0.053) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 3 - Unexposed) 4.46 3.87 0.59 4.21 4.29 -0.08
(0.059) (0.018) (0.062) (0.038) (0.023) (0.045)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 2 - Unexposed) 3.79 3.43 0.36 3.20 3.12 0.08
(0.058) (0.017) (0.060) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 1 - Unexposed) 2.34 2.00 0.34 1.34 1.31 0.03
(0.063) (0.019) (0.066) (0.035) (0.021) (0.041)
Rural Non-Mayan Males Rural Mayan Males
HWI LWI Diﬀerence HWI LWI Diﬀerence
(HWI-LWI) (HWI - LWI)
Born 1978-1983 (Exposed 3) 4.33 4.73 -0.40 3.17 4.04 -0.87
(0.024) (0.010) (0.026) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Born 1961-1977 (Exposed 2) 3.52 3.82 -0.30 2.18 2.94 -0.76
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Born 1941-1960 (Exposed 1) 1.96 2.31 -0.35 0.86 1.56 -0.70
(0.019) (0.007) (0.021) (0.006) (0.008) (0.01)
Born 1920-1941 (Unexposed) 1.05 1.31 -0.26 0.35 0.87 -0.52
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 3 - Unexposed) 3.28 3.42 -0.14 2.82 3.17 -0.35
(0.032) (0.013) (0.035) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 2 - Unexposed) 2.47 2.51 -0.04 1.83 2.07 -0.24
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.00) (0.00) (0.016)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 1 - Unexposed) 0.91 1.00 -0.09 0.51 0.69 -0.18
(0.029) (0.011) (0.031) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015)
Data Sources: 2002 National Population Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Guatemala),
Recovery of Historical Memory Project (1999), and Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation (1999).
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Table 3.4: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Comparing Exposed with Unexposed Cohorts in High
and Low War Intensity Departments: Years of Schooling for Females
Urban Non-Mayan Females Urban Mayan Females
HWI LWI Diﬀerence HWI LWI Diﬀerence
(HWI-LWI) (HWI - LWI)
Born 1978-1983 (Exposed 3) 7.97 8.27 -0.30 4.10 4.75 -0.65
(0.031) (0.009) (0.032) (0.027) (0.016) (0.031)
Born 1961-1977 (Exposed 2) 6.97 7.44 -0.47 2.65 3.14 -0.49
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Born 1941-1960 (Exposed 1) 4.85 5.59 -0.74 0.88 1.32 -0.44
(0.035) (0.01) (0.036) (0.015) (0.01) (0.018)
Born 1920-1941 (Unexposed) 2.84 3.78 -0.94 0.27 0.60 -0.33
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 3 - Unexposed) 5.13 4.49 0.64 3.83 4.15 -0.32
(0.052) (0.017) (0.055) (0.029) (0.019) (0.035)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 2 - Unexposed) 4.13 3.66 0.47 2.38 2.54 -0.16
(0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 1 - Unexposed) 2.01 1.81 0.20 0.61 0.72 -0.11
(0.055) (0.017) (0.058) (0.019) (0.014) (0.024)
Rural Non-Mayan Females Rural Mayan Females
HWI LWI Diﬀerence HWI LWI Diﬀerence
(HWI-LWI) (HWI - LWI)
Born 1978-1983 (Exposed 3) 3.57 4.27 -0.70 1.68 2.76 -1.08
(0.022) (0.010) (0.024) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014)
Born 1961-1977 (Exposed 2) 2.60 3.13 -0.53 0.80 1.55 -0.75
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Born 1941-1960 (Exposed 1) 1.09 1.54 -0.45 0.14 0.46 -0.32
(0.016) (0.006) (0.017) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Born 1920-1941 (Unexposed) 0.58 0.83 -0.25 0.05 0.20 -0.14
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 3 - Unexposed) 2.99 3.44 -0.45 1.62 2.56 -0.93
(0.028) (0.013) (0.031) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 2 - Unexposed) 2.02 2.30 -0.28 0.75 1.35 -0.60
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Diﬀerence (Exposed 1 - Unexposed) 0.51 0.71 -0.20 0.09 0.26 -0.17
(0.024) (0.01) (0.026) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Data Sources: 2002 National Population Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Guatemala), Recovery of Historical
Memory Project (1999), and Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation (1999).
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Table 3.13: Schooling of Migrant and Non-migrant Males
Migrants Non-migrants Migrants Non-migrants
from HWI in HWI from LWI in LWI
Departments Departments Departments Departments
Urban non-Mayan Males
Years of schooling 7.32 7.17 7.02 7.47
Primary school 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.72
Secondary school 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.47
High school 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.31
Observations 27,144 54,237 190,708 665,115
Urban Mayan Males
Years of schooling 4.41 3.91 5.31 4.36
Primary school 0.42 0.35 0.51 0.40
Secondary school 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.18
High school 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10
Observations 16,832 81,519 28,624 218,640
Rural non-Mayan Males
Years of schooling 3.34 3.10 3.27 3.34
Primary school 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.29
Secondary school 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.09
High school 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Observations 9,955 71,786 84,983 472,843
Rural Mayan Males
Years of schooling 1.94 1.91 2.85 2.60
Primary school 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.20
Secondary school 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.05
High school 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
Observations 25,314 318,133 14,907 275,990
Data Sources: 2002 National Population Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Guatemala),
Recovery of Historical Memory Project (1999), and Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation (1999).
The sample includes individuals born between 1920 and 1983. Migrants include individuals who have
a diﬀerent birth department and department of residence in December 1996. Non-migrants include
individuals who have the same department of birth and department of residence in December 1996.
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Table 3.14: Schooling of Migrant and Non-migrant Females
Migrants Non-migrants Migrants Non-migrants
from HWI in HWI from LWI in LWI
Departments Departments Departments Departments
Urban non-Mayan Females
Years of schooling 6.04 6.34 6.00 6.84
Primary school 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.65
Secondary school 0.35 0.38 0.33 0.43
High school 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.28
Observations 31,885 63,017 237,413 761,719
Urban Mayan Females
Years of schooling 2.65 2.37 3.55 2.83
Primary school 0.23 0.20 0.31 0.24
Secondary school 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.11
High school 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06
Observations 15,989 91,597 28,571 242,530
Rural non-Mayan Females
Years of schooling 2.64 2.37 2.73 2.80
Primary school 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.23
Secondary school 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08
High school 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
Observations 10,095 75,491 89,386 495,208
Rural Mayan Females
Years of schooling 0.83 0.81 1.62 1.44
Primary school 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.09
Secondary school 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03
High school 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Observations 23,592 347,876 14,753 303,968
Data Sources: 2002 National Population Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Guatemala),
Recovery of Historical Memory Project (1999), and Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation (1999).
The sample includes individuals born between 1920 and 1983. Migrants include individuals who have
a diﬀerent birth department and department of residence in December 1996. Non-migrants include
individuals who have the same department of birth and department of residence in December 1996.
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Table 3.15: Cohorts Used in Post-War Analysis
Grade Cohorts Cohorts of Grade-Speciﬁc Age Age of Oldest Cohort
Included
in Sample in 1978-1983 in 1997-2002 in 1997 in 2002
1 1978-1995 1978-1989 1990-1995 7 7
2 1978-1994 1978-1988 1989-1994 8 8
3 1978-1993 1978-1987 1988-1993 9 9
4 1978-1992 1978-1986 1987-1992 10 10
5 1978-1991 1978-1985 1986-1991 11 11
6 1978-1990 1978-1984 1985-1990 12 12
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4 Conclusions
This dissertation examined three topics related with migration and human capital forma-
tion in developing countries. The ﬁrst chapter developed an endogenous growth model with
intergenerational transfers and international migration to investigate how exposure to inter-
national migration aﬀects physical-human capital formation and, hence, economic growth in
the source countries. Migrants move to a higher wage country, where immigrants from their
particular source country represent only a small fraction of the total population and hence
are unable to aﬀect real wages in the host country. The migrants do not carry physical cap-
ital from the source country to the host country. The human capital technology depends on
private investment in, and real government expenditure on, education. Individuals behave
altruistically toward their children and derive utility of living in the source country when
older. The preference for joining the labor force in the source country captures the fact
that workers are likely to have a preference for the country of their origin life-style because
of cultural factors, family relationships, and so on.
Numerical simulations illustrated the relationships between exogenous parameters and
the stationary migration rate and economic growth rate, in which were used standard val-
ues of the preference parameters and the parameters of the human capital and production
functions. The main ﬁndings from comparative statics are as follows: (i) the migration rate
is strictly increasing in the labor income tax rate, whereas the economic growth rate is non-
monotonically associated with this parameter; (ii) the migration rate is strictly decreasing
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in the preference for joining the labor market in the source country, while the economic
growth rate is nonmonotonically correlated with that parameter; (iii) both the migration
and the economic growth rates are strictly increasing in the host country real wages; (iv)
both the migration rate and economic growth are strictly increasing in the parents’ degree
of human capital altruism; and (v) while the migration rate is strictly decreasing in the
parents’ degree of physical capital altruism, economic growth is strictly increasing in it.
Since in the analytical model of the ﬁrst chapte individuals within, as well as across,
generations are identical in their preferences and innate abilities, the results might change
if one assumes heterogeneity in innate abilities. The ﬁndings would critically depend on
whether it is assumed that high or low-skilled workers are more likely to emigrate. If high
(low) skilled workers are more likely to emigrate, then the likelihood of adverse economic
consequences may be magniﬁed (contracted) due to the fact that the government expendi-
ture on education per student would decrease (increase).
An extension of the theoretical analysis developed in the ﬁrst chapter would be to assume
a small open economy with perfect capital mobility. Since labor taxes are not a relatively
important source of government revenue in labor-exporting countries, future work would
also include a wider range of taxes such as the value added and tariﬀs. These taxes are much
more important than labor taxes in non-OECD countries. The results in this paper might
be aﬀected if, instead of assuming a log utility function and a Cobb-Douglas human capital
technology, one assumes a more general speciﬁcation for those functions. Therefore, the
results should be read taking into account the potential limitation of those speciﬁcations.
Here, research is required.
The analytical model developed in the second chapter analyzes the determinants of in-
dividual migrant remittance behavior and extends the altruism-based frameworks proposed
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by Lucas & Stark (1985) and Funkhouser (1995). This model predicts that migrants with
higher labor income are more likely to remit and tend to remit more, households with lower
income tend to receive more remittances, both the likelihood of remitting and remittance
size are positively related to the degree of proximity between the migrants and the remain-
ing household members in the source country and the relationship between migrant worker
remittances and the length of stay in the host country might be non-monotonic over time.
It also demonstrates that when forgone household labor income is taken into account the
individual migrant remittance is a non-increasing function of household migration size. The
main ﬁndings in the empirical part of this paper are generally supportive of the predictions
of the model.
Future research related with remittances might be focused on the consequences of re-
mittances for developing countries. Remittances may prove poverty-alleviating and reduce
inequality, either directly through ﬂows to the poor, if not the poorest, or indirectly through
a stimulant eﬀect on the local economy. Moreover, remittances may have long-term eﬀects
by overcoming liquidity constraints and allowing investment in the education and health
care of receiving families. Similarly, remittances create a stable source of income which
has a positive eﬀect on exchange reserves and the balance of payments and might enhance
ﬁnancial development in small cities or towns of the source country. As foreign exchange
inﬂow, remittances enter the economy in a diﬀerent way than private capital inﬂows, for-
eign investment or ﬁnancial aid, and, until now, there is no systematic study for a better
understanding of those diﬀerences. In fact, macroeconomic eﬀects remain poorly modeled
and poorly understood. Particularly lacking are models that may facilitate the evaluation
of both migration and remittance eﬀects. However, many nations, like Ecuador, presume
major beneﬁts from remittance inﬂow and some actively promote additional ﬂow, both
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through eﬀorts to lower transfer fees and through oﬀers of alternatives for investment with
government and international agency support.
In the third chapter, we investigate the impact of Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war
(1960-1996) on educational outcomes of individuals. The empirical identiﬁcation strategy
uses a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach by comparing the diﬀerence in the schooling of co-
horts who were school age during the three periods of the war with those who had completed
school age by 1960 in departments that experienced higher and lower war intensity. Besides
including ﬁxed eﬀects for an individuals department of residence and year of birth, we also
include interactions between year of birth indicators and the 1964 enrollment rate as well
as interactions between year of birth indicators and the availability of water and electricity
in a department in 1964. These interactions allow us to control for diﬀerences in pre-war
levels of education and human development in higher and lower war intensity departments
that may have inﬂuenced levels and trends in educational attainment in these departments
even in the absence of the war.
We ﬁnd a strong negative impact of the civil war on the education of rural Mayan
males and females, which supports the conclusion that internal armed conﬂict reinforces
poverty and social exclusion among the most vulnerable groups. Among rural Mayan males,
those who were school age during the three periods of the civil war in departments where
more human rights violations were committed completed 0.27, 0.71, and 1.09 years less of
schooling respectively whereas rural Mayan females exposed to the three periods of the war
completed 0.12, 0.47, and 1.17 years less of schooling respectively. Given an average of 4.66
and 3.83 years of schooling for males and females, these represent declines of 6, 15, and
23 percent for males and 3, 12, and 30 percent for females. Our results are robust to the
inclusion of indicators for department of residence, year of birth, and controls for diﬀerent
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trends in education and human development in war aﬀected and peaceful departments
of Guatemala. Examining grade completion, we ﬁnd that it was primarily due to a lower
likelihood of completing primary school grades that rural Mayan males and females received
less schooling as a result of the war. This result is not surprising since only 25 percent of the
population in Guatemala receive more than a primary education. Finally, we ﬁnd that rural
Mayan males and females who were primary school age during post-war years in higher war
intensity departments were more likely to complete each of grades 1 through 6 or higher,
suggesting that at least primary school outcomes improved immediately after the war for
the two groups most aﬀected by it.
That the war had a negative impact on the education of males and females among the
most disadvantaged group shows that it worsened the position of rural Mayans amongst the
poorest groups by deteriorating their educational attainment. The war may have reinforced
already existing gender, regional, sectoral, and ethnic diﬀerences in educational outcomes.
Our post-war analysis indicates that at least primary school outcomes improved for rural
Mayan males and females who were school age after the signing of the peace agreement in
December 1996. While this result provides some evidence of post-war recovery, at least in
terms of primary education, we cannot be certain that subsequent cohorts will experience
similar improvements nor that existing educational disparities will be narrowed in the near
future.
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